

GLOBAL VIEWS 2006

The United States and Japan: Responding to the Rise of China and India

Results of a 2006 Multination Survey of Public Opinion



**THE CHICAGO COUNCIL
ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS**

In partnership with

Japan Economic Foundation

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Executive Summary	4
Part I: China and India in a Rising Asia	10
The Rise of China	10
The Rise of India	17
Japan	23
The United States	29
Regional Troublespots	36
Part II: Addressing Global Challenges	39
Methodology	51
Appendix A	53
Appendix B	54
Appendix C	54

Introduction

For more than three decades, the United States and Japan have ranked as the world's two largest economies and have enjoyed a strong strategic and trading partnership. The nature of this relationship, however, is being transformed by the emergence of China and India as potential great powers in the twenty-first century. China and India account for nearly 40 percent of the world's population, and within twenty years will almost certainly join the United States and Japan as two of the world's four largest economies.

China has become a global manufacturing power and has already displaced the United States as Japan's primary trading partner. It is utilizing increased East Asian economic interdependence and skillful diplomacy to co-opt the interests of its neighbors and assert its influence throughout Asia. China's economic and political clout is also increasingly felt well beyond Asia, especially in countries and regions that China regards as important for its growing energy needs. Its military spending has aroused concern in Japan and the United States. In the United States there is a far-reaching debate as to whether there is a "China threat" and whether cooperation or containment is the right long-term approach toward China. China-Japan relations are strained by a combination of economic nationalism, security tensions, and lingering historical animosities.

While India occupies a lower profile in the United States and Japan as an emerging economic

and political power, it is quickly assuming a new prominence in global affairs. Many in the United States and Japan regard India as a critical player in the long-term Asian balance of power. While the Indian government has resisted being a party to containment of China, it is pursuing a strategic partnership with the United States. At the same time, China and India are developing stronger ties with each other, having developed healthy two-way trade and worked hard to manage border disputes.

The rise of these powers will impact the U.S.-Japan economic and geostrategic relationships by creating new poles of power and influence in international trade and politics and within international institutions. The rise of China is particularly relevant for the future direction of the U.S.-Japan relationship given the high level of bilateral tension between China and Japan, the uncertainty over the North Korean nuclear program, and the U.S. commitment to defend Japan from attack. Despite concerns over China's economic and military growth, many in the United States and Japan argue that the best approach to dealing with China, and to a lesser extent India, is not a policy of attempted containment, but active engagement to facilitate sustained economic development. This, it is argued, would lead to long-term political stability in China and India and more cooperative approaches to addressing critical international problems such as failing states, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, climate change, energy and resource compe-

tion, transnational health threats, and barriers to open global trade.

One of the key factors influencing policymaking in these countries will be public opinion. It is critical to develop a better understanding of how the publics in the United States, Japan, China, and India view the rise of China and India and how the United States and Japan should respond. Should the United States and Japan help China and India to develop? What foreign policy tools do Americans want the United States to employ in responding to emerging challenges? What are perceptions of the U.S. military presence in Asia? How will the U.S. strategic relationship with Japan be influenced by the rise of China? What are Japanese and Chinese attitudes towards their bilateral relationship and how might tensions be resolved? What are Chinese and Indian perceptions of their nations' international challenges and opportunities and their respective roles as emerging great powers? Are there areas of potential collaboration to address transnational problems?

In order to shed light on attitudes in these important areas, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, working in partnership with the Japan Economic Foundation, has sponsored a study of U.S. and Asian public opinion on the rise of China and India and its implications for the international order. The survey includes polling undertaken by The Chicago Council in the United States, China, and India, with a parallel survey carried out by the Japan Economic Foundation in Japan. This report focuses on the comparative analysis of American, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese public attitudes on a wide range of issues. In addition, The Chicago Council, working together with the Asia Society, has issued a separate report that includes a more detailed analysis of the U.S. survey results, together with the China and India data and the results of parallel surveys in South Korea and Australia conducted by the East Asia Institute and the Lowy Institute for International Policy, respectively.

This report also serves as a counterpart to the separate U.S.-Japan Binational Study Group report "Engaging China and India: An Economic Agenda for Japan and the United States" sponsored by The Chicago Council, the Japan Economic Foundation,

and the Pacific Council for International Policy. The Study Group, comprised of American and Japanese leaders and experts, focused on ways the United States and Japan can cooperate to create "win-win" opportunities with China and India in trade and capital flows, technology and innovation, and energy and the environment. The Binational Study Group report can be accessed on the Web sites of the three organizations.

Acknowledgments

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) would like to express our great appreciation to the many organizations and individuals who contributed in different ways to this report.

We would like to thank the members of The Chicago Council's project team, who contributed at every phase of the study's development. This year's project team included Catherine Hug, president of Hug Communications; Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA); Mike Kulma, associate director, Policy and National Programs, Asia Society; Benjamin I. Page, Gordon Scott Fulcher Professor of Decision Making in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University; Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, director, South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Dali Yang, professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

At The Chicago Council, special recognition is due to Christopher Whitney, executive director for studies, who had overall responsibility for developing and implementing The Chicago Council study and who worked diligently with the Japan Economic Foundation on this report. We also want to thank Silvia Veltcheva, who served as project coordinator, for her excellent work in carrying out this project. David Tully of Northwestern University played a critical role in developing the topline reports, analyzing the survey results, and fact-checking the report. Chicago Council staff and interns, including Jo Heindel, Andy Chen, Anushya Devendra, Felicity Vabulas, Keith Weghorst, Baiju Gandhi, Angel Desai, and Leena Al-Arian also worked hard on the project.

The Chicago Council is also grateful to Mike Dennis and Stefan Subias at Knowledge Networks and Lloyd Hetherington and Ilda Islas at Globescan for all the hard work they dedicated to the study.

At the Japan Economic Foundation, we would like to recognize the dedication and energy of the staff, especially Masaru Inoue, director of international affairs, who played the central role on the project, and Asuka Niwa, who assisted him. Both were critical to the success of the comparative public opinion survey study, which is the first such study JEF has conducted.

The Japan Economic Foundation is grateful to Shin Yoshikawa and Nanae Ando at Central Research Services, Inc., a Japanese polling firm that specializes in opinion surveys, for all the hard work they dedicated to the survey.

The project would not have been possible without the generous financial support of several institutions. The Chicago Council is very grateful for the funding provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which has been a core funder of The Chicago Council studies for many years. We are also very thankful for the continued support of the Robert R. McCormick Tribune

Foundation, which has provided critical funding for each of the past three Chicago Council public opinion studies. The Chicago Council is particularly grateful to the Asia Society for both its funding and for its contributions as a partner in developing, implementing, and disseminating the study.

The data from this survey will be placed on deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the Roper Center for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut, and NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago. The data will be available to scholars and other interested professionals. The report will be available on the Internet at www.thechicagocouncil.org and at www.jef.or.jp.

Marshall M. Bouton
President
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Noboru Hatakeyama
Chairman and CEO
Japan Economic Foundation

Executive Summary

Part I: China and India in a Rising Asia

The Rise of China

The Chinese believe their country is a significant and growing power in the world and show strong support for its economic and military rise. They do not appear to be particularly alarmed by potential threats to vital interests except for the spread of epidemic disease, and they consider foreign policy goals related to economic security to be the most important. While people in other countries are more modest in their assessment of China's power and influence, they recognize its growing status. While there is some nervousness about China converting its growing economic power into military power, relations with China are viewed positively, and Americans and Indians want to work together with China to solve regional and world problems.

- Chinese see their influence in the world today as second only to the United States and believe they will pull even with the United States in terms of influence within ten years. They prefer their country to have more influence than any other and highly favor China taking an active part in world affairs. They overwhelmingly view the prospect of China becoming more powerful economically and militarily as positive.

- Chinese view their country fourth behind the United States, Japan, and Germany as a leader in developing new products and technologies and see China rising to second place but not surpassing the United States in ten years in this area. One-half of the Chinese public think China's economy will someday grow to be as large as the U.S. economy.
- The threat of epidemics such as AIDS and avian flu is considered a critical threat by more Chinese than any other assessed threat. Disruption in energy supply is the only other threat considered critical by a majority.
- People in the United States, Japan, and India rate China's influence in the world today lower than do the Chinese themselves. While they see it rising in ten years, all countries see the influence of the United States remaining well ahead.
- Americans are divided about whether China becoming significantly more powerful economically would be mainly positive or negative. Indians are also somewhat divided, but view it mostly positively. However, majorities in the United States and a plurality in India view the growth of Chinese military power as mainly negative. Americans, Japanese, and Indians all support engaging China rather than trying to contain its growth.

- Indians have warmer feelings toward China than Americans or Japanese. Only small percentages trust China “a great deal” to act responsibly in the world, and more people than not in all three countries think China practices unfair trade.
- Asian countries surveyed have a positive view of China’s role in resolving key problems facing Asia, while a plurality of Americans have a negative view. The U.S.-China and China-Japan relationships are seen more as rivalries than partnerships by those on both sides of these relationships, while the China-India relationship is seen as more of a partnership than a rivalry by both sides. A majority of Americans and Japanese think China and India are rivals.
- Japanese and Chinese agree that bilateral tensions can be resolved, with a majority of Japanese saying that both countries need to compromise more and a majority of Chinese saying that Japan needs to compromise more.
- Indians favor an active role for India in world affairs and see the prospect of becoming more powerful economically and militarily as mainly positive. Three-quarters favor gaining a seat in the UN Security Council.
- Like the Chinese, Indians feel quite threatened by potential epidemic diseases, but also show significant concern about international terrorism, unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, tensions with neighboring Pakistan, and Islamic fundamentalism.
- The highest foreign policy priorities according to the Indian public are combating international terrorism and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons along with economic concerns: protecting jobs, promoting economic growth, and securing adequate energy supplies. Combating world hunger also places high.

The Rise of India

Indians are bullish on their country’s role in Asia and the world and on its prospects for the future, but still look to the United States as the world’s leader. While their self-assessment is more modest than that of the Chinese, Indians already see themselves as more influential in the world than China and as gaining on the United States. India is, in many respects, well regarded by people in the United States, China, and Japan and is recognized as a country on the rise. India is, however, still in the shadow of China and, to a lesser, extent Japan.

- Indians view their influence in the world today and in Asia as ahead of China and second only to the United States. They also view themselves as a leader in developing new products and technologies, again, only behind the United States.
- In ten years they see themselves as gaining on the United States in terms of influence in the world and innovation, but do not believe they will equal or surpass the United States.
- Among the publics in China, Japan, and the United States, India places at the bottom of the list of nine countries asked about in terms of world influence today. In ten years, India’s influence is seen as rising, but not by much, placing India last again in almost all cases.
- India is also not recognized as a leading source of innovation today, and while it is seen as rising more than other countries in ten years, it still places low compared to other countries.
- Feelings toward India are warmer among Chinese than among Americans or Japanese. Chinese and Americans view India’s economic rise as mainly positive. India is also recognized as a fair trader by the Chinese and Japanese, but not by Americans.
- Trust of India is generally low, though the Chinese mistrust the United States more. Roughly one-half of people in the United States and China think India is playing a positive role in resolving problems facing Asia, while Japanese tilt toward viewing India as playing a negative role.
-

Japan

Despite having the world's second largest economy, Japanese do not view themselves as among the world's top five most influential countries. However, they show strong support for international engagement and see their country as playing a significant role in Asia. While they already recognize China's influence as greater than their own, they are optimistic about Japan's future influence and see it as a global technology leader. The view of Japan by others differs widely among the surveyed countries. While historical legacy casts a shadow on Japan's relations with China, views among Americans and Indians are much more positive.

- While Japanese see the United States, the EU, Russia, Great Britain, China, and France as having more influence than Japan in the world today, they believe their influence is growing and that they will surpass France, Great Britain, and Russia in influence ten years from now. Three-quarters of Japanese believe their country should take an active part in world affairs.
- Japanese view themselves as third behind the United States and China in influence in Asia. As a leader in the development of new products and technologies, Japanese see themselves as second behind only the United States. While they see the United States declining as an innovator in ten years, they still see the United States as first and Japan maintaining its second-place position.
- Japanese show concern about threats to their quality of life such as global warming, disruption in energy supply, and the threat of AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics.
- Several international security concerns are also considered threats to Japan's vital interests by a majority of Japanese: international terrorism, the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, and instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

- Chinese show very cool feelings toward Japan, have little trust in its actions, and think relations with Japan are worsening. Nevertheless, a plurality of Chinese think Japan is playing a positive role in resolving problems in Asia and only a very small number of Chinese think differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved.
- Americans and Indians have warm feelings toward Japan and a favorable impression of its trade practices. Both see relations with Japan as the same or improving and view it as a responsible and reliable actor in the world. Three-quarters of Americans say the United States and Japan are partners rather than rivals. They also support Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, a plurality of Americans now think China is more important than Japan.

The United States: The View from Asia

The countries surveyed regard the United States as the most important player in the world today, for the next ten years, and in Asia today. However, they are concerned about the reliability and responsibility of the United States and do not believe that U.S. power will remain dominant over the longer term. Many, especially the Chinese, are uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence in the region.

- Chinese, Japanese, and Indians see U.S. influence today as substantially above any other country and do not predict much of a decline in influence over the next ten years, even as others gain in influence. In fifty years, a majority in all three countries believes another nation will become as powerful or surpass the United States in power.
- Feelings toward the United States overall are warm, though Chinese feelings are much more neutral. The United States ranks next to last of fifteen countries asked about in China.
- Chinese and Indians want the United States to have less influence in the world than it does now, but think it would be mainly negative if the

United States became significantly less powerful economically than it is now. Chinese also think it would also be mainly negative if the United States became significantly less powerful militarily than it is now, though a plurality of Indians think it would be mainly positive.

- Asians agree with most Americans that the Iraq war has not reduced the threat of terrorism, will not lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East, and has worsened relations with the Muslim world. Trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world is high among Japanese, but low among Chinese and Indians. Chinese and Japanese view U.S. trade practices negatively, while a plurality of Indians view it positively.
- The United States is also seen as having more influence in Asia than any other country and is viewed as playing a positive role in resolving key problems facing Asia.
- Nevertheless, Chinese and Japanese are clearly against the U.S. military presence in Asia, preferring fewer U.S. bases overall and opposing bases in Japan. They also think the U.S. military presence in East Asia decreases stability and want it decreased. Indians are more ambivalent on all accounts.

Regional Troublespots

Potential conflicts between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, and North and South Korea do not generate great concern among most respondents in this study.

