平成 23 年度　日欧フォーラム（欧州）

JEF-DGAP International Symposium

“How Japan and Germany Cooperate in Major World Issues?”

報　告　書

2012 年 2 月 16 日（木）

（ドイツ国　ベルリン市開催）

財団法人　国際経済交流財団

KEIRIN

この事業は、競輪の補助金を受けて
実施したものです。
http://ringring-keirin.jp/

平成23年度　日欧フォーラム　2012年2月16日(木)(於:ドイツ国　ベルリン市)

JEF 畠山会長　開会挨拶

DGAP von Maltzahn 副会長　開会挨拶

セッション1

von Stechow 大使　ランチョンスピーチ

セッション2

セッション3

会場の様子

畠山会長と Daerr 大使

目　次

1．開催趣旨

2011 年 3 月 11 日に発生した東日本大震災は、人命・都市インフラ・産業界に甚大な被害を与えたのみならず、我が国のエネルギー政策、地球温暖化対策に大きな課題を残すことになった。

国際経済交流財団（**Japan Economic Foundation**：**JEF**）は、その時点に於ける国際的な問題を取り上げ日欧の研究者、政策担当者等の間で意見交換を行うシンポジウム並びにラウンドテーブルを開催してきた。本年は、いち早く「脱原発」を宣言するなど「環境先進国」として注目を集めるとともに、経済面でも欧州の核として着実な発展を見せているドイツに於いて、ドイツ外交評議会（**German Council on Foreign Relations**：**DGAP**）との共催により、「日 **EU・FTA** の利点とリスク」、「福島原発事故と今後のエネルギー政策」、「気候変動問題」の 3 点をメイン・テーマに、日・独の専門家、政策担当者に参集いただきシンポジウムを開催することとした。

なお、本事業は財団法人ＪＫＡより機械工業振興事業補助金の交付を受けて実施したものである。

2．開催概要

1．開催時期：2012 年 2 月 16 日（木）終日　　JEF-DGAP 国際シンポジウム

2．開催場所：ドイツ国　ベルリン市
（於：　ドイツ外交評議会 (DGAP) 会議室）

3．主 催 者：
日本側　　財団法人国際経済交流財団／ Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)
欧州側　　ドイツ外交評議会／ German Council on Foreign Relations
（Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. (DGAP)）

4．出 席 者：日欧より　計 15 名　（アルファベット順／敬称略）

【日本側】　　計 6 名

畠山　襄	財団法人国際経済交流財団　会長
原岡　直幸	財団法人国際経済交流財団　専務理事
西村　六善	日本国際問題研究所 客員研究員、前内閣官房参与
斎藤　伸一	財団法人国際経済交流財団　理事　業務担当
田中　伸男	財団法人日本エネルギー経済研究所　特別顧問、前 IEA 事務局長
渡邊　頼純	慶應義塾大学　総合政策学部　教授

【欧州側】　　計 9 名

Daniel Klingenfeld	WBGU Research Analyst, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)
Hubert Knirsh	Head of Division, International Economic and Financial Policy, Federal Foreign Office (AA)
Prof. Dr. Diethard Mager	Deputy Director-General for General issues of Energy Policy, Energy Research, Renewable Energies, and Coal, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
Amb. Baron Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn	Executive Vice President, DGAP
Dr. Eberhard von Rottenburg	Senior Manager and Energy Expert in the Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Dr. Karsten Sach	Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider	Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute and Head of the China/Asia-Pacific Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Amb. Andreas von Stechow	Ambassador (ret.), Economic Advisory Division, Federal Foreign Office (AA)
Friedolin Strack	Head of the Department Asia and Africa, Foreign Trade Promotion, Federation of German Industries (BDI)

５．テーマ：“How Japan and Germany Cooperate in Major World Issues?”
セッション 1: The FTA between the EU and Japan: Benefits and Risks
セッション 2: The nuclear incident in Fukushima: Consequences for the energy mix in Germany and Japan
セッション 3: How Japan and Germany can cooperate to build up a common framework to address the issue of global climate change?