- Relatively small numbers of Americans, Japanese, and Indians view the China-Taiwan conflict as a critical threat. A solid majority of Americans oppose using U.S. troops to defend Taiwan.
- Only in Japan do a large number of people view the threat on the Korean Peninsula as critical or as potential source of conflict in the future.

Part II: Addressing Global Challenges

Nuclear Proliferation

- Majorities in the United States, Japan, and India consider the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers as a critical threat. Less than one-third of Chinese are of the same opinion. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is considered a very important foreign policy goal by a majority in all these countries.
- Americans, Japanese, and Indians believe a country should have the right to go to war with another country if it has strong evidence the country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that might be used against it in the future. The Chinese are divided. However, respondents in all these countries agree that the United Nations has the right to authorize force to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Environment and Epidemic Diseases

- Global warming is a big concern in all countries surveyed, with Japanese showing the greatest sense of alarm. Only small percentages believe the evidence for global warming is so weak that no action with economic costs should be taken. Japanese, Americans, and Chinese agree that action should be taken now even if it involves substantial economic costs. Indians prefer to take a lower-cost, more gradual approach.
- Concern about the threat of AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics is very high in Asian countries surveyed, especially China, where it is the top threat. Americans are the least concerned, with less than one-half seeing this as a critical threat.

Energy

- Disruption in energy supply ranks near the top of the list of critical threats in all countries surveyed except India. Securing adequate supplies of energy is also considered a very important foreign policy goal by majorities in all these countries.
- Americans, Japanese, Chinese, and Indians say competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas will be a somewhat or very likely source of conflict between major powers in Asia in the future. Large majorities in the United States, China, and India also say it is somewhat or very important that their countries work together to reduce competition over energy resources.
- Nevertheless, Chinese and Indians think countries should have the right to go to war with another country to preserve access to vital resources such as energy. Americans are split on the issue, and Japanese oppose nations having this right.

Economic Security, Globalization, and Trade

- Globalization is seen as mostly good by majorities in all countries surveyed. The majorities saying this in Japan and China are extremely high, while the majority in India is small. Americans fall in between.
- Majorities in all countries surveyed think international trade is good for their countries' economies, consumers, companies, and their own standards of living. While Chinese, Japanese, and Indians also think international trade is good for creating jobs in their countries and for job security for their countries' workers, Americans clearly think trade is bad for both.
- The trading practices of China and the United States are generally seen as unfair. India is generally seen as practicing fair trade. Americans think Japan practices fair trade; Chinese disagree.

- Americans, Japanese, Chinese, and Indians (to a lesser extent) favor complying with adverse WTO rulings.
- Support is generally high in Asia for free trade agreements with other countries. Chinese, Japanese, and Indians all support agreements with the United States and each other (where asked). Americans, however, oppose free trade agreements with all except Japan, where a plurality is in favor.
- Strong majorities of Chinese and Japanese support an East Asian free trade area that includes China, Japan, and South Korea.
- Majorities of Chinese and Indians think there will be greater economic integration among Asian countries in the future. Pluralities in both countries also think there will be political integration similar to what is occurring among European countries. Japanese disagree on both accounts.

Human Rights

- All publics think the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide.
- Chinese, Japanese, and Americans believe rules against torture should be maintained, while a plurality of Indians think governments should now be allowed to use torture if they may gain information that saves innocent lives.
- Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations is the lowest-ranking foreign policy goal in the countries where the question was asked (Japan, the United States, and India).

Multilateralism and the Use of Force

- All publics think their countries should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if they have to go along with a policy that is not their first choice. Majorities in all

countries also favor steps to strengthen the United Nations, including giving it the power to regulate the international arms trade, having a standing UN peacekeeping force, giving it authority to go into countries to investigate human rights violations, and creating an international marshals service that could arrest leaders responsible for genocide.

- Support is also strong for multilateral uses of force through the United Nations. In addition to the case of genocide discussed above, there is support for the UN Security Council authorizing force to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups, to defend a country that has been

attacked, and to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons. All support the UN Security Council having the right to authorize the use of force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

- All countries surveyed also support the right of a country to go to war if another country attacks it first, to maintain territorial integrity, and if it has evidence that it is in imminent danger of being attacked. All but Japan support the right to go to war to stop a neighboring country from supporting an insurgency within their own country.

Part I: China and India in a Rising Asia

The Rise of China

From a Cold War rival with the West in the global divide between communism and democracy, China has evolved into a new kind of power, unleashing its economic potential through privatization—one-half of its economy is now privately owned—while maintaining the one-party system. With significant foreign investment from the West flowing into China and massive exports and loans from China flowing in the opposite direction, the fates of China and the world's other economic powers are now inextricably linked. Our study shows that the Chinese are well aware of their rising position and welcome it with open arms. It also shows that other countries do not consider China's influence to be as high as do the Chinese themselves, but do recognize its growing status and appear to be comfortable with China rising as an economic power. While there is some nervousness about China converting its growing economic clout into military power, relations with China are viewed positively, and other countries want to work together with China to solve regional and world problems.

The Chinese Worldview

The Chinese public views China's current position in the world very positively and expresses a high level of support for its rise both as an economic and

military power. They are confident that in the near future China will match the United States' level of world influence, and most, though certainly not all, think China will catch up with the United States economically.

The Chinese express unreserved enthusiasm for China playing an active role in the world and increasing its power and influence. Eighty-seven percent favor China taking an active part in world affairs, with just 7% saying it should stay out of world affairs.

Asked about China's level of influence in the world today on a scale of 0 to 10 (see Figure I-1), the Chinese see their country as quite influential, with a mean rating of 7.8, second only to the United States (8.6). They view Russia as next most influential (7.4), followed by the EU (7.1). Japan (6.7) ranks lower than Germany (6.9), Britain (6.9), and France (6.8), with India at the bottom (6.1). The Chinese see their level of influence in Asia as even higher (8.0)—tied with the United States as the most influential. Russia again comes next (7.1), this time followed by Japan (6.8, see Appendix B).

Asked what levels of world influence they would like countries to have on a scale of 0 to 10, on average they would like China to rise from 7.8 to 8.9 and for the United States to drift down from 8.6 to 7.1, on par with the level they desire for the European Union (7.2). They would like to see India's influence in the world to rise to 6.5 and Japan's to decline to 5.6 on this scale.

**Figure I-1 – Influence of Countries in the World:
The Chinese View**

Ratings by Chinese of how much influence in the world the following countries have now, should have, and will have ten years from now (see also Appendix A). Mean levels on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not influential at all and 10 meaning extremely influential.

	Has now	Should have	Will have ten years from now	Difference between has now and will have
United States	8.6	7.1	8.3	-0.3
China	7.8	8.9	8.3	+0.5
Russia	7.4	na	7.5	+0.1
European Union	7.1	7.2	7.3	+0.2
Germany	6.9	na	7.1	+0.2
Great Britain	6.9	na	7.0	+0.1
France	6.8	na	7.0	+0.2
Japan	6.7	5.6	6.7	0
India	6.1	6.5	6.5	+0.4

When asked about the prospect of China becoming significantly more powerful economically than it is today, an overwhelming 91% of Chinese see this as mostly positive. Likewise, when asked about the prospect of China becoming more powerful militarily, an overwhelming majority (90%) of Chinese think this would be mainly positive. There is enthusiasm for Chinese culture to spread around the world: 91% see it as a good thing.

The Chinese also believe they can match U.S. global influence. Asked what they think will occur in the next ten years, they predict that China's influence will rise, on average, to 8.3—matching the level of influence they predict for the United States (see Figure I-1). Asked what will be the case in fifty years, only 23% of the Chinese believe that the United States will continue to be the world's leading power (the lowest percentage among the publics of all countries surveyed). Sixty percent believe that another nation will become as powerful as the United States (33%) or that the United States will be surpassed by another nation (27%).

The Chinese public is not, however, as confident that they will catch up with the U.S. as a technology leader (see Figure I-2). Asked to rate them-

selves today in terms of how much they are leaders in developing new products and technologies, the Chinese give themselves a 7.2 on average, behind the United States (8.5), Japan (7.5), and Germany (7.4). Ten years from now they see themselves rising, on average, to 7.9—overtaking the Japanese (7.7) and the Germans (7.6), but still lagging behind the level they forecast for the United States (8.6).

In the long run, most Chinese, though not quite a majority, believe China will catch up economically. Asked if they think it is more likely that someday China's economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy or that the U.S. economy will always stay larger than China's, 50% of the Chinese public say that China will catch up with the United States, while 38% think that it will not (12% are unsure).

Those who say they believe that China will catch up were also asked to estimate how many years this would take. The median response among those respondents is more than twenty years. This relatively modest perception of China's economic position is also reflected in the fact that most Chinese are unaware that China is loaning the United States much more money than the United States is loaning China. Only 14% of Chinese know that China loans more to the United States. Thirty percent assume that the United States loans more to China, 15% assume the amounts are about equal, and 41% are unsure. Incidentally, most Americans aren't aware of this either, with 42% believing that the United

**Figure I-2 – Leaders in Innovation:
The Chinese View**

Ratings by Chinese on how much the following countries are leaders in developing new products and technologies. Mean levels on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all a leader and 10 meaning very much a leader.

Country as a leader in innovation	Now	In ten years	Difference
U.S.	8.5	8.6	+0.1
Japan	7.5	7.7	+0.2
Germany	7.4	7.6	+0.2
China	7.2	7.9	+0.7
South Korea	7.1	7.4	+0.3
India	5.8	6.4	+0.6

States loans more to China rather than the other way around (24%).

Chinese Foreign Policy Priorities

Though the Chinese see their country as on the rise as a world power and express enthusiasm for this development, it is striking that when asked about what Chinese foreign policy priorities should be—in terms of goals and threats—concerns related to world power status do not come out on top. Rather, there is much more concern about issues related to economic security and quality of life, probably reflecting both the emphasis of Chinese leaders over almost thirty years on economic improvement and the more recent concern of the Chinese public with some of the unintended consequences and limitations of economic growth such as a worsening environment.

When presented with a list of eleven foreign policy goals, economic concerns are seen as “very important” by many more Chinese than other types of concerns (see Figure I-4). Protecting the jobs of Chinese workers places highest, seen as very important by 71% of Chinese. This is followed by promoting economic growth (64% very important) and securing adequate energy supplies (61%). At the bottom of the list—seen as very important by just 40%—is the goal of building superior military power in Asia, the step most often associated with a nation seeking world power status.

Some “global power” goals do still receive majority support as very important. Combating international terrorism places fourth (55% very important), and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons places seventh (52% very important). However, this does not necessarily imply an enthusiasm for China playing a prominent unilateral role, as close behind is strengthening the United Nations, which 51% see as very important.

Asked to rate a list of threats to the vital interests of China, only two are considered critical by a majority of Chinese. Chinese again cite quality-of-life issues as paramount (see Figure I-3). In first place, with 65% calling the threat critical, is AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics, followed

by disruption in energy supply, with 54% calling it critical. Another environmental issue—global warming—is in third place, with 47% calling it critical. Only in fourth place does a traditional great power issue appear—international terrorism, with 42% calling it critical. It is followed by another—the U.S. military presence in Asia—with 38% seeing it as critical.

China’s Strategic Position: The View from Outside

Just as the Chinese view themselves as a power on the rise, so, too, do other Asian nations we surveyed and the United States—though in more modest terms. While the Chinese already rank themselves second behind the United States on the 10-point scale of world influence today (at 7.8 on average to the United States’ 8.6), Americans rank China third behind their country and Great Britain (and even with Japan at 6.4). Indians rank it fifth (at 6.0) behind the United States, their own country, Japan, and Russia. Japanese see China as tied with France for fifth (at 5.6), behind the United States, the EU, Russia, and Great Britain.

In terms of influence within Asia, Chinese rank China’s influence today even with the United States, while Japanese rank it second after the United States and Indians rank it fourth, on par with Russia.

Looking to the future, no country sees China in ten years as overtaking the United States in terms of world influence. While the Chinese see themselves as pulling even with the United States (rising from 7.8 to 8.3), the other nations surveyed see China’s influence rising more modestly, with the United States staying clearly ahead. Americans see China’s influence rising from 6.4 to 6.8 (putting China second behind the United States’ 8.0). Indians see China rising from 6.0 to 6.2, moving it ahead of Russia, even with Japan, but still behind the United States and India. Japanese believe China will rise from 5.6 to 6.0, moving it into third position out of the nine countries asked, behind the United States and the EU (see Figure I-5 and Appendix A).

Looking further ahead, fifty years from now, however, a majority in every country surveyed

Figure I-3 – Critical Threats to China’s Vital Interests

Percentage of Chinese who view each of the following as a critical threat to Chinese vital interests in the next ten years.





Figure I-4 – Chinese Foreign Policy Goals

Percentage of Chinese who view each of the following as a very important foreign policy goal for China.




believes either that “another nation”—presumably China or India—will become as powerful as the United States or that the United States will be surpassed in power by another nation (as opposed to the United States continuing to be the world’s leading power, see Figure I-27). While relatively small numbers predict that the United States will be sur-

passed (from a low of 16% among Americans to 27% among Chinese), a total of 60% of Chinese, 56% of Japanese, 55% of Americans, and 53% of Indians believes another nation will be *at least* as powerful.

When it comes to the specific question of whether China will catch up with the United States economically, Americans are more confident that

Figure I-5 – China’s Influence in the World

Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think China has in the world today, how much they think it will have in the world in ten years, and how much they want it to have (see also Appendix A). 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.



China will catch up than the Chinese themselves. Sixty percent of Americans say it is more likely that someday China’s economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy than that the U.S. economy will always stay larger than China’s. Only one-half (50%) of the Chinese are as confident. Indians are quite uncertain: Only 22% believe that China will catch up, and 36% say the United States’ economy will remain larger, while a large 42% say they do not know.

Among Americans who believe that China will catch up, the median estimate of how long this will take is twenty years. The median respondent in India believes that it will never occur.

In terms of China’s leadership in developing new products and technologies, all countries surveyed believe China is improving, though none see China overtaking the United States in the next ten years. While the Chinese are the most optimistic, seeing themselves rise from a mean 7.2 to 7.9 on the 10-point scale, the mean perception among Indians is that China will rise from 6.2 to 6.5 (moving ahead of Japan but still behind India and the United States), while Americans see it rising from 5.5 to 6.1 (behind the United States and Japan). Japanese have a more

modest impression of China’s role as an innovator, ranking it last out of six countries, with a mean of 3.4. While they anticipate China improving to 4.6 in 10 years, this is still quite low, above only South Korea.

While the Chinese overwhelmingly see the way the Chinese government manages its economy and its political system as more of an advantage than a disadvantage for China (78% see it as an advantage), less than one-half, though still a plurality, of Americans (49% to 41%) and Indians (46% to 23%) see this as an advantage for China.

Responding to the Rise of China

Americans, Japanese, and Indians are not of the mind that their countries should actively work to try to prevent the rise of China. Large majorities of Japanese (72%) and Americans (65%) believe that in dealing with China’s power their countries should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China rather than actively work to limit the growth of China’s power. Among Indians, a plurality (40% to 23%) concurs.

Nonetheless, people have complex feelings about the rise of China. While there is largely a sanguine response about the economic rise of China, there is apparent anxiety about the potential for China to rise militarily. Few countries prefer to see China’s influence increase, and some would prefer it to decrease.

When respondents were asked about the prospect of China becoming significantly more powerful economically than it is today, this produced a relatively unconcerned response (see Figure I-6). In the United States, views are evenly divided between those who see this as mainly positive (47%) and mainly negative (46%). A plurality of Indians (46% to 39%) see it as mainly positive (15% did not answer).

Americans and Indians were also asked how positive or negative it would be if China were to catch up with the United States economically. There are strikingly low levels of concern about this prospect. Only about one in three in both countries sees this as mostly negative (U.S. 33%, India 31%), but more Indians see this as mostly positive (28%)

than do Americans (9%). A majority of Americans (54%) cluster around the view that this would be equally positive and negative, a view taken by 20% of Indians.

By contrast, the prospect of China becoming significantly more powerful militarily than it is today elicits a much different response (see Figure I-6). A large majority of Americans (75%) see this as mainly negative, as do a modest plurality (46%) of Indians (40% of Indians think it would be mainly positive).

There seems to be some concern that the rise of Chinese military power will be destabilizing in Asia. Asked how likely it is that the growth of Chinese military power will be a potential source of conflict between major powers in Asia, 94% of Japanese say it is likely (58% very likely, 36% somewhat likely), as do 88% of Americans (50% very, 38% somewhat) and 72% of Indians (39% very, 33% somewhat).

When other nations are asked to evaluate the development of China as a world power as a potential threat, large numbers, though not majorities, of China's immediate neighbors perceive this as a crit-

ical threat. Among Japanese, 45% see the development of China as a world power as a critical threat to Japan, ranking it seventh out of fourteen threats. Forty-three percent of Indians concur.


Fewer Americans perceive the rise of China as a critical threat to their vital interests. Among Americans, 36% perceive it as a critical threat, relatively unchanged from 2004, but substantially lower than it was in the 1990s through 2002. In the current survey it ranks ninth out of thirteen threats.

When asked how much influence they would like China to have in the world on a 10-point scale, respondents in the countries surveyed other than China prefer China's influence to remain below that of the United States, though mean levels vary. Interestingly, the Indians would prefer China's influence to increase slightly from 6.0 to 6.2, though this places China third in influence behind their own country and the United States, and even with Japan. But Japanese and Americans would prefer to see China's influence decrease significantly, from 5.6 to 4.0 and 6.4 to 4.6, respectively.

Japanese and Indians seem to be divided about whether it is mainly a good thing or a bad thing for Chinese culture to spread around the world. Equal percentages of Japanese (50%) say it is good and say it is bad, and 43% of Indians say it is a good thing, while 40% say it is a bad thing.

Figure I-6 – Increase in China's Power


Percentage in each country who believe it is mainly positive or mainly negative for China to become significantly more powerful economically and militarily.



Attitudes about China

To understand the complexity of feelings about the rise of China, views of China and China's external behavior may provide insight. While warmth of feelings toward China vary, trust in China's foreign policy behavior is low, and China is widely perceived as unfair in trade. However, Japanese and Indians tend to perceive China as a constructive player in Asia.

Asked to rate their feelings toward China on a 100-degree "feeling thermometer," where fifty is neutral, Indians express fairly warm feelings (see Figure I-7), giving China a mean of 54. However, China receives a fairly cool 40 from Americans and a quite cool 30 from the Japanese.



In keeping with the wariness about China's rise, trust in China is not very high overall. Asked how much they trust China to act responsibly in the world, majorities in Japan (83%) and the United States (58%) say they trust China not at all or not very much. Indians also lean in the direction of mistrust, with 49% saying they trust China not at all or not very much, and 42% saying they trust China somewhat or a great deal.

Asked how much they trust China to take the interests of their country into account when making foreign policy decisions, 75% of Japanese and 60% of Americans say not very much or not at all. Indians, though, are more divided, with 46% saying they trust the Chinese not very much or not at all, and 43% saying somewhat or a great deal.

Asked how much they trust China to keep its commitments, 83% of Japanese and 58% of

Americans say not very much or not at all. Once again, the Indians are divided, with 49% showing low levels of trust and 43% trusting China somewhat or a great deal.

China has quite a poor image in terms of its fairness in trade. Majorities in Japan (68%) and the United States (58%) believe that it practices unfair trade. Indians are divided (34% fair, 36% unfair). It may be significant that China enjoys a trade surplus with all these countries, although the bilateral Japan-China trade imbalance is quite small.

Contrary to many of the negative views Japanese have towards China, there is a positive view in Japan of China's role in resolving key problems in Asia (see Figure I-8). Fifty-two percent believe that China is playing a very or somewhat positive role. Sixty-two percent of Indians agree. A plurality of Americans, though (47%), have a negative view.

Overall, the character of China's relations with other countries is seen as at least staying the same, if not improving. Fifty percent of Indians say their relations with China are improving. Pluralities in United States say they are staying about the same, though many more say relations with China are improving (30%) than worsening (17%).

Nevertheless, roughly equal percentages of Chinese and Americans (52% and 49%, respectively) view their two countries as mostly rivals, with 39% of Chinese and 41% of Americans viewing their countries as mostly partners. Japanese very strongly see China and the United States as rivals (83% rivals and 17% partners). Indians are divided as to whether they think China and the United States are rivals or partners (42% rivals and 43% partners).

The China-Japan relationship is also viewed as a rivalry on both sides, with a strong majority of Japanese (86%) and 65% of Chinese saying so. The China-India relationship, however, is viewed much more positively on both sides. A plurality of Indians (46%) view India and China as mostly partners (38% rivals). Chinese are even more positive, with 56% seeing the relationship with India as a partnership rather than a rivalry (30%). Interestingly, large majorities of Japanese (68%) and Americans (66%) think that China and India are rivals (see Figure I-9).







Figure I-9 – Partners or Rivals

Percentage of respondents in each country who say the following countries are rivals or partners.

Mostly rivals Mostly partners



Despite the clear rivalry between Japan and China, Japanese and Chinese agree that bilateral tensions can be resolved. A majority of Japanese (56%) feel that both countries need to compromise more in order to resolve tensions, compared to only 19% who feel that China needs to change its policies to resolve tensions, 9% who believe that Japan needs to change its policies to resolve tensions, and 16% who believe that tensions cannot be resolved. Only 12% of Chinese believe the differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved.

This compares to 84% who think that tensions can be resolved if one or both countries would compromise (53% think that Japan needs to change its policies to resolve tensions, 28% believe both sides need to compromise more, and 3% say China needs to change its policies).

The Rise of India

In the past decade, India's economic growth has placed it among the fastest-growing countries in the world. Its nuclear explosions have underlined its military presence, and its relations with the United States and with Asian countries beyond the immediate South Asian periphery have become much more active. Our study shows Indians see India as an influential, rising nation, but still look to the United States as the world's leader. The study also shows that popular perceptions of India in the United States and in Asia only partially reflect the change that has taken place. India is in many respects well regarded and is seen as a country on the rise. However, it is also still in the shadow of China and to a lesser extent Japan.¹

The Indian Worldview

Like the Chinese, Indians are bullish on their country's role in Asia and the world and on its prospects for the future. While their self-assessment is more modest than that of the Chinese, Indians already see themselves as more influential in the world than China and as gaining on the United States.

Indians have a high estimate of their role in the world today. When rating India's influence in the world on a 10-point scale (see Figure I-10), the mean response is 6.3, placing India second only to the United States (7.3) and roughly on par with Japan (6.2) and slightly ahead of China (6.0).

Indians also believe their country has a large

1. It is important to bear in mind when interpreting the Indian results that even controlling for education, larger numbers of Indians answered that they "don't know" or provide no answer on many questions than their counterparts elsewhere. It is therefore difficult to obtain majority opinions on some issues. The size and shape of pluralities may be more instructive.

**Figure I-10 – Influence of Countries in the World:
The Indian View**

Ratings by Indians of how much influence in the world the following countries have now, should have, and will have ten years from now (see also Appendix A). Mean levels on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not influential at all and 10 meaning extremely influential.

	Has now	Should have	Will have ten years from now	Difference between has now and will have
U.S.	7.3	6.7	7.2	-0.1
India	6.3	7.0	6.6	+0.3
Japan	6.2	6.2	6.2	0
Russia	6.2	na	6.1	-0.1
China	6.0	6.2	6.2	+0.2
Germany	5.8	na	5.9	+0.1
Great Britain	5.7	na	5.8	+0.1
European Union	5.6	5.7	5.9	+0.3
France	5.3	na	5.5	+0.2

and positive influence in Asia today, rating India at an average of 6.3 on the 10-point scale, second only to the rating they give the United States (7.1) and ahead of their rating for China (5.9, see Appendix B). Asked to evaluate India's role in solving problems in Asia, Indians rate themselves more positively than any other country, with 69% saying India plays a positive role (41% very positive, 28% somewhat positive).

**Figure I-11 – Leaders in Innovation:
The Indian View**

Ratings by Indians on how much the following countries are leaders in developing new products and technologies. Mean levels on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all a leader and 10 meaning very much a leader.

Country as a leader in innovation	Now	In ten years	Difference
U.S.	6.8	7.1	+0.3
India	6.4	6.9	+0.5
Japan	6.3	6.4	+0.1
China	6.2	6.5	+0.3
Germany	5.7	5.8	+0.1
South Korea	5.5	5.8	+0.3

Indians want to expand their international role, but this desire is not as unequivocal as it is for the Chinese. A majority (56%) favors India playing an active part in world affairs. Indians would like to see their influence in the world rise from 6.3 to 7.0 (ahead of both the United States, 6.7, and China, 6.2). Solid majorities welcome the prospect of a more militarily and economically powerful India, with 65% and 63% of Indians, respectively, saying these developments would be positive. There is enthusiasm for Indian culture to spread around the world, with 71% seeing it as a good thing. This is less than the 91% of Chinese who feel this way about the spread of their culture. A strong majority of Indians (75%) want India to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Indians express optimism that their influence will grow, putting them in the top tier of nations on both fronts. Asked what they think will occur in the next ten years, they predict that India's influence will rise, on average, from 6.3 to 6.6 on the 10-point scale (see Figure I-10). This is below the influence they project for the United States (7.2), but above where they anticipate China or Japan will be (6.2 for both).

Like the Chinese, Indians believe that another nation will eventually become as powerful as the United States. Asked what will become of U.S. power in fifty years, only 28% say the United States will continue to be the world's leading power (only slightly higher than the 23% who make this assumption in China). Rather, a majority of 53% say that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States (30%) or will surpass it (23%).

In light of the dramatic success of India's information technology industry, it is not surprising that Indians give their country high marks as an innovator (see Figure I-11). Indian respondents rank India at 6.4 on a 10-point scale as a leader in developing new products and technologies. They put themselves behind the United States (6.8) and slightly ahead of China (6.2) and Japan (6.3). Ten years from now, Indians see their country as rising in this area, on average, from 6.4 to 6.9, remaining above where they think China (6.5) or Japan (6.4) will be and approaching the level they forecast for the United States (7.1).

Indian Foreign Policy Priorities

When looking at potential threats to vital interests, Indians appear to be more concerned about regional security threats than their Chinese counterparts, who are more preoccupied with quality of life and economic issues. Of the five issues that the largest share of Indians regard as critical threats to their country's vital interests, four relate directly to regional security problems (see Figure I-12). International terrorism tops the list, with 65% seeing it as critical—presumably related to terrorist attacks that India itself has suffered. The others are linked to India's long-standing, conflict-ridden relationship with its neighbor, Pakistan, including tensions between India and Pakistan (53% critical), the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers (55%), and Islamic fundamentalism (52%).

Nevertheless, Indians are concerned with quality-of-life issues as well. The threat of AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics ranks second as a critical threat (60%). Global warming is considered a critical threat by 51%. No other threat is considered critical by a majority of Indians, though significant numbers of Indians consider disruption in energy supply (43%), the development of China as a world power (43%), and the U.S. military presence in Asia (42%) as critical threats. There is less concern about economic competition, either from the United States or Asian countries, about a confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan, or about instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

In line with their concerns about security threats, Indians consider foreign policy goals that address these threats to be very important, although economic and quality-of-life issues also loom large (see Figure I-13). The goals rated as very important by the largest percentages of Indian respondents are combating international terrorism (60%) and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (56%). While these are also among the top goals of Americans, relatively fewer Indians than Americans see them as critical, by 12 and 18 percentage points, respectively.

Five of the next six goals are related to economics and quality of life: promoting economic growth, combating world hunger, protecting Indian jobs, security adequate supplies of energy, and improving the global environment. In each case, a majority of Indians consider the goal very important. Interestingly, a higher proportion of Chinese (64%) than Indians (54%) believe that promoting economic growth should be a very important foreign policy goal, perhaps reflecting again the higher overall level of confidence and expectation among Chinese about their rise as a new power. By contrast, more Indians than Chinese cite combating world hunger as a very important goal (54% versus 42%), likely reflecting the bigger problem of hunger in India than in China.

Although they appear at the bottom of the list, the goals of strengthening the United Nations and promoting and defending human rights in other countries are still considered very important by roughly one-half of Indians (49% and 48%, respectively).

India's Strategic Position: The View from Outside

Despite Indians' own view that their country is the second most influential power in the world behind the United States in the world today, other countries surveyed do not view India that way. In fact, publics in Japan, China, and the United States all rank India at the bottom of a list of nine countries in terms of world influence, a list that includes countries normally regarded as highly influential in the world—the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the European Union, France, Great Britain, and Germany. The Chinese rate India's influence just below Japan (which may, in turn, be unusually low given bad China-Japan relations), and Americans rate it just below France. In ten years, people in Japan, China, and the United States expect India's influence to rise, but not by much. The Chinese see it rising from an average of 6.1 to 6.5, still placing it last on the list of nine countries asked about. Japanese see it rising from 4.4 to 5.0 and remaining in last place on the list. Americans see it rising from 4.8 to 5.4, surpassing only France. This contrasts

Figure I-12 – Critical Threats to India’s Vital interests

Percentage of Indians who view each of the following as a critical threat to India’s vital interests in the next ten years.