６．形　　式：オープン・シンポジウム（終日）

７．聴　　衆：約 40 名 （スピーカー等は除く）

８．使用言語：英語

９．事 務 局：
【日本側】
財団法人国際経済交流財団 (Japan Economic Foundation (JEF))

住 所：〒 104-0061　東京都中央区銀座 5-15-8 時事通信ビル 11 階
Ｔｅｌ：03-5565-4824　Ｆａｘ：03-5565-4828
ＵＲＬ：http://www.jef.or.jp
担 当：理事　　業務担当　斎藤伸一
業務部交流事業課　渡辺昌子
業務部交流事業課　丹羽飛鳥

【欧州側】
ドイツ外交評議会 (German Council on Foreign Relations（DGAP）)
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

住 所：Rauchstraße 17/18, D-10787, Berlin, Germany
Ｔｅｌ：+49 (0)30 25 42 31 26　Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31 16
ＵＲＬ：http://www.dgap.org/
担 当：Dr. Claudia Schmucker,
Head of Program, Globalization and World Economy Program, DGAP
Mr. Stefan Dauwe, Managing Director, DGAP Consulting GmbH

3. 詳 細 日 程

How Japan and Germany Cooperate in Major World Issues?
JEF-DGAP International Symposium
Thursday, 16 February 2012, Rauchstraße 17/18, 10787 Berlin, Germany

---

9:30-10:00 am	**CONFERENCE REGISTRATION**
10:00-10:30 am	**OFFICIAL WELCOME** **Amb. Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn,** Executive Vice President, DGAP **Noboru Hatakeyama,** Chairman and CEO, JEF; Former Chairman and CEO, JETRO; Former Vice-Minister for International Affairs, MITI (METI as of now)
10:30-12:00 **SESSION 1:**	**THE FTA BETWEEN THE EU AND JAPAN: BENEFITS AND RISKS**
Speakers:	**Yorizumi Watanabe,** Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University
	Hubert Knirsch, Head of Division, International Economic and Financial Policy, Federal Foreign Office (AA)
	Friedolin Strack, Head of the Department Asia and Africa, Foreign Trade Promotion, Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Moderator:	**Naoyuki Haraoka,** Executive Managing Director of JEF
12:00-1:00	**LUNCH**
Key-note Speaker:	**Amb. Andreas von Stechow**
1:00-2:30 pm **SESSION 2:**	**THE NUCLEAR INCIDENT IN FUKUSHIMA: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENERGY MIX IN GERMANY AND JAPAN**
Speakers:	**Nobuo Tanaka,** Global Associate for Energy Security and Sustainability, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan; Former Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
	Prof. Dr. Diethard Mager, Deputy Director-General for General issues of Energy Policy, Energy Research, Renewable Energies, and Coal, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
	Dr. Eberhard von Rottenburg, Senior Manager and Energy Expert in the Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Moderator:	**Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider,** Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute and Head of the China/Asia-Pacific Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

2:30-3:00 pm **COFFEE BREAK/REFRESHMENTS**

3:00-4:30 pm SESSION 3: **HOW JAPAN AND GERMANY CAN COOPERATE TO BUILD UP A COMMON FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE?**

Speakers: **Amb. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura,** Visiting Fellow at Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA); Former Special Advisor to the Cabinet, in charge of Climate change; Former Ambassador in charge of Global Environment and Chief Climate Negotiator in Japan; Former Ambassador to OECD and to Mexico

Dr. Karsten Sach, Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation , Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)

Daniel Klingenfeld, MPP, M.Sc., WBGU Research Analyst, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)

Moderator: **Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider**

4:30-4:50 pm **CLOSING CEREMONY**

Amb. Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn
Noboru Hatakeyama

End of Symposium

4. 出　席　者

Listed by alphabetical order by surname

First Name	Sur Name	Position / Organization
Peter	Alltschekow	Managing Director, Germany Trade and Invest GmbH
VLR Stefan	Bantle	Head of Division 402-9 (Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation incl. NSG, EURATOM, Global Partnership), Federal Foreign Office (AA)
VLR Jörn	Beißert	Deputy Head of Division 403 (Economic Relations with Countries and Regions), Federal Foreign Office (AA)
Dr. Friederike	Bosse	Secretary General, Japanese-German Center Berlin
Hans Joachim	Daerr	Ambassador (ret.)
Stefan	Dauwe	Managing Director, DGAP Consulting GmbH
Dr. Achim	Deja	President and CEO, TIMA International GmbH
Dr. Heribert	Dieter	Senior Associate, Global Issues Division, SWP
Dr. Ursula	Eid	Parliamentary State Secretary (ret.)
Der-An	Fann	Director Commercial Secretary, Taipeh Representation Berlin
Carolina	Geier	Embassy Banking and International Business, Commerzbank AG
Sebastian	Grübel	Consultant of Economy and Finance, Embassy of United Kingdom
Naoyuki	Haraoka	Executive Managing Director of JEF
Noboru	Hatakeyama	Chairman and CEO, JEF; Former Chairman and CEO, JETRO; Former Vice-Minister for International Affairs, MITI (METI as of now)
Andrea	Hideg	Desk Officer, Asia and Africa, Federation of German Industry (BDI)
Dr. rer. pol. Hanns G.	Hilpert	Research Division Asia, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Emi	Ichiyanagi	FU Berlin
Hikaru	Ikarashi	II. Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Germany
Johannes	Kerner	Desk Officer, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
Daniel	Klingenfeld	WBGU Research Analyst, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)
Hubert	Knirsch	Head of Division, International Economic and Financial Policy, Federal Foreign Office (AA)
VLR I Dr. Heinrich	Kreft	Ambassador, Director for Public Diplomacy and Dialogue among Civilizations, Federal Foreign Office (AA)
RD Orloff	Kurth	Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Stefan	Lautenbacher	BMWi
Jungho	Lee	III. Secretary, Embassy of Korea
André	Lieber	Research Fellow, Office Environment Minister Dr. Norbert Röttgen, MP

First Name	Sur Name	Position / Organization
Dr. Beate	Maeder-Metcalf	Minister, Head of Economic Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Tokyo
Prof. Dr. Diethard	Mager	Deputy Director-General for General issues of Energy Policy, Energy Research, Renewable Energies, and Coal, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
Baron Paul von	Maltzahn	Executive Vice President, DGAP
Tobias	Münchmeyer	Deputy Director, Political Unit, Greenpeace
Mareike	Neels	Regional Manager Japan, Korea, German-Asia-Pacific Business Association
Amb. Mutsuyoshi	Nishimura	Visiting Fellow at Japan Institute for in charge of Climate change; Former Ambassador in charge of Global Environment and Chief Climate Negotiator in Japan; Former Ambassador to OECD and to Mexico
Asuka	Niwa	Japan Economic Foundation
Kenji	Okada	Envoy, Embassy of Japan in Germany
Dr. Kirstin	Pukall	Head of Division, Japan, South and South East Asia, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
Vera	Ragone	Journalist
Dr. Eberhard von	Rottenburg	Senior Manager and Energy Expert in the Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Dr. Karsten	Sach	Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)
Dr. Tashinori	Saeki	General Director, JETRO Berlin
Amb. Shinichi	Saito	Executive Director in charge of International Affairs,JEF
Dr. Alexandra	Sakaki	Japan Economic Foundation Research Division Asia, JEF German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Prof. Dr. Eberhard	Sandschneider	Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute and Head of the China/Asia-Pacific Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Volker	Schlegel	Ambassador (ret.), Head of Asia-Pacific-Forum Berlin
Dr. Claudia	Schmucker	Head of Program, Globalization and World Economy program, DGAP
Ralf	Segeth	International Business Development, Elia Group
Nabi	Sonboli	Envoy, Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran
Andreas von	Stechow	Ambassador (ret.), Economic Advisory Division, Federal Foreign Office (AA)
Wolfgang	Stopper	Division VA3 (Gen. questions of the commercial policy), Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
Friedolin	Strack	Head of the Department Asia and Africa, Foreign Trade Promotion, Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Hiroshi	Sugano	WSE, Embassy of Japan in Germany
Kotaro	Tanaka	Counsellor (Ecomomic Affairs), Embassy of Japan in Germany
Nobuo	Tanaka	Global Associate for Energy Security and Sustainability, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan; Former Executive Director of the International Energy Agency
Dr. Silke	Trumm	Market Development Specialist Asia/Pacific, Business Unit Industrialized Countries, German Development Cooperation (GIZ GmbH)
Yorizumi	Watanabe	Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University
Kazuaki	Yuoka	CEO, Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry

5. 略　歴

Listed by alphabetical order by surname

Noboru Hatakeyama
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

He served as the Chairman and CEO of Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) during the period between 1998 and 2002. Originally, he joined the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1959 and he served as a Secretary to Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki from 1980 to 1982. He had been appointed as the Director-General of various bureaus and department which included the Petroleum Department of the MITI's Agency of Natural Resources and Energy from 1984 to 1986, International Trade Administration Bureau from 1986 to1988, the Basic Industries Bureau of the MITI from 1988 to 1989, the International Trade Policy Bureau from 1989 to 1991. He was appointed the MITI's Vice-Minister for International Affairs from 1991 to 1993. During this period, he was a Japan's representative in GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and other negotiations mainly with the U.S. and the EU especially on automobile issues. He is well-known as a pioneer of Japan's free trade agreements, including the Japan-Mexico, Japan-Chile and Japan-Swiss FTAs. He authored a book 'Trade Negotiation, Dramas around National Interest', published in Japanese by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. He graduated from Tokyo University's Faculty of Law in 1959.

Naoyuki Haraoka
Executive Managing Director,
Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

After graduating the University of Tokyo in 1978 (Bachelor of Economics), he joined MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) of Japanese government. Having been posted in the industrial policy section and the international trade policy section for a few years, he was enrolled in a two year MPA (Master of Public Administration) programme at Woodraw Wilson School of Princeton University in the US on a Japanese government sponsorship. After having acquired MPA at Princeton, he rejoined MITI in 1984 as an economist. Since then he had been posted as Deputy Director and Director of a number of MITI divisions including Research Division of International Trade Policy Bureau. He was also posted in Paris twice, firstly, Principal Economist of Trade Bureau of OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) from 1988 to 92 and secondly Counselor to Japanese Delegation of OECD from 1996 to 99. After coming back to MITI from his second stay in Paris, at the occasion of the government structural reform in 2001 when MITI was remodeled as METI (Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) he joined the efforts to found METI research institute, Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry as its Director of Administration. He became Chief Executive Director of JETRO San Francisco in 2003 and stayed in San Francisco until 2006. He was Director-General of METI Training Institute from 2006 until July, 2007 when he left METI permanently and joined JEF as Executive Managing Director.

Daniel Klingenfeld
Research Analyst for Professor Schellnhuber, German Advisory Council on Global Change to the Federal Government (WBGU)

Daniel Klingenfeld, born in 1980 in Berlin, has been working at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research since September 2009. He is research analyst for Professor Schellnhuber at the German Advisory Council on Global Change to the Federal Government (WBGU). In addition, he is writing his doctoral thesis under the supervision of Professor Edenhofer. He holds degrees from the Kennedy School at Harvard University (Master in Public Policy) and ESCP Europe (M.Sc. in Management). Klingenfeld studied business administration and intercultural management at Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena. Following an exchange year at the University of Technology in Sydney, he earned a triple Master's degree from ESCP Europe, having completed study years in Paris, London, and Berlin. His thesis examined the chances for acceptance of a global cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases in the United States of America. From 2006-2008, as a McCloy Scholar, he pursued Master studies in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, specializing in energy and climate policy. Following his graduation, he worked in the Climate Change and Clean Energy Group at IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates. Building on further experience in the energy domain, such as for example with the National Commission on Energy Policy in Washington D.C., he focuses on the challenges of global energy and climate policy design.

Hubert Knirsch
Head of Divison for International Economic and Financial Policy,German Foreign Office

Hubert Knirsch is. He studied public administration at the University of Konstanz and received a Certificat d´Etudes Politiques from the Institut d´Etudes Politiques in Paris. He began his career in the Foreign Service as second secretary at the German Embassy in Warsaw from 1989 to 1992. Upon returning to Germany, he was desk officer in the section for European Security Policy at the Foreign Office until 1995, when he moved to the German Embassy in Washington, DC as counsellor in the economic section. In 1998, he became desk officer in the section for Foreign and Security Policy in the chancellor's office in Berlin. From 2001 to 2005 he was deputy head of division for International Economic and Financial Policy at the Foreign Office. He then returned to Warsaw as minister-counsellor and head of political section at the German Embassy, a position he held until 2008. From 2008 to 2011, he was head of office for former federal president Richard von Weizsäcker.