Figure I-13 – Indian Foreign Policy Goals

Percentage of Indians who view each of the following as a very important foreign policy goal for India.



with Indians’ own view that their country will rise from 6.3 to 6.6, though remaining second behind the United States (see Figure I-14 and Appendix A).

Within Asia, India’s influence rates seventh out of nine countries among Chinese, above Australia

and Indonesia, but behind the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the European Union, and South Korea. Japanese have a slightly higher assessment of India’s influence in Asia, ranking it fifth out of nine countries, on par with South Korea, and above

the EU, Australia, and Indonesia among countries asked.

Assessments of India's role as a leader in developing new products and technologies show the same pattern: India is not seen as a top source of innovation among the six countries asked about, all of them looked on as significant innovators: the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and India. India's current role as an innovator comes at the bottom of the list among Chinese and Americans (tied with South Korea among Americans) and as fourth out of six countries for Japanese respondents (ahead of South Korea and China). However, India is seen as becoming more important. Looking ten years into the future, mean ratings of India's expected role as an innovator go from 5.8 to 6.4 among Chinese (up 0.6), from 4.1 to 5.0 among Japanese (up 0.9) and from 3.8 to 4.6 among Americans (up 0.8). For both Chinese and Americans this rise is larger than for any of the other countries on the list, and for Japanese it is the second highest rise after that of China. Nevertheless, India still does not move up relative to other countries according to the Chinese and Japanese, and it only edges out South Korea slightly according to Americans. Again, this contrasts with India's own

view that it is currently second behind the United States as a leader in innovation and will close in on but not yet surpass it in ten years.

Reactions to India's Changing Role


Feelings about India in the surveyed countries vary. When asked to record their views of India on the thermometer scale, Chinese give India a warm average of 62. Feelings among Japanese and Americans are more reserved, at 49 and 46, respectively.


In the United States and China, modest majorities see the expansion of Indian economic power as a mainly positive development (see Figure I-15). A majority welcomes it in China (56% mainly positive) and in the United States (53% mainly positive). Smaller percentages see India's economic rise as mainly negative, with Chinese the least worried (26% mainly negative), followed by Americans (39%). By comparison, the economic rise of China is seen as mainly positive by smaller margins in the United States and India.

The positive view of India's economic power is also evident on the question of India's trade practices. Unlike China, India is generally perceived as practicing fair trade. Majorities in Japan (77%) and China (58%) regard India as a fair trader. Only in the United States is India regarded primarily as an unfair trader (47% unfair, 39% fair). Interestingly, the United States is the only country among those surveyed that imports more from India than it exports. This contrasts with the much more negative view of the trade practices of China, which enjoys a trade surplus with all these countries (see page 16 in *Attitudes about China*).

Opinions are mixed, however, about the prospect of growing Indian military power (see Figure I-15). In China 56% see it as a plus, a surprising finding considering the long-standing India-China rivalry. (The reverse is not true. Indians, by 46% to 40%, regard a more militarily powerful China as mainly negative.) This contrasts with the 69% of Americans who regard India's military buildup negatively.

The level of trust that countries have toward India is generally low, though somewhat divided.





When asked whether they trust India to act responsibly in the world, the overall response is not very positive. In Japan and the United States, fewer than 50% trust India either somewhat or a great deal, and in China 68% say they do not trust India either at all or very much. For both Americans and Japanese, however, trust in India to act responsibly is higher than trust in China.

Respondents in Japan and the United States have similarly low expectations that India will take their country’s interests into account in making foreign policy decisions, with 61% and 53%, respectively, saying they do not trust India either at all or very much. The Chinese are divided, with 46% saying they trust India somewhat or a great deal and 45% saying not at all or not very much. In light of the long-standing rivalry between India and China, it is noteworthy that the Chinese mistrust the United States (58% not at all or not very much) and Japan (67% not at all or not very much) more than India to take Chinese interests into account.

Japanese, Americans, and Chinese are essentially divided about whether they trust India to

keep its commitments, though a small majority of Japanese (52%) and pluralities of Americans (49%) and Chinese (47%) lean toward the negative, saying they trust India not at all or not very much.

On the question of how much influence they want India to have in the world, the Chinese want India to have more influence than it does now (growing from 6.1 to 6.5), more than Japan, but less than China, the European Union, and the United States. Americans want India to have the least amount of influence among the five countries, with Americans preferring India’s current level of influence to decrease (from 4.8 to 4.6, see Figure I-14). Japanese would like India’s influence to remain at approximately its current level (growing slightly from 4.4 to 4.5).

Feelings about whether India is playing a positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia are also somewhat divided. A majority of Japanese (62%) say India’s role is either somewhat or very negative, while pluralities of Americans (50%) and Chinese (48%) say it is either somewhat or very positive (see Figure I-16).

Attitudes toward the possibility of India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council are generally positive, if still somewhat divided (see Figure I-17). Compared to the 75% of Indians who want a seat on the Security Council, a much smaller majority (53%) in the United States favors a permanent Indian seat. In China and Japan,





Figure I-17 – Extending UNSC Membership to India

Percentage in each country who favor or oppose India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.



only pluralities are in favor (37% and 30%, respectively), but substantial numbers of respondents say “it depends” in both countries.

When evaluating their relations with India, very few Americans or Chinese surveyed believe relations with India are worsening. A plurality of 48%

of Americans say relations with India are staying about the same, while a plurality of Chinese (47%) say relations with India are improving.


Overall, Americans and Chinese view their relationship with India as one of partnership rather than rivalry, and Indians themselves concur. Sixty-one percent of Americans and 55% of Indians view the United States and India as mostly partners. Fifty-six percent of Chinese and 46% (a plurality) of Indians view China and India as partners. Contrary to the positive Chinese and Indian views of their own relationship, large majorities of Japanese (68%) and Americans (66%) think that China and India are rivals (see Figure I-18).

Japan

Japan’s sustained economic recession over the past decade, coupled with the rise of China as an economic and political power, has had a significant impact on Japan’s position as a primary economic power in Asia. While Japan still possesses the world’s second largest economy, China has already eclipsed it as a trading partner for many countries. If current growth rates continue, China will surpass Japan in GDP by 2020. Lingering tensions with China and uncertainty over the North Korean nuclear program have also caused concerns in Japan over the security climate in East Asia.

Figure I-18 – Partners or Rivals

Percentage of respondents in each country who say the following countries are rivals or partners.



The Japanese Worldview

Despite having the world’s second largest economy, Japanese do not view themselves as among the world’s top five most influential countries. However, they show strong support for international engagement and see their country as playing a significant role in Asia. While they already recognize China’s influence as greater than their own, they are optimistic about Japan’s future influence and see it as a global technology leader. Japanese show a strong level of interest in international engagement, with 74% saying Japan should take an active part in world affairs. They see their country as being a mid-level global power and significantly less influential than the United States. When asked to rate Japan’s

Figure I-19 – Influence of Countries in the World: The Japanese View

Ratings by Japanese of how much influence in the world the following countries have now, should have, and will have ten years from now (see also Appendix A). Mean levels on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not influential at all and 10 meaning extremely influential.

	Has now	Should have	Will have ten years from now	Difference between has now and will have
United States	8.5	6.4	7.8	-0.7
European Union	6.3	6.3	6.3	--
Russia	5.8	na	5.5	-0.3
Great Britain	5.7	na	5.5	-0.2
China	5.6	4.0	6.0	+0.4
France	5.6	na	5.4	-0.2
Japan	5.3	6.6	5.7	+0.4
Germany	5.2	na	5.4	+0.2
India	4.4	4.5	5.0	+0.6

influence in the world on a 10-point scale, Japanese give a mean response of 5.3, placing Japan seventh out of nine countries asked, ahead of Germany (5.2) and India (4.4) and slightly behind France and China (5.6 each). This compares to their mean score of 8.5 for the United States (see Figure I-19).

Japanese do perceive their country has having a higher level of influence in Asia, rating it an average of 6.0 on the 10-point scale, third behind the United States (7.5) and China (6.3) and ahead of Russia (5.0) and India (4.8). There are, however, divisions among Japanese over the nature of Japan's role in Asia. Fifty percent believe Japan is playing a positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia, and an equal percentage think Japan is playing a negative role.

Similar to Chinese and Indians, Japanese would like to see their influence in the world rise above all other countries. The mean response for the level of global influence they want Japan to have is 6.6, ahead of the United States (6.4), the EU (6.3), India (4.5), and China (4.0). A strong majority of 69% favors Japan obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Japanese are optimistic about the future influence of their country, but do not expect it to grow as significantly as Chinese and Indians anticipate for their countries. On the 10-point scale, Japanese see Japan's influence in the world rising from 5.3 to 5.7 in the next ten years, placing it fourth out of nine countries. This is below the projected level of influence for the United States (7.8), the EU (6.3), and China (6.0), but ahead of Russia (5.5), Great Britain (5.5), Germany (5.4), France (5.4), and India (5.0).

Given Japan's strength as a global technology leader, it is no surprise that it scores well among Japanese as a leader in technological innovation. Japanese rank Japan at 6.6 on a 10-point scale as a leader in developing new products and technologies, behind only the United States at 7.3. They additionally see Japan as maintaining this position over the next ten years.

Like the Chinese and Indians, Japanese believe another nation will eventually become as powerful as the United States in the next fifty years, with 56% saying that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States (39%) or will surpass it (17%). Only 44% believe the United States will continue to be the world's leading power.

Japanese Foreign Policy Priorities

Japanese show concern about threats related to quality-of-life issues and international security. Asked to rate a list of threats to the vital interests of Japan, three quality-of-life-related threats figure prominently (see Figure I-20). Global warming is cited as a critical threat by 82% (the top rated threat overall), and disruption in energy supply (76%) and the threat of AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics (70%) also score high. Several international security concerns are also considered threats to Japan's vital interests by a majority of Japanese: international terrorism (76%), the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers (68%) and instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula (67%). While no other threat is cited as critical by a majority of Japanese, there are still substantial numbers of Japanese who consider the

Figure I-20 – Critical Threats to Japan’s Vital interests

Percentage of Japanese who view each of the following as a critical threat to Japan’s vital interests in the next ten years.





Figure I-21 – Japanese Foreign Policy Goals

Percentage of Japanese who view each of the following as a very important foreign policy goal for Japan.




development of China as a world power (45%) and Islamic fundamentalism (36%) as critical threats. There is significantly less concern over threats of economic competition, including economic competition from Asian countries (32% critical), economic competition from low-wage countries (32% critical) and economic competition from the United States (27% critical).

Similarly, Japanese show strong support for foreign policy goals to address perceived quality-of-life and security threats (see Figure I-21). Just as global warming is the top-rated threat, improving the global environment is the most commonly cited foreign policy goal for Japan, with 79% of Japanese stating that it should be a very important goal. Other quality-of-life goals—securing adequate supplies of energy (72%), protecting the jobs of Japanese workers (64%), and promoting economic growth (48%)—are also cited by large numbers of Japanese as being very important foreign policy goals. Additionally, security goals such as preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (75% very important) and combating international terrorism (49%) are high priorities for many Japanese. More altruistic goals such as helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries, promoting and defending human rights in other countries, and protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression are cited as very important by far few Japanese (32%, 31%, and 27%, respectively). The goal of helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations is the goal cited by the fewest Japanese (24%) as being very important.

Strained Relations with China

Japan's relations with China are still strongly colored by the legacy of World War II. Former Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors modern Japan's war dead, including those convicted of war crimes, is a source of particular resentment. In addition, disputes over the portrayal of the war in textbooks, disagreements over territorial boundaries, and concern over potential Japanese remilitarization continue. The depth of



these emotions were evident in the March 2005 Chinese demonstrations against Japan—triggered by the Japanese government's reauthorization of a textbook that downplayed wartime atrocities—resulting in attacks against Japanese businesses and government offices in China.

It is thus no surprise that Japan receives the lowest thermometer rating (see Figure I-22) of all countries asked about from the Chinese (36). Three-quarters of Chinese oppose Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (see Figure I-23).

The Chinese thermometer rating for Japan is 15 degrees cooler than the next lowest score given to any country by the Chinese—51 degrees for the United States. Seventy-nine percent of Chinese have





Figure I-24 – Partners or Rivals


Percentage of respondents in each country who say the following countries are rivals or partners.

Mostly rivals Mostly partners

Japan and U.S.



Japan and China



no or very little trust in Japan acting responsibly in the world. Eighty percent have no or very little trust in Japan keeping its commitments. Sixty-seven percent of Chinese believe that Japan generally does not take the interests of China into account when making foreign policy decisions. A plurality of Chinese (49%) think that relations between China and Japan are worsening, compared to 25% who see relations as improving. Sixty-five percent of Chinese believe China and Japan are mostly rivals, with 26% considering the two countries to be mostly partners (see Figure I-24).

Surprisingly, however, a plurality of Chinese (48%) think Japan is playing a very positive (22%) or somewhat positive (26%) role in resolving key problems in Asia, compared to only 39% who believe Japan is playing a very or somewhat negative role. As mentioned previously, only 12% of Chinese believe the differences between China and Japan cannot be resolved. This compares to 84% who

think that tensions can be resolved if one or both countries would compromise (53% think that Japan needs to change its policies to resolve tensions, 28% believe both sides need to compromise more, and 3% say China needs to change its policies). It is possible that Chinese perceptions have been positively impacted by the large degree of economic interdependence between China and Japan, seen most visibly through Japan's substantial trade with and foreign direct investment in China and elsewhere in Asia. Continued economic integration could thus potentially facilitate improved relations.

More Positive Attitudes among Americans and Indians

Americans and Indians assign relatively warm ratings to Japan, rating it at 58 and 54 degrees, respectively, on the thermometer scale (see Figure I-22). They perceive their relations with Japan as stable and view Japan as a responsible and reliable partner in the international order. Eighty-five percent of Americans and 70% of Indians think their respective country's relations with Japan are staying about the same or improving. Similarly, 71% of Americans have either some or a great deal of trust in Japan to act responsibly in the world. Indian attitudes are more divided, with a plurality of 46% of Indians sharing this belief, and 41% having no or not much trust in Japan acting responsibly in the world. Sixty-four percent of Americans and 59% of Indians think Japan is playing a positive role in resolving the key problems facing Asia. Fifty-eight percent of Americans and 46% of Indians also think that Japan takes the interests of their respective countries into account when making foreign policy decisions.