Prof. Dr. Diethard Mager
Deputy Director-General for General issues of Energy Policy, Energy Research, Renewable Energies, and Coal,
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology

Dr. Diethard Mager, born in 1954 in Stuttgart (Germany). In 1976, he began studying Geology at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. His scientific work concentrates on granite intrusions, and he received his PhD in 1985. After two years as advisor for mineral economics at the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) in Hanover he joined the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology in Bonn in 1987. He worked there in the forthcoming years as a senior advisor in the fields of mineral economics, geo-scientific research, radioactive waste management, and the decommissioning and remediation of uranium mines and milling sites. In 1996, he became the head of the division on mine safety and mining research. In 1998 he was appointed as head of the division on mineral resources, geosciences, uranium, and CCS (carbon capture and storage). He took over his current position in December 2010. Dr. Mager holds an honorary professorship in the field of applied geology at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, and he holds regular lectures and seminars on energy politics, mineral economics, waste management, and mine decommissioning.

Baron Paul von Maltzahn
Executive Vice President,
German Council on Foreign Relations

Baron Paul von Maltzahn, born in 1945 in Demmin (Germany). He has read law, history, and Arabic at the universities of Heidelberg, Munich, and Hamburg, receiving his law degree in 1968. After studying a year Political Sciences in Paris, Baron von Maltzahn joined the German Foreign Service in 1970. His first post abroad was as attaché in Dublin. From 1973 to 1976, he served as press attaché at the German Embassy in Beirut, followed by three years as cultural attaché in Paris. In 1980, he moved to Damascus to serve as Deputy Chief of Mission, a position he would also hold in Algiers (1989-1991). Before becoming German ambassador in Cairo (2000-2003) he served as Minister in London (1996-2000). From Cairo he moved to Teheran (2003-2006), Jakarta (2006-2009), and Baghdad (2009-2010). Upon retiring from the Foreign Service, he took up his current position at the DGAP in September 2010.

Mutsuyoshi Nishimura
Ambassador (ret.)

Being a foreign service officer of Japan, he was Consul-General in Chicago in 1994, Director-General for European Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1997, Ambassador to the OECD (1999-2002) and to Mexico (2003-2005). Since 2005, he was Ambassador in charge of Global Environment and Chief Climate Negotiator of Japan. He was Special Advisor to the Cabinet in charge of climate change (2008-2011).

Dr. Eberhard von Rottenburg
Senior Manager and Energy Expert in the Federation of German Industries (BDI)

Dr. Eberhard von Rottenburg works since 2009 as a Senior Manager and Energy Expert in the Federation of German Industries (BDI). Before, he acted as an energy lawyer in the German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW). His working experience includes activies at the Berlin Appellate Court, the Deutsche Bank (Frankfurt) and the German Embassy in Israel. He studied German, European and Russian Law at the Universities of Passau (Germany) and St. Petersburg (Russia) and wrote a doctoral thesis on energy and world trade law at the Free University of Berlin.

Dr. Karsten Sach
Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)

Dr. Karsten Sach, born in 1959 in Gruberhagen (Germany). He studied law in Kiel and Freiburg and passed the state law examination in 1989 and received his PhD in 1993. Prior to receiving his doctorate, he was a researcher and lecturer at various universities from 1984 to 1991. He began his work at the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety in 1991 in the Division for the Protection of the Marine Environment and International Water Protection Law. In 1993, he became environment attaché at the Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union. In 1998, he became deputy head of division for International Cooperation, Global Conventions, and Climate Change at the BMU, and was made head of division in 1999. He has been chairman of the management board of the European Environment Agency since September 2008, and chairman of the administrative committee of the preparatory commission of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) from 2009 to 2011.

Amb. Shinichi Saito
Executive Director in Charge of International Affairs,
Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

Before assuming this post, he served as Japanese Ambassador to Nicaragua from April 2007 to October 2010. During this period, he actively involved in various Japanese aid programs in Nicaragua.

Originally, he started his career in JETRO, Japan External Trade Organization, in 1967 where he experienced various sectors such as Marketing Research, Import and Investment Promotion, Exhibition Projects, etc. He also experienced overseas assignments in JETRO for three times both in the United States and Malaysia. From April 2003 to April 2005, he served as chairman of Investment Promotion Committee of APEC.

He also serves as councilor of JETRO from May, 2011 and executive director of Shoko Kaikan from November, 2011.

Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider
Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute and Head of the China/Asia-Pacific Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Eberhard Sandschneider, born in 1955. He graduated from the Saar University, Saarbrücken in 1981 in English Language and Literature, Latin, History and Political Science. In 1986, he received his PhD in Political Science at the Saar University with a thesis on "The Political Role of the People's Liberation Army after the Cultural Revolution". He finished his "habilitation" on "Stability and Transformation of Political Systems" in November 1993. He held a position as professor for International Relations between 1995 and 1998 in Mainz, before accepting a chair at Free University Berlin in 1998. Between March 2001 and March 2003 he served as Dean of the faculty for Political and Social Sciences at Free University. In August 2003 he succeeded Karl Kaiser as the Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

Andreas von Stechow
Ambassador (ret.);
Advisor to the German Foreign Office

He deals with foreign market access issues and advises German companies. Born in 1943, he studied law and economics at the University of the Philippines and in Germany. He served as Ambassador in Bangkok and Bern. He served as Deputy Director General for economic questions in Bonn and Berlin. He was head of the Economic and Commercial Division of the German Embassy in Tokyo from 1990 to 1997. He was in charge of UN economic organizations in Geneva and was director for EU External Policy and GATT/WTO. He worked at the German Federal Reserve Bank in Frankfurt, and he has been advisor to the Max-Planck-Plasmaphysik Society since 2009. He is the author of „Persönliches zur Schweiz“ (Orell Füssli Verlag, Zürich 2009) and numerous other publications on Asia with a focus on ASEAN, multilateral trade, and Japan. He lectures in Germany, Japan, and China on trade issues and is an Asia expert for German Hapag-Lloyd Cruise. Von Stechow is married has two children and lives in Berlin and Tokyo.

Friedolin Strack
Head of the Department Asia and Africa, Foreign Trade Promotion, Federation of German Industries (BDI);
Managing Director, Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business

Friedolin Strack, born in 1965 in Den Haag, The Netherlands, has been Starting his career at the BDI in 1994, he worked on international investment issues, development policy, and bilateral economic relations with the Middle East and Africa. In 1996, he was promoted to Head of Section for International Investment, Trade, and Investment Promotion. From 1999 to 2010, he was Regional Director Asia-Pacific. Strack graduated in Political Science, History, and Sociology from the University of Freiburg. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from the Free University in Berlin and also an M.A. in International Economics from the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. He grew up in the Black Forrest in Southern Germany.



Nobuo Tanaka
Global Associate for Energy Security and Sustainability, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ)

As Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA) from 2007 to 2011, he oversaw a seminal period in the Agency's work and direction. Under his leadership, the IEA initiated a collective release of oil stocks in June 2011, the third such collective action in the Agency's history, opening new scope and a new era for IEA emergency action. He was responsible for pioneering the concept of 'comprehensive energy security' while also expanding the Agency's focus on climate change, renewable energy and the transition to a low-carbon energy economy. He also played a crucial and personal role in the strengthening of ties with major IEA non-Member energy players, including China, India, Russia, etc.

He began his career in 1973 in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in Tokyo, and has served in a number of high-ranking positions in METI, including Director-General of the Multilateral Trade System Department. In this capacity, he led many trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and for bilateral Free Trade Agreements. He was deeply engaged in a range of bilateral trade and economic issues with the US as Minister for Industry, Trade and Energy at the Embassy of Japan, Washington DC from 1998 to 2000, as well serving as the first secretary of the Embassy from 1982 to 1985.

With a strong background in international affairs, He has served as both Deputy Director and Director for Science, Technology and Industry (DSTI) of the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Yorizumi Watanabe
Professor, Keio University

Following several appointments in Japan's foreign service, specializing in international trade policy issues, Professor Watanabe has now brought those skills and experience to the senior academic post he has filled at Keio University since 2005.

Prof. Watanabe's distinguished career has featured significant engagement in all the major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations in which Japan has been involved in the past two decades. This included the role of policy advisor to relevant Ministers, and postings to Japan's diplomatic missions in Brussels and Geneva.

He was Deputy Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan from 2002-2004 and served as Chief Negotiator for the Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Working Party on Russia's Accession to the WTO. He was Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2004. He has been a member of the Task Force on Japan-India Economic Partnership, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry since 2006.