Perceptions of Japan's trading practices are also seen as positive. A majority of Americans (54%) think Japan practices fair trade. This is the highest level yet since the question was first asked of Americans in 1990, when only 17% thought Japan was a fair trader. The relative weakening of the Japanese economy through the 1990s has clearly softened American concerns about Japan: In 1994, 62% of Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a critical threat, but by 2002 the number was only 29%. Indians, who do not share the his-

torical animosity toward Japan felt by Chinese, also lean toward perceiving Japan as a fair trading partner. A plurality of 45% think that Japan practices fair trade, while 28% disagree. This, together with Japan's role as a major regional aid donor, may be positively influencing Indian perceptions of Japan.

As perceptions of Japan as an economic threat have diminished, American attitudes toward the U.S.-Japan relationship have focused on its friendly and mutually supportive nature. This has likely been reinforced by the role Japan has played in assisting the United States in Iraq, in the war on terror, and as the principal U.S. ally in East Asia. Seventy-three percent of Americans think the United States and Japan are mostly partners, compared to only 17% who believe they are mostly rivals. Interestingly, Chinese and Indians are less convinced that the U.S.-Japan relationship is primarily one of partnership, with only pluralities of Chinese (49%) and Indians (40%) thinking the United States and Japan are mostly partners.

Americans are also highly supportive of Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (see Figure I-23). A plurality of Indians, though not a majority, also support this. A plurality of the American public (49%) now believes China is more important to the United States than Japan, compared to 44% who indicate the opposite. This is up from the 2002 survey, when Americans were evenly split at 43% on this question.

Varying Perceptions of Influence

Attitudes toward Japan and perceptions of its influence in Asia and the world run parallel for many of the publics in the surveyed countries. Americans and Indians, who share relatively warm perceptions of Japan, both see it as a significant international player. Indians give it the third-highest mean ranking for influence in Asia and influence in the world, after the United States and India but ahead of China, Russia, and the EU in both Asia and the world. Americans, similarly, rank Japan third for influence in the world (though tied with China) after the United States and Great Britain (see Appendixes A and B and Figure I-25).


The rather low opinion of Japan among Chinese is reflected in their perceptions of its influence. While the Chinese give Japan a mean score of 6.7 for its influence in the world, this score is the second lowest of the nine nations they evaluated. For influence in Asia, Chinese give Japan a mean score of 6.8, placing it behind China, the United States, and Russia but ahead of India. It is interesting that both Chinese and Indians perceive Japan as being less influential in Asia than their own country, but more influential than the other.

Looking forward, Americans and Indians see Japan's global influence as remaining roughly equal to current levels. When asked how much influence Japan will have in the world in ten years, Americans see its influence rising from 6.4 to 6.6, though China's influence overtakes it, rising from 6.4 to 6.8. Indians and Chinese see no significant change in Japan's level of influence or in its ranking.

Both Americans and Indians are generally comfortable with Japan's level of influence. When asked how much influence they want Japan to have in the world, Americans give it a mean score of 5.8, and Indians give it a 6.2, the same score they give Japan for its present level of influence. While Americans'

Figure I-25 – Japan's Influence in the World

Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think Japan has in the world today, how much they think it will have in the world in ten years, and how much they want it to have (see also Appendix A). 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.



desired influence for Japan (5.8) is 0.6 lower than their perceptions of its actual influence, it still positions Japan as number two after the United States (8.2), ahead of the EU (5.7), and far ahead of China (4.6) and India (4.4). Chinese would like to see Japan have less power, giving it a mean score of 5.6 for desired influence in the world, 1.1 lower than their perception of its current influence and the lowest score they give any evaluated country, including India.

The United States

Americans are committed to a strong international role. Sixty-nine percent say the United States should take an active part in world affairs rather than stay out of world affairs. However, 75% say the United States does not have the responsibility to play the role of world policeman, that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur (only 22% believe it does have this responsibility). Seventy-six percent agree that the United States is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.

Seventy-five percent say the United States should do its share to solve international problems together with other countries, rejecting the idea that the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems (just 10% have this view) or that the United States should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems (only 12% say this).

Perceptions of World Influence and the Rise of Asia

While few Americans want to be the preeminent leader in solving world problems, they still see themselves as the world's leading power and prefer it to stay that way. Asked to rate how much influence various countries have in the world on a scale of 0 to 10, they give the United States an average rating of 8.5, well above the 6.7 rating for Great Britain, the next highest rating given (see Figure I-26). China and Japan are seen as having the next highest level

Figure I-26 – Influence of Countries in the World: The American View

Ratings by Americans of how much influence in the world the following countries have now, should have, and will have ten years from now (see also Appendix A). Mean levels on a 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not influential at all and 10 meaning extremely influential.


	Has now	Should have	Will have ten years from now	Difference between has now and will have
United States	8.5	8.2	8.0	-0.5
Great Britain	6.7	na	6.4	-0.3
China	6.4	4.6	6.8	+0.4
Japan	6.4	5.8	6.6	+0.2
European Union	6.0	5.7	6.1	+0.1
Russia	5.6	na	5.6	--
Germany	5.5	na	5.7	+0.2
France	4.9	na	4.9	--
India	4.8	4.4	5.4	+0.6

of global influence, both at an average of 6.4, with the European Union next at 6.0. Russia, Germany, France, and India are seen as having relatively less influence.

When asked how much influence Americans want countries to have on the same 10-point scale, they put the United States clearly on top, giving it an 8.2 average rating (see Figure I-26). This time, however, Japan and the European Union are next in line (Britain was not asked about), though well below the United States, at 5.8 and 5.7, respectively. Americans want China to have significantly less influence (4.6) than they think it has now (6.4).

This desire for the United States to maintain its leading world position is reflected in the 55% of Americans who see maintaining superior military power worldwide as a very important foreign policy goal. About one-half (49% to 46%) even say that the United States should make “active efforts” to ensure that no other country becomes a superpower.

Looking forward, however, Americans are well aware that the world balance of power is changing. Average ratings on the 10-point scale of how much world influence various countries will have ten years from now indicate that Americans expect drops in



U.S. and British power and rises in the influence of China and India. They see China as overtaking both Britain and Japan to occupy second place in world influence after the United States (see Figure I-26).

In fact, 60% of Americans believe that China's economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy within two decades or so. With China presumably in mind, only 40% of Americans foresee that in the next fifty years the United States will continue to be the world's leading power (see Figure I-27); most say that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States (39%) or that the United States will be surpassed in power by another nation (16%).

Most Americans' reactions to the rise of China are restrained and nuanced. Americans distinguish clearly between rising Chinese economic power, with which they are generally comfortable, and increased military or geopolitical power, about which many are uneasy or alarmed. Americans' overall feelings toward China are rather cool, averaging just 40 degrees on the 100-degree thermometer. This is down 4 degrees since 2004, though not too different from their feelings toward Indonesia (a 41-degree average rating), South Korea (44 degrees), or India (46 degrees). While slightly more Americans

think the United States and China are mostly rivals than mostly partners, most favor friendly cooperation and engagement with China, and most say they want to work together with China and India on solving a number of specific problems.

Threats to U.S. Interests

While there is clearly some concern among Americans about China, the threat of China's rise as a world power ranks low compared to concern about other threats facing the United States. When Americans are asked about a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United States in the next ten years, the threats of international terrorism and of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers continue to be viewed as the most "critical" threats (see Figure I-28). Fully 97% and 96% of the public, respectively, see those threats as at least "important," if not critical, with only 2% and 3% saying they are "not important" threats at all.

Also generating relatively high concern is disruption in energy supplies, with 59% considering this a critical threat. The only other threat that a majority of Americans consider critical is large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States (51%).

By contrast, the rise of China as a world power is viewed as a critical threat by only 36% of Americans, only slightly higher than concern about the threat of economic competition from "low-wage countries" (32% critical), which is low and dropping. Americans are even less concerned about the threat of economic competition specifically from Asian countries, with only 24% viewing this as critical. Strikingly, the other possible threats asked about, all emanating from Asia, also do not greatly alarm Americans. Instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula is viewed as a critical threat by 38% of Americans, generating the most concern. But a confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan is seen as a critical threat by just 18% of Americans, and tensions between India and Pakistan, two of the world's newest nuclear powers, is seen as a critical threat by only 17%.


Figure I-28 – Critical Threats to U.S. Vital Interests

Percentage who see each of the following as a critical threat to U.S. vital interests in the next ten years.



Figure I-29 – U.S. Foreign Policy Goals

Percentage who think the following should be a very important foreign policy goal of United States.



Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy

Given the continued concern about threats from around the world, Americans show no sign of turning away from international engagement by downgrading foreign policy goals (see Figure I-29).

Consistent with the perceptions of threats to U.S. interests, two of the top-ranked goals are preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (called a very important goal by 74%) and combating international terrorism (called very important by 72%). These goals have placed at or near the top of the list in every Chicago Council survey in which they were included. Securing adequate supplies of energy is also called very important by 72%, up 3 points since 2004 and consistent with concerns about disruption of energy supplies.

Topping all of these, however, is the goal of protecting the jobs of American workers (76% call this very important), despite the relatively low placement of economic competition from low-wage countries and from Asian countries on the list of perceived threats to U.S. vital interests. The fact that it outranks combating terrorism as a goal of U.S. foreign policy highlights concern about economic security. Indeed, not far behind are promoting economic growth (62% very important) and controlling and reducing illegal immigration (58% very important).

The other two goals deemed very important by a majority of Americans are maintaining superior military power worldwide (55%) and improving the global environment (54%). Strengthening the United Nations is a very important goal for 40% of Americans,

Humanitarian goals have never had the highest priority among Americans, with the possible exception of combating world hunger, which is called very important by a substantial 48%. But the goals of promoting and defending human rights in other countries, protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, and helping to improve the standard of living in less-developed countries are considered very important goals by only 28%, 22%, and 22%, respectively. At the very bottom of the list, despite much official rhetoric about spreading democracy

abroad, comes the goal of helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations, which a bare 17% of Americans call very important.

The View of the United States from Asia

The rise of China and India is altering Asia's economic and geopolitical landscape, but the United States still dominates. The United States is the region's main export market (and thus engine of growth), leading investor, primary source of technology, and dominant military power. Since World War II, the United States has been the de facto balancing power in Asia. The study suggests that at present, the countries surveyed still regard it as the most important player today and for the next ten years. However, they are concerned about the reliability and responsibility of the United States and do not believe that U.S. power will remain unequalled over the longer term. While they have bones of contention with the United States and are especially uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence, Asians want the United States to be engaged and to work together with them to address critical challenges.

Figure I-30 – U.S. Influence in the World

Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think the United States has in the world today, how much they think it will have in the world in ten years, and how much they want it to have (see also Appendix A).

10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.





Figure I-31 – U.S. Influence in Asia

Percentage from each country who believe U.S. influence in Asia has increased, remained about the same, or decreased in the past ten years.



U.S. Power and Influence

Most Asians surveyed see the United States as highly influential—indeed, as the most influential power in the world today. On the 10-point scale of influence in the world, all countries put the United States ahead of other countries by a fairly significant margin. Chinese give the United States a mean level of 8.6, followed by their own country at 7.8. Japanese give it a 8.5, followed by the EU in a distant second at 6.3. Indians give it a 7.3, followed by their own country at 6.3 (see Figure I-30).

Asian perceptions of the U.S. role in the international arena are mirrored in their thinking about the U.S. role in the Asian region. Chinese, Japanese, and Indians see the United States as highly and quite positively influential in the region. All rate U.S. influence in Asia virtually as high as they do U.S. influence globally, at 8.0, 7.5, and 7.1, respectively. This places the United States at the top among the nine nations asked about, including Russia, the European Union, China, India, and Japan (see Appendix B).

Over the past ten years, most Asians surveyed think U.S. power in the region has either remained the same or increased (see Figure I-31). In no country among those surveyed does more than 20% think U.S. influence in Asia has decreased.

In Japan a majority (51%) thinks U.S. influence in Asia has increased over the last ten years, and pluralities in China and India (43% and 46%, respectively) agree.

Looking ahead ten years, U.S. global influence is seen as staying quite high, if declining slightly in some cases, while the influence of others increases. In ten years Chinese see the United States' world influence declining only slightly, from an average 8.6 to 8.3, while Japanese see it declining from 8.5 to 7.8. Indians see it remaining virtually unchanged, going from 7.3 to 7.2. Americans themselves see their influence dropping slightly in ten years, from 8.5 to 8.0. The publics in all four countries still place the United States on top of other countries in terms of world influence in ten years (though the Chinese believe they will match U.S. influence by then).

Looking farther into the future, however, the assessments of U.S. power in the world begin to shift. As mentioned, only a minority believes that the United States will continue to be an unequalled world power. A majority in every country surveyed believes another nation will become as powerful or surpass the power of the United States over the next fifty years (see Figure I-27). In each case, more people believe another nation will become as powerful as the United States than believe that a nation will surpass the United States, but the majorities are clear—the United States will not continue to be the world's one leading power. Even among Americans, only 40% believe the United States will remain unequalled in half a century.

The nation that appears to be the clearest candidate for catching up to the United States is China (though Indians appear to feel it may be their country). A majority of Americans (60%) and a plurality of the Chinese (50%) believe that someday China's economy will grow as large as the U.S. economy (rather than that the U.S. economy will always stay larger than China's). A large number of Indians (42%) say they don't know whether China's economy will catch up. However, more Indians (36%) say the U.S. economy will always remain larger than China's than say China's economy will catch up (22%). This is perhaps because Indians see their own country as both more influential and more

innovative than China (see *The Indian Worldview*, pages 17-18).

Wariness of the United States

While the view from Asia is that U.S. influence will remain quite high, even if others begin catching up, publics in the Asian countries surveyed would prefer that the United States have less influence in the world than it has now (see Figure I-31 and Appendix A). (This is not unlike the American opinion that other countries should have less influence than them.) Japanese want the United States to have an average of 6.4, instead of 8.5, less than what they desire for Japan (6.6). The Chinese want the United States to have an average of 7.1 instead of 8.6, less than both China (8.9) and the European Union (7.2), but more than India (6.5) and Japan (5.6). Indians also want the United States to have less influence (6.7 instead of 7.3), but less than only India (7.0).

Along with this preference for the United States to have somewhat less influence, a strong majority of Chinese (61%) believe that the United States does *not* have the responsibility to play the role of world policeman, a role they also think the United States has been playing more than it should (77%). Interestingly, a slight majority of Indians (53%) do think the United States has the responsibility to play the role of world policeman. The same percentage of Indians, however, believe the United States is playing that role more than it should. Japanese (74%) strongly believe that the United States is playing this role more than it should.

These views are reflected in the generally negative view among most Asians—and shared by

most Americans—of the Iraq war. In every country surveyed, majorities believe that the war has not reduced the threat of terrorism, has worsened America’s relations with the Muslim world, and should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal with rogue states (see Figure I-32).

The prevailing negative perceptions of the Iraq war and of the United States acting as “policeman” in the world more than it should be may also be reflected in the general views of Chinese and Indians of U.S. behavior. On the question of whether the United States can be trusted to act responsibly in the world, in neither country do more than 17% of respondents say the United States can be trusted a great deal. Majorities of Chinese (59%) and Indians (52%) say the United States cannot be trusted either very much or at all to act responsibly. In addition, majorities in China (58% and 69%, respectively) and slight pluralities in India (46% and 47%, respectively) think the United States does not take the interests of their country into account when making foreign policy decisions and cannot be trusted to keep its commitments.


Confidence in the United States is much higher, however, among Japanese. Sixty-five percent of Japanese say the United States can be trusted to act responsibly in the world. Sixty-two percent believe the United States takes the interests of Japan into account when making foreign policy decisions, and 59% trust the United States to keep its commitments.

Despite differences in levels of trust of the United States, Japanese, Chinese, and Indians generally agree that the U.S. military presence inter-

Figure I-32 – Views on the Iraq War				
<i>Percentage who agree with each statement.</i>				
	The threat of terrorism has been reduced by the Iraq war.	The war will lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East.	The war has worsened America’s relations with the Muslim world.	The experience of the Iraq war should make nations more cautious about using military force to deal with rogue states.
United States	35	32	66	66
China	25	41	55	56
India	42	43	56	51
Japan	21	31	82	85

Figure I-33 – U.S. Military Bases Overseas

Percentage who think the United States should have more bases overseas, fewer bases overseas, or about as many as it has now.



nationally should be decreased. When asked about the overall number of U.S. military bases overseas, majorities of Chinese (63%) and Japanese (62%) and a plurality of Indians (39%) would like to see fewer U.S. bases (26% of Indians favor more bases, 14% want as many as there are now, and 22% are not sure).

When asked whether the United States should or should not have bases in several specific locations in Asia, Japanese and Chinese are clearly against them, while Indians are more divided (see Figure I-33). Strong majorities of Japanese and

Chinese oppose U.S. bases in Japan (60% each), Pakistan (62% and 66%, respectively), South Korea (57% and 71%, respectively), and Afghanistan (60% and 65%, respectively). Indians are somewhat more favorably disposed to bases in their own region, with pluralities supporting U.S. bases in Pakistan (46%) and Afghanistan (46%), but opposed to U.S. bases in Japan (51%) and South Korea (a plurality of 45%).


Majorities of Chinese (56%) and Japanese (53%) believe the U.S. military presence in East Asia decreases stability in the region. Indians are again divided, with 33% saying it decreases stability, 31% saying it increases stability, 16% saying neither, and 20% saying they are not sure.

In line with these views, clear majorities of Chinese (64%) and Japanese (59%) want the U.S. military presence in East Asia decreased (see Figure I-34), as does a weak plurality (38%) of Indians (30% of Indians want it increased, 13% want it maintained at its present level, and 19% are not sure). Most Americans (58%) correctly perceive that most East Asians want the U.S. presence decreased, and even though a similar number of Americans (57%) prefer that it be maintained, 55% of Americans think the United States should reduce its presence if that is what most East Asians want.

Additionally, U.S. trade practices are also viewed rather negatively. Fifty-seven percent of Japanese and 53% of Chinese think the United States practices unfair trade. While a plurality of 40% of Indians think the United States practices fair trade, 30% say U.S. trade is unfair, and another 30% are not sure.

Figure I-34 – U.S. Military Presence in East Asia

Percentage in each country who think the U.S. military presence in East Asia should be increased, maintained at its present level, or decreased.




Desire for Cooperation

Despite these clear irritations with the United States, the overall U.S. role in Asia is seen as a positive. Asked whether the U.S. role in resolving key problems facing Asia is very or somewhat positive or very or somewhat negative, strong majorities in Japan (76%), China (59%), and India (66%) say the United States is playing either a somewhat or very positive role.

This view of the U.S. role in Asia is accompanied by generally positive feelings toward the United

Figure I-35 – Which Country Is More Important?

Percentage in each country that says one of the following two countries is more important to their country.



States among respondents in the Asian countries surveyed. On the thermometer scale, Indians give the United States warm ratings of 57, the highest rating given to any country. Japanese give it a rating of 63, the second highest rating given to any country. Chinese give the United States a rather neutral 51, though it places fourteenth out of fifteen countries asked about in China, above only Japan, which receives China's only cool rating at 36.

Further, while there is an overall desire for the United States to have somewhat less influence than it does today, Chinese and Indians do not think it would be a good thing if the United States became *significantly* less powerful militarily and, especially, economically. A majority of Chinese think it would be mainly negative if the United States became significantly less powerful either militarily (52%) or economically (54%). Indians are more ambivalent about the impact of a decline in U.S. power, with a very slight plurality (42%) agreeing that economic decline would be mainly negative, but a very slight plurality (43%) agreeing military decline would be mainly positive.

Indeed, most Chinese and Indians prefer that the United States remain constructively and cooperatively engaged in the world. Only 14% of Chinese and 10% of Indians want the United States to withdraw from efforts to solve the world's problems. Instead, a strong majority of Chinese (68%) and a

plurality of Indians (42%) want the United States to do its share in efforts to solve international problems by working together with other countries.

A strong majority of Chinese (63%) say the United States is more important to China than Japan, and 73% of Japanese similarly say the United States is more important to Japan than China (see Figure I-35). A plurality of Indians (45%), by a two-to-one margin, see the United States as more important to India than China (23% say China is more important). These findings reinforce the view of the United States as the dominant power in the region and as a balancer in the Sino-Japanese relationship, where the greatest tensions exist.

Overall, it seems clear that the Asian publics we surveyed expect and prefer that the United States will play a leadership role in world affairs, even as some are wary of how responsibly that role will be played.


Regional Troublespots

As this study reflects, many of the important regional relationships in Asia have improved in recent years. Relations between India and China have become friendlier, and bilateral trade has skyrocketed. China has shown increased and positive interaction in relations with Southeast Asia, as has Japan. Economic interaction is on the rise, as is cooperation on transnational issues such as public health, human trafficking, and other human security issues.

However, there are a number of potential hotspots throughout the region such as China-Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. These are both long-standing disputes. Our survey sheds new light on Asian and U.S. attitudes on these issues, adding depth to a continued conversation and better understanding of the issues involved. While these specific hotspots are addressed in the following sections, respondents to this study also identified possible future sources of conflict in the region, including competition over vital energy resources, the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries in Asia, and others. These issues are covered in Part II of the report.

Figure I-36 – Confrontation between China and Taiwan as a Critical Threat

Percentage in each country who consider a confrontation between China and Taiwan to be a critical threat to their country's vital interests in the next ten years.



China-Taiwan

Since 1949 and the defeat of the Nationalists at the hands of the Communists, there has existed a great deal of tension and sometimes outright hostility between mainland China and Taiwan. In recent years, while the status quo has largely prevailed, there have been flare-ups in the relationship as a result of activities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. With China as a growing economic, political, and military power in the region, the concern for stability by regional players is not without merit. However, respondents in most countries surveyed did not regard this dispute as critical to their national interests. Only 18% of Americans, 26% of Japanese, and 32% of Indians think a confrontation between China and Taiwan is a critical threat to the vital interests of their countries in the next ten years (see Figure I-36). Similarly, only 26% of Japanese, 31% of Americans, and 36% of Indians think that China-Taiwan relations are very likely to be a potential source of future conflict between major powers in Asia. However, a plurality of Chinese (45%) think China's relations with Taiwan are a very likely potential source of conflict in the future (74% likely overall, including those who say somewhat likely and very likely).

There is a long-running debate in think tank and policy circles, particularly in the United States, as to whether, in the event of Chinese military action against Taiwan, the United States should or should not use U.S. military power to defend Taiwan.

While there is general support in the government for such U.S. troop involvement (sans a Taiwanese declaration of independence), survey results of the U.S. public suggest a different story. A full 61% of those surveyed oppose the use of U.S. troops to defend Taiwan in a context that is not specified as multilateral.

The Korean Peninsula

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is one of the most volatile and complicated in the region. Again, a remnant of the Cold War era and the splitting of Korea into North and South following World War II, the present condition is a delicate balance for these two countries on either side of the demilitarized zone. In recent years, the so-called Six-Party Talks (between the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and North Korea) have been held in an effort to end the North's nuclear aspirations, while bringing greater stability to the peninsula and the region more generally. So far, the talks have not been very successful. With differences abounding in the diplomatic sphere about how to solve the problem, it is not surprising that this study also finds varying views on the subject.

In assessing the threat the Korean Peninsula poses to the vital interests of other countries, there are differing levels of concern. In Japan, 67% think this is a critical threat, compared to only 23% of Chinese and 29% of Indians. Sixty percent of Japanese see the situation on the Korean Peninsula as a very likely source of conflict between major powers in Asia in the future, compared to only 23% of Chinese and 32% of Indians. Interestingly, Americans are somewhat more concerned than Chinese and Indians, but less concerned than Japanese: 38% see the problem as a threat to vital interests, and 41% see it as a very likely source of conflict in the future.

Overall feelings toward North Korea are mixed, as one would expect, in the various Six-Party countries in the study. On the thermometer scale, Japanese have extremely negative feelings towards North Korea (7 degrees, 23 degrees cooler than China, the next lowest rated country) and Americans have only

slightly warmer feelings (23 degrees). Reflecting the historical friendship that exists between China and North Korea, Chinese respondents have a quite warm (73) feeling toward North Korea.

In the event of hostilities between North and South, Americans are split over the use of U.S. troops. Forty-five percent are in favor of using U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea, while 49% are opposed. However, in a show of support for multilateral action, 65% of Americans favor U.S. contributions to military forces, together with other countries, to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse

the aggression if North Korea were to attack South Korea. Indeed, the American commitment to South Korea remains strong: 62% say they want the United States to have long-term military bases in South Korea. Nevertheless, American opinion tilts toward wanting to reduce the number of troops in South Korea (see Figure I-41). While 42% of Americans say the 30,000 troops the U.S. currently has in South Korea is about right, another 42% say it is too many, and only 10% say it is too few. Chinese respondents think that there are too many U.S. troops in South Korea (65%).

Part II: Addressing Global Challenges

This section of the report takes a closer look at public views on a number of issues that engage Asia and the world and that represent important challenges for the international system: nuclear proliferation, energy resources, trade, the environment, human rights, multilateral cooperation, and the use of force. While many of the findings have been discussed separately in previous sections as they relate to each country, this section brings many of the questions together to provide a more comprehensive picture of each of these challenges. The emergence of China and India as increasingly powerful players, and India's effort to develop a larger role in international institutions, especially the UN Security Council, will affect how the world deals with them.

In principle, there is a remarkable consensus on the importance of some of the issues covered in this section. Except for China, the publics in all countries surveyed attach great importance to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Global warming, epidemic disease, energy shortages, and trade figure above the midpoint of most assessments of foreign policy priorities. Human rights draw a surprisingly strong response, including a widespread willingness to contemplate military action under UN auspices. There is strong support for strengthening the United Nations. Indeed, the apparent popular agreement across the region in all these areas stands in contrast to the sharp disagreements that have accompanied efforts to reach formal international agreement on them.

But one can also discern the seeds of a more complicated future. Several of the issues addressed in this section are also looked on as "likely" or even "very likely" sources of conflict in Asia. The clearest example is energy, which all countries surveyed placed at the top of their list of potential conflict areas. India and China are expected to be the two most rapidly growing energy markets in the next decade. They have concluded a cooperation agreement, but have also disagreed over energy deals. The competition between these two fast-growing economic powers and Japan and the United States for energy supplies is likely to intensify, further aggravating today's tight supplies. In addition, as energy usage grows and development continues, addressing the environmental impact of China's and India's rise will become ever more critical.

As India and China become more internationally active, the international community will need to factor them into the way it deals with the economic and political issues discussed in this section. The way they deal with nuclear nonproliferation, for example, will have a major impact on the success of international efforts to prevent new countries from entering the nuclear weapons club. Their size makes them critical to the future of environmental efforts, trade negotiations, and epidemic prevention. The region's strong expressed commitment to cooperation is reassuring, but it is likely to be tested in the years to come.

Nuclear Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is viewed as one of the most pressing problems among the publics of most countries surveyed for this study and support for efforts to stop proliferation is strong, including the use of force. On the list of threats to vital interests, the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers is considered “critical” by majorities in the United States (69%, up from 64% in 2004), Japan (68%), and India (55%). Chinese are the least concerned, with just 28% calling the threat critical. Nevertheless, in all countries but China the threat is ranked high relative to other threats (see Figure II-1).

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is also a top foreign policy goal for most countries. This goal is considered very important by majorities in Japan (75%), the United States (74%, 73% in 2004), India (56%), and China (52%). Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries in Asia is seen as a very important area for cooperation between the United States, China, and India by 67% of Americans, 51% of Indians, and 48% of Chinese. From a list of six such areas for potential cooperation between these three countries, it ranks first for the United States, third for Indians, and fifth for Chinese.

A key part of treaty-based efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation is international inspections of national facilities—something that some people find offensive to their sense of national sovereignty. However, on the question of inspections related to the biological weapons treaty, very large majorities


Figure II-1 – Nuclear Proliferation as a Critical Threat

Percentage in each country calling the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers a critical threat and ranking of this threat among all threats asked about in that country.

Country	Percent critical	Rank
United States	69	2 out of 13
Japan	68	5 out of 14
India	55	3 out of 13
China	28	7 out of 11

Figure II-2 – Support for Inspections of Biological Research Laboratories

Percentage in each country who think their country should participate in an agreement under the treaty banning biological weapons that would allow international inspectors to examine biological research laboratories to ensure that countries are not producing biological weapons.



generally show a readiness to accept such inspections (see Figure II-2). Asked whether their country should participate in an agreement under the treaty banning biological weapons that would allow international inspectors to examine biological research laboratories to ensure that countries are not producing biological weapons, participation is endorsed by 89% in the United States and 65% in China. Once again, Indian support is somewhat lower, with a plurality of 50% favoring participation and 32% opposing it. This may reflect that nation’s very recent experience in resisting international pressures to inspect its nuclear facilities.

Similarly, support is strong for the recent suggestion that certain countries not be allowed to develop nuclear fuel out of concern they will use it to develop nuclear weapons. In the past, the inter-

Figure II-3 – Nuclear Fuel

Percentage in each country who think it is a good or bad idea that certain countries not be allowed to develop nuclear fuel out of concern that they will use it to develop nuclear weapons.






Figure II-4 – UN Security Council Authorization of Force

Percentage in each country agreeing that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force for each of the following two purposes.

To prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons



To prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them



national community has agreed (under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) that all countries have the right to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. When asked if this proposal is a good idea or a bad idea (see Figure II-3), majorities in Japan (81%), the United States (66%), and China (57%) say it is a good idea, as does a plurality in India (49% to 36%).

A substantial number of respondents feel that the prospect of a country acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a legitimate *casus belli*. Sixty percent of Americans believe that countries, on their own, should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in

the future. Fifty-three percent of Japanese and a bare majority of Indians agree (51%). Views are evenly divided in China.

A slightly greater consensus forms around the view that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them (see Figure II-4). Majorities in the United States (62%), Japan (60%), and India (53%) say the UN Security Council should have this right. A plurality of the Chinese (47% to 40%) agree. The fact that 53% of Indians support the UN Security Council having this power is striking in light of India's acquisition of nuclear weapons during a period when most UN members had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that forbids new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Support for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize force to prevent a country from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons is at similar levels (see Figure II-4). Majorities in Japan (59%) and the United States (57%) believe the UN Security Council should have this right. Pluralities in India (50%) and China (47%) also believe the Security Council should have this right.

Environment and Epidemic Disease

The effect of rapid economic growth in China and India that is being powered by fossil fuels, coupled with already high levels of emissions in the United States and other developed countries, is contributing to increased greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Some project that this could lead to shifts in weather patterns that could produce permanent shortfalls of precipitation in areas that are currently fertile, leading to destabilizing migration flows, political instability, and an increased risk of war.

As mentioned throughout this report, recognition of and concern about global warming is, indeed, growing. Global warming ranks high on the list of threats to vital interests among a large number of respondents in this study (see Figure II-5). In Japan it is the top rated threat, with 82% regarding

Figure II-5 – Global Warming as a Critical Threat

Percentage in each country calling global warming a critical threat and ranking of this threat among all threats asked about in that country.

Country	Percent critical	Rank
Japan	82	1 out of 14
India	51	6 out of 13
China	47	3 out of 11
United States	46	6 out of 13

it as critical. In China, it comes in third, with 47% regarding it as critical. In India (51%) and the United States (47%), it comes in about the middle of the list of possible threats, in sixth out of thirteen in both cases. Substantial numbers also consider global warming an “important,” if not critical, threat.

The public in the countries surveyed are apparently quite prepared to take action on environmental issues. Only small percentages of the publics in Japan, the United States, China, and India believe the evidence for global warming is so weak that no action with economic costs need be taken (see Figure II-6). The largest percentage with this view is in India (24%), followed by the United States

(17%), with the percentages in China and Japan in single digits. All agree that some action must be taken, though there is considerable variation in the respondents’ willingness to consider substantial economic costs. A strong majority of 61% of Japanese prefer to begin taking action now even if this involves significant costs; pluralities of Chinese and Americans agree. Indians prefer to deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost. In addition, Chinese and Indians favor less-developed countries making a commitment to limit their greenhouse gas emissions if developed countries are willing to provide substantial aid, by 79% to 8% in China, and by 48% to 29% in India. Sixty four percent of Americans think that developed countries should provide substantial aid to developing countries if they make a commitment to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.

Americans differ from Japanese, Chinese, and Indians on the effects of economic activity on the environment. A plurality (49%) in the United States says international trade is bad for the environment. In China, Japan, and India majorities (58%, 56%, and 51%, respectively) think trade is good for the environment. This could reflect recognition that environmental improvement can result from trade in environmentally friendly technologies and that rising fortunes can make more funds available for addressing environmental issues.

The strong perception of the threat of global warming is further reflected in public views of foreign policy goals. In each country, a majority says improving the global environment is a very important foreign policy goal, with 79% of Japanese, 54% of Chinese and Americans, and 51% of Indians agreeing. Seventy percent of Americans additionally favor having the United States participate in the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming.

Overwhelming majorities in Japan (95%), the United States (91%), and China (85%) favor incorporating minimum environmental standards into trade agreements. Even in India, a large majority (60%) favors such standards, with only 28% opposed.

The threat from AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics is also taken very seriously

Figure II-6 – Responses to Global Warming

Percentage who choose each of the following three statements as closest to their view regarding what the countries of the world should do about the problem of global warming.

- Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs.
- The problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost.
- Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs.





Figure II-7 – AIDS, Avian Flu, and Other Epidemics as a Critical Threat

Percentage in each country calling AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics a critical threat in the next ten years.



across Asia (see Figure II-7). In China it tops the list of eleven threats, with 64% of respondents considering it critical. In India it is the second highest ranking threat at 60% critical, behind international terrorism and above India-Pakistan tensions and the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers. In Japan it is the fourth highest ranking threat at 70% critical, above the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers. Only in the United States is the number considering it critical below one-half (49%).

Energy

The issue of energy is quickly becoming one of the most critical challenges in the world today. In a little over a decade, China has changed from a net oil exporter to the second largest oil importer, behind only the United States. The growing demand for oil from Asian countries, especially China and India, has been one reason for the spike in oil prices. These high prices, however, have highlighted the costs of growth, raised concerns about energy dependence, and given rise to fears about “energy nationalism.”

The growing problem of access to energy resources is clearly being recognized by publics in Asia and the United States. On the question of critical threats to vital interests, respondents in all countries except India put disruption in energy supply near the top of the list. Seventy-six percent of Japanese believe disruption in energy supply is


a critical threat, tied for second with international terrorism behind global warming. Fifty-four percent of Chinese respondents think likewise, which places it second behind AIDS, avian flu, and other potential epidemics as a perceived threat. Another 29% see the energy issue as “important.” Indians are less concerned about the energy issue, placing disruption in energy supply in the middle of the list of critical threats.

The preferred foreign policy goals reflect the same thinking. Securing adequate supplies of energy is considered a very important foreign policy goal by majorities in all countries surveyed. In Japan it is seen as very important by 72% of respondents, third on the list of very important foreign policy goals, behind improving the global environment and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In China it is seen as very important by 61% of respondents, while in India, securing adequate supplies of energy is again in the middle of the list of very important foreign policy goals.

Rising concern about energy security has prompted national and corporate leaders in Asian countries to make greater efforts to secure long-term oil deals. Sometimes these efforts have pitted Asian nations or corporations against each other in bidding for oil assets or access. Indeed, competition for access to energy is viewed as a potential source of conflict between major powers in Asia in the future (see Figure II-8). When judging a number of potential sources of conflict between major pow-

Figure II-8 – Competition over Oil and Gas as a Potential Source of Conflict in Asia

Percentage in each country who think that competition over oil and gas is a very or somewhat likely potential source of conflict among major powers in Asia.



ers in Asia, more people in the United States, Japan, China, and India believe competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas will be a very or somewhat likely source of conflict than any other item asked about. Ninety-five percent of Japanese, 90% of Americans, 84% of Chinese, and 79% of Indians say such a conflict is either somewhat or very likely.

Strikingly, majorities of Chinese (63%) and Indians (54%) think countries, on their own, should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them in order to preserve access to vital resources such as energy (see Figure II-9). Americans are split on this issue, with 47% saying countries should have this right and 48% saying they should not. Japanese do not favor this, with only 37% saying countries should have this right, and 62% saying they should not.

When asked how important it is that the United States, China, and India work together on reducing competition over vital energy resources like oil and gas, 90% of Americans, 83% of Chinese, and 82% of Indians believe cooperation is either very important or somewhat important.


Economic Security, Globalization, and Trade

Not surprisingly, economic issues figure prominently as concerns among the publics of all countries, though there is substantial variation in views of how globalization and trade affect economic security at home. Chinese and Japanese, especially, have embraced international economic integration and believe they are benefiting greatly from it. Americans, on the other hand, who are seeing the effects on jobs of growing manufacturing and service sectors in other countries as well as of high U.S. trade imbalances, especially with China, are substantially less enamored of globalization and trade.

The threat of direct economic competition per se does not appear to strike a chord among the publics surveyed in this study, at least when compared with the many other threats facing nations today. Economic competition from low-wage countries, economic competition from Asian coun-

Figure II-9— Right to Go to War to Preserve Energy Resources

Percentage in each country agreeing that countries, on their own, should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them in order to preserve access to vital resources such as energy.



tries, and economic competition from the United States do not rank high on the list of possible critical threats for the countries surveyed. Both Chinese and Indians seem relatively unconcerned about economic competition from the United States (29% and 39% critical, respectively) or from other Asian countries (25% and 33% critical, respectively), and Americans are even less concerned about competition from Asian countries (24% critical). Japanese as well show low levels of concern about economic competition from other Asian countries (32% critical), low-wage countries (32% critical), or the United States (27% critical).

However, this does not mean that economics and the effects of global economic trends are being lost on the general public. The importance of economic issues can be seen perhaps most clearly on the list of foreign policy goals considered very important. For Americans, protecting the jobs of American workers tops the list of very important foreign policy goals (76%). This goal ranks fourth for Japanese, with 64% calling it very important. For the Chinese, protecting jobs (71%), promoting economic growth (63%), and securing energy supplies (61%) are the top three very important foreign policy goals. While economic-related goals are not in either of the top two spots for Indians, they are in the next four spots: protecting jobs (54%), economic growth (54%), combating world hunger (54%), and securing energy supplies (52%).

Trade and Development

Such preoccupation with growth and jobs is reflected in our findings on globalization and international trade. In spite of the current impasse in the Doha Round of global trade talks, there is broad support for globalization (see Figure II-10). In Japan and China there is virtually a full embrace of globalization, with 92% and 87%, respectively, believing globalization is “mostly good.” Sixty percent of Americans agree. Indians are perhaps the least sure, although a slight majority (54%) still agrees that globalization is mostly good.


The broad support for globalization does not mean that survey respondents think globalization is an unalloyed benefit. In fact, survey respondents make important distinctions about the differential impact of international trade. In China there is an overwhelming sense that international trade is good for their countries’ economies (88% good in China), similar to their views about globalization more broadly. They feel almost as strongly that international trade is good for companies in their countries (78% good). On the question of whether international trade is good for “consumers like you,” responses are still positive but somewhat less (69% good in China).

In the United States, only 54% say international trade is good for the U.S. economy, and only 52% say it is good for U.S. companies, but 73% say it is good for consumers. Japanese have an overwhelmingly positive view of the benefits of international trade, seeing it as good for consumers (92%), the Japanese economy (89%), their standard of living (88%), Japanese companies (87%). Only on the issue of the environment is the Japanese majority more modest, with 56% believing international trade is good for the environment. For no option asked did a majority of Japanese believe that international trade was a negative.

International trade is viewed quite positively overall in India as well. Sixty-four percent of Indians say it is good for their economy, 61% say it is good for consumers, 59% say it is good for Indian companies, and 54% say it is good for their standard of living.

Figure II-10 – Globalization: Good or Bad for Countries

Percentage in each country who believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of their country's economy with others around the world, is mostly good for their country.




Trade and Jobs

Much more dramatic differences show up on views about the relationship between international trade and jobs. Chinese have the most favorable assessment, with 73% saying international trade is good for creating jobs in China. This compares with 69% in Japan and 56% in India. In contrast, 60% of Americans think international trade is bad for creating jobs in the United States. On the question of whether international trade is good or bad for job security, the numbers are somewhat less among Asians surveyed, though still positive, and Americans are even more negative (see Figure II-11). Chinese are still the most positive, with 65% saying international trade is good for job security

Figure II-11 – International Trade and Job Security

Percentage in each country who think international trade is good for the job security of workers in their country.



for its workers, followed by the Japanese (64%). This compares with a plurality of 49% in India. Only 30% in the United States feel the same way, while 67% say international trade is bad for job security.

Trade Practices

Respondents in the study are quite sensitive to the issue of fairness in trade. While China is the world's fast-rising trading power, its trading partners apparently think it is achieving this unfairly. Indeed, a majority or plurality of the respondents in every survey country, 68% in Japan, 58% in the United States, and 36% in India (versus 34% fair) believe China practices unfair trade.

American and Japanese trading behavior is not well received by Chinese: 53% of the Chinese think the United States practices unfair trade, and 55% say likewise about Japan. In both cases, Indians are less critical, with a plurality considering both Japan and the United States to be fair traders (45% and 40%, respectively).

In contrast, perceptions of India are more positive. Majorities of Japanese (77%) and Chinese (58%) think India is practicing fair trade.


Working within the WTO

Although respondents throughout the region see trade as an important element in their national lives, they have mixed feelings about using the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanisms (see Figure II-12). When asked whether their countries should comply with a WTO ruling even if it goes against them, a robust 73% of Americans and 64% of Japanese say "yes." By contrast, public support for compliance with negative WTO rulings is limited in India, where a plurality (37%) favors compliance, but 29% oppose it, and 21% say it depends.

Even though China only joined the WTO at the end of 2001 and is still in the process of meeting the terms of its WTO membership, more Chinese are ready to accept WTO rulings. Fifty-eight percent of Chinese would comply with a negative ruling, and another 16% say it depends, compared with only 19% who do not favor compliance.

Figure II-12 – Compliance with WTO Rulings

Percentage in each country who believe their country should comply with WTO rulings even if the ruling goes against their country.



Promoting Free Trade Agreements

With talks in the Doha Round of the WTO's trade negotiations suspended, many countries are pursuing trade agreements with other countries separately. Support is generally strong for such agreements, except in the United States. The United States stands out as every other country's desirable free trade partner: A majority of the respondents in each Asian country included in the survey, ranging from 55% in India to 66% in China and 74% in Japan, support signing a free trade agreement with the United States. Americans, however, think quite differently. More Americans oppose signing free trade agreements with China and India than favor them (see Figure II-13). Only in the case of Japan are more Americans in favor of an agreement, though not a majority. This is hardly surprising. Although the United States has implemented free trade agreements with several countries in the past, the concept of free trade areas has never had widespread popular support because of the perceived link to job losses.

Support for a free trade agreement with Japan among Chinese and Indians is much weaker than that for the United States. Again, China leads, with 53% in favor while India is somewhat reluctant, with 48% in favor (though 27% are not sure).

While Americans are reluctant to sign free trade agreements with any of the countries in the survey except Japan, the Chinese are in favor of sign-


ing such agreements with every one of them (the United States, India and Japan). This study in contrast between American and Chinese public attitudes toward free trade agreements suggests strong Chinese confidence in their ability to benefit from trade and points to substantial public support for China's leaders to take a proactive role in promoting free trade. This won't happen easily, however, as only 34% of Americans and 44% of Indians support signing a free trade agreement with China.

India gets a mixed reception in terms of free trade agreements. Sixty-six percent of Japanese and 59% of Chinese support signing a free trade agreement with India, but as mentioned, Americans are against it (54%).

Interestingly, Chinese and Japanese both support regionwide free trade arrangements even though bilateral relations have been strained. Sixty-nine percent of Chinese and 67% of Japanese think there should be an East Asia free trade area including China, Japan, and South Korea. Chinese

and Japanese, however, differ on the prospects for increased regional economic integration, with a majority of Chinese (75%) believing there will be greater economic integration among Asian countries in the future and a majority of Japanese (62%) saying the opposite.

Support for regional free trade arrangements is reflected in the thermometer ratings toward ASEAN and APEC. Chinese have very favorable feelings toward both (68 degrees toward ASEAN and 73 toward APEC). Feelings in Japan and India, however, are cooler (52 and 48, respectively, toward ASEAN and 53 and 46, respectively, toward APEC). The India ratings are particularly unsurprising given that India wants to join both forums but has not been invited. Feelings toward the World Trade Organization are generally higher, especially among Indians. The WTO receives a rating of 79 from Chinese and 67 from Indians. Japanese and Americans are less enthusiastic, giving the WTO a 55 and 50, respectively.




Human Rights

The rising importance of China and India as stakeholders in the international system may have ramifications for norms on human rights. It is thus particularly interesting that our findings indicate general agreement across survey countries on human rights goals and approaches to dealing with human rights violations.

The goal of promoting and defending human rights ranks in the bottom one-half of foreign policy goals for all the countries in which the question was asked. Forty-eight percent of Indians (tenth out of eleven), 31% of Japanese (tenth out of twelve), and 28% of Americans (eleventh out of fourteen) say it is a very important foreign policy goal.

While defending human rights is not seen as a high priority goal, there is majority support in these countries for having a multilateral framework for using force to accomplish certain humanitarian goals. On the question of whether the UN Security Council should or should not have the right to authorize the use of military force in each of six different cases, the highest level of support from the American public (83%) and the Japanese (80%) goes to preventing severe human rights violations such as genocide. For Americans, this is equal to the percentage who support the UN authorizing force to defend a country that has been attacked (see Figure II-14). Remarkably, the Chinese public also strongly believes that the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of force to prevent severe human rights violations—72% say it should, also the highest level of support among all six options. In India this item ranks second out of six, receiving strong majority support (63%). Since India faces hostilities with its neighbors, it is not surprising that larger majorities think the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize force to defend a country that has been attacked (67%).

Majorities in the United States, China, and India also agree that the UN Security Council has the *responsibility* to intervene in countries where severe human rights violations such as genocide may be occurring, even against the will of those countries' governments. When asked whether they



believe the Security Council does or does not have this responsibility, 72% in the United States, 76% in China, and 51% in India say it does. On this question, which explicitly states that the authorization of force may occur even against the will of a country's own government (and which differentiates between the *right* to authorize force and the *responsibility* to authorize it), support among Indians is about 12 percentage points lower than in the previous scenario, which did not explicitly state this. It is possible that the issue may resonate with the Indian public's fears of a possible UN intervention in Kashmir. Chinese support, on the other hand, is even higher on this question of the responsibility to authorize force even against the will of a country's government.

Beliefs about human rights were also tested on a question about changing the rules against torture in light of the fight against terrorism. Strong majorities in the United States, Japan, and China do not believe the rules against torture should be altered. Only 30% of Americans, 27% of Japanese, and 18% of Chinese say that terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. Rather, 67% of Americans, 72% of Japanese, and 69% of Chinese say that rules against torture should be maintained because torture is morally wrong and weakening these rules

may lead to the torture of its country's soldiers who are held prisoners abroad. In India, though, the opposite is true: 46% say that governments should now be allowed to use torture rather than that the rules against torture should be maintained (38%). The views of the Indian public on this issue may have been strongly affected by the recent terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Mumbai, India. Polling was already under way in the country when these events occurred on July 11, 2006. India has suffered a number of similar terrorist attacks in its recent past.

Seeing that publics in all countries show wide support for protection of human rights, it is not at all unexpected that international human rights groups hold a favorable place in the public mind. On the thermometer scale of international organizations, feelings toward these groups in all countries are above 50 degrees (neutral). Americans give international human rights groups an average rating of 56, which places them behind only the World Health Organization. The average rating given by Indians is 58. Japanese give it a 55, placing it behind only the World Health Organization and the United Nations.

The high level of support for human rights does not hold up in the case of spreading democracy to other nations. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations ranks the lowest of all foreign policy goals in all countries where the question was presented. It is considered a very important goal by 41% in India and only 24% in Japan and 17% in the United States. Opinion is more mixed on the question of the UN Security Council having the right to authorize military force to restore a democratic government that has been overthrown. Of the six situations asked about, this one draws the lowest level of support in China and Japan, with 37% in both countries saying the UN Security Council has this right. Majorities in the United States (57%) and India (51%) support the United Nations having this right.²

2. American respondents also give the same level of support (57%) for the right of the Security Council to authorize military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

Multilateral Institutions and the Use of Force


While the end of the Cold War is but a shadow in the rear-view mirror of international relations, the ramifications of the shift away from a bipolar world are still being played out around the globe. With U.S. efforts in Iraq and in the war against terrorism have come significant debates about multilateral versus unilateral action in the international arena. A rising Asia is at the heart of many of these debates. While these arguments will continue to be played out at the highest levels of government, this study of public attitudes in Asia and the United States reveals a major show of support for multilateral efforts.

At the heart of this multilateralism is the question of whether people support joint decision making within the United Nations (see Figure II-15). When asked whether their country should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations when dealing with international problems, even if this means that their country will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice, most people surveyed agree. Majorities agree in Japan (65%), the United States (60%), and China (78%), while a plurality agrees in India (44%, with 35% disagreeing).

Even more striking, majorities in all countries favor most of the steps to strengthen the United Nations that figured in our questionnaire. Eighty-five percent of Japanese, 60% of Americans, 59% of Chinese, and 57% of Indians favor giving the United Nations the power to regulate the international arms trade. The numbers in favor of having a standing UN peacekeeping force are similar: 72% of Americans, 66% of Japanese, 62% of Chinese, and 58% of Indians. Perhaps most striking are the numbers in favor of giving the UN authority to go into countries to investigate violations of human rights (82% of Japanese, 75% of Americans, 57% of Chinese, and 54% of Indians) and to create an international marshals service that could arrest leaders responsible for genocide (92% of Japanese, 75% of Americans, 57% of Chinese, and 57% of Indians). Only on the issue of giving the UN the power to fund its activities by imposing a small tax on such things as the international sale of arms or oil does some

Figure II-15 – Decision Making within the UN

Percentage in each country who believe that when dealing with international problems, their country should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that it will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.



opposition creep into responses (50% opposed in the United States).

When it comes to expanding the UN Security Council to include India or Japan, however, views diverge, reflecting the state of relations between countries in the region. Americans, Chinese, and Indians favor a seat for India on the Security Council, but to widely divergent degrees (from 75% of Indians to 53% of Americans to a 37% plurality of Chinese). Japanese have mixed views on adding India, with 30% in favor, 25% opposed, and 45% stating that it depends. While support for adding Japan to the Security Council is strong in Japan, the United States, and India, the Chinese (75%) are strongly opposed. As discussed in other areas of this report, this opposition is surely tied to the historical animosity that exists toward Japan as a result of World War II and other grievances.

Other countries also clearly support multilateral uses of force. As discussed in other sections of this report, there are high levels of support for the UN Security Council having the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent severe human right violations such as genocide. There is also strong support for UN action to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups (United States 76%, Japan 73%, China 67%, and India 60%) and to defend a country that has been attacked (United States 83%, Japan 79%, China 70%, and India 67%). All support UN action to prevent a country that does not have

nuclear weapons from producing nuclear fuel that could be used to produce nuclear weapons. These are again, striking findings in support of preventive uses of force.

The clear support for working cooperatively through international institutions does not, however, preclude people from supporting unilateral military operations when deemed necessary. There is, not surprisingly, strong support among the various publics for a country's right to go to war if another country attacks them first (90% of Americans, 80% of Japanese, 79% of Chinese, and 61% of Indians), or to maintain their territorial integrity (58% of Americans, 81% of Chinese, 55% of Indians, and 54% of Japanese). There is also generally strong support for a country's right to go to war if it has strong evidence that the country is in imminent danger of being attacked by another country: 79% of Americans, 69% of Japanese, 60% of Chinese, and 52% of Indians believe their countries should have the right to go to war in such a situation. Support for war to stop a neighboring country from supporting an insurgency within their own country ranges from a high of 56% (China) to a low of 35% (Japan). The range supporting war to preserve access to vital resources such as energy goes from 37% to 63% (see *Energy* section).

There is also support for countries having the right to go to war if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in the future (plurality of 45% in China, 51% in India, 53% in Japan, and 60% in the United States). This is rather striking support for preventive war, which has traditionally not been a legitimate reason for war among nations. On the American side, there is substantial support for the implied unilateral use of force in some situations. Nevertheless, support for the use of force is generally stronger in multilateral scenarios, together with other countries and/or through the United Nations.

Taken together, questions on the use of force show that while countries are willing to take unilateral action when necessary to defend themselves, they also support and, in many cases, require that actions be taken multilaterally.

Methodology

United States

The survey of the United States was conducted by Knowledge Networks, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Menlo Park, California. The survey was conducted between June 23 and July 9, 2006, with a sample of 1,227 American adults who had been randomly selected from KN's respondent panel and answered questions on screens in their own homes. The margin of sampling error is approximately plus or minus 3 percentage points.

The survey was fielded using a randomly selected sample of KN's large-scale, nationwide research panel. This panel is itself randomly selected from the national population of households having telephones and subsequently provided Internet access for the completion of surveys (and thus is not limited to those who already have Internet access). The distribution of the sample in the Web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the U.S. population on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, education, etc. The panel is recruited using stratified random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD provides a nonzero probability of selection for every U.S. household having a telephone. Households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Web access and an Internet appliance, which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and uses the television as a monitor. For

more information about the methodology, please go to www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.

China

The survey of China was conducted by the international polling firm GlobeScan. The survey was conducted July 10-21, 2006, with a sample of 2,000 respondents, but was subsequently reduced to 1,964 after screening out respondents who were illiterate or who had no formal education whatsoever, giving the results a margin of error of plus or minus 2.3 percentage points. The sample was nationally representative of those eighteen years of age or older and was drawn by a stratified multistage sampling method. All thirty-one provinces were divided into three strata according to their geographical location and their HDI (Human Development Index). The sample was weighted to represent the 2005 census that indicated that 43% of people live in cities or towns and 57% of people live in villages.

India

The survey of India was conducted by the international polling firm GlobeScan. The survey was conducted July 9-27, 2006. The original sample included 3,132 respondents, but was subsequently reduced to 2,458 after screening out respondents who were illiterate or who had no formal education

whatsoever, giving the results a margin of error of approximately plus or minus 2 percent points. The sample was a representative stratified random sample of all adults, age eighteen years of age or older. The sample was a nationwide sample drawing from 97% of the population geographically and 98% demographically across 526 parliamentary areas of the country. Respondents in the northeastern part of the country, representing 2% of the population and 3% of parliamentary areas, were not polled due to the relatively inaccessible nature of these respondents and other factors.

Japan

The survey of the Japanese public was conducted by Central Research Services for the Japan Economic Foundation. The survey was conducted over the Internet between June 28 and July 3, 2006, with a

sample of 1,000 adults between twenty and sixty-nine years old. The sample was drawn from a larger panel of 820,000 people who registered online through Web sites for panel registration and banner ads of various kinds. The sample was constructed using quotas based on the national census. While not a randomly-selected sample, efforts were made to validate the representativeness of the sample by conducting a pretest that included questions concerning demographic attributes (occupation, education, and income) as well as key attitudinal factors (views of countries, political party support, and interests in international affairs). The pretest results indicated that the sample was representative of the general population on the tested variables based on comparisons with government demographic statistics and various public opinion polls that adopted two-stage stratified random sampling and individual face-to-face interview methods.

Appendix A

Perceived Influence of Countries in the World by Ranking

Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think each country has in the world today, how much they think it will have in ten years, and how much they want it to have. 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.

Today		In ten years		Desired influence	
U.S. Public					
United States	8.5	United States	8.0	United States	8.2
Great Britain	6.7	China	6.8	Japan	5.8
Japan	6.4	Japan	6.6	European Union	5.7
China	6.4	Great Britain	6.4	China	4.6
European Union	6.0	European Union	6.1	India	4.4
Russia	5.6	Germany	5.7		
Germany	5.5	Russia	5.6		
France	4.9	India	5.4		
India	4.8	France	4.9		
Chinese Public					
United States	8.6	United States	8.3	China	8.9
China	7.8	China	8.3	European Union	7.2
Russia	7.4	Russia	7.5	United States	7.1
European Union	7.1	European Union	7.3	India	6.5
Germany	6.9	Germany	7.1	Japan	5.6
Great Britain	6.9	France	7.0		
France	6.8	Great Britain	7.0		
Japan	6.7	Japan	6.7		
India	6.1	India	6.5		
Indian Public					
United States	7.3	United States	7.2	India	7.0
India	6.3	India	6.6	United States	6.7
Japan	6.2	Japan	6.2	China	6.2
Russia	6.2	China	6.2	Japan	6.2
China	6.0	Russia	6.1	European Union	5.7
Germany	5.8	Germany	5.9		
Great Britain	5.7	European Union	5.9		
European Union	5.6	Great Britain	5.8		
France	5.3	France	5.5		
Japanese Public					
United States	8.5	United States	7.8	Japan	6.6
European Union	6.3	European Union	6.3	United States	6.4
Russia	5.8	China	6.0	European Union	6.3
Great Britain	5.7	Japan	5.7	India	4.5
China	5.6	Russia	5.5	China	4.0
France	5.6	Great Britain	5.5		
Japan	5.3	Germany	5.4		
Germany	5.2	France	5.4		
India	4.4	India	5.0		

Appendix B

Perceived Influence of Countries in Asia by Ranking					
<i>Average rating of the level of influence respondents from the following countries think each country has in Asia. 10-point scale, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential.</i>					
Chinese Public		Indian Public		Japanese Public	
United States	8.0	United States	7.1	United States	7.5
China	8.0	India	6.3	China	6.3
Russia	7.1	Japan	6.0	Japan	6.0
Japan	6.8	China	5.9	Russia	5.0
European Union	6.7	Russia	5.9	India	4.8
South Korea	6.7	European Union	5.5	South Korea	4.8
India	6.3	South Korea	5.2	European Union	4.5
Australia	6.2	Australia	5.2	Australia	3.9
Indonesia	5.8	Indonesia	4.7	Indonesia	3.8

Appendix C