Prof. Watanabe completed his BA and MA and was PhD candidate in International Relations at Sophia University, Tokyo. He also studied at the College of Europe in Bruges under Belgian Government Scholarship. He is the author of a number of publications on GATT/ WTO and trade and economic partnership agreements. His most recent book on the TPP (Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement) has been ranked one of the top-ten best-selling books on economics in December, 2011 in Tokyo.

6 . 議 事 要 旨

以下の要約は、ドイツ DGAP 側で作成した英文サマリーを和訳したものである
（日本語）

JEF（国際経済交流財団）／ DGAP（ドイツ外交評議会）共催国際シンポジウム
「日本とドイツは世界の主要課題にどのような協力ができるか？」

2012 年 2 月 16 日 ドイツ国　ベルリン市

歓迎の挨拶および開会の辞

ポール・フォン・マルツァーン大使（Amb. Paul von Maltzahn）
フォン・マルツァーン大使は、今回のシンポジウムでは世界の主要課題を取り上げると述べた。日本は大震災、津波、原発事故という三重苦に直面している。今回は、この危機が及ぼす影響にどう対処すべきかについて議論する。また、日本はきわめて積極的な自由貿易協定（FTA）政策に乗り出した。世界的な気候変動も重要なテーマであるが、欧州ではユーロ圏の危機が長引き、この問題は二の次になっている。しかし、もう一度きちんと議論しなければならない。

畠山襄　国際経済交流財団　会長
畠山氏は、現在の G8 および G20 の改革に向けた新しいガバナンス・モデルを紹介した。2007 年の G8 ハイリゲンダム・サミットでは、ドイツが新興 5 カ国のグループ（G5）を会合に招待した。このアウトリーチ会合はイタリアのサミットまで 2 年続いた後、そこでさらに延長された。しかし、G8 ＋ G5 のメンバー選定には客観的尺度がないため、国際基準に照らした正当性がない。もともと G7 は、経済規模の大きい国といった客観的な参加基準を定めていた。しかし、カナダが 1995 年以降、世界の GDP ランキングで 7 位に達せず、また 1998 年以降、8 位より上位になったことのないロシアが加わったことでこれが変化した。このため、氏は、世界に占めるその国の GDP（国内総生産）や人口のシェアからなるといった客観的な尺度に基づいて参加国を選ぶ、新たな G10 のグループを提案した。10 カ国という規模は、グローバル・ガバナンスに有効に対応するうえで妥当な大きさと考えられる。2008 年のデータに基づいて G10 のメンバー国を選ぶとすると、カナダを除く G7 諸国（G6）、および 4 カ国の BRIC（ブラジル、ロシア、インド、中国）諸国による構成となる。2015 年は、この新しいグループにはよい船出の年になりそうだ。2015 年はドイツが G8 サミットの議長国を務めることになっており、同国は G5 の参加を実現してこの面での理解度が高いため、議長国としてこれほどふさわしい国はない。

セッション Ⅰ ：日本と EU の FTA：メリットとリスク

モデレーター：原岡直幸　国際経済交流財団　専務理事
原岡氏は、議論のたたき台として 3 点を挙げた。1）EU（欧州連合）と日本の二国間 FTA の現状、2）将来の成長戦略の一環としての貿易と投資、3）WTO（世界貿易機関）の規定と FTA の補完性、

特に一部の FTA における GATS（サービス貿易に関する一般協定）プラス条項。

スピーカー：渡邊頼純　慶応義塾大学　教授

渡邊教授は、自らの世界経済のビジョンは 3 つの広域地域（メガ・リージョン）、すなわち EU、米州（NAFTA［北米自由貿易協定］加盟国とメルコスール［南米南部共同市場］を含む）、東アジア（ASEAN ＋ 3、ASEAN ＋ 6）で構成されると述べた。さらに地域間の協力協定、すなわち、アジアと米州地域による APEC（アジア太平洋経済協力）、EU とアジアによる ASEM（アジア欧州会合）、EU と米国による大西洋市場（Transatlantic Marketplace）および大西洋経済評議会（Transatlantic Economic Council）の存在もある。ドーハラウンドが完全に暗礁に乗り上げているため、地域協定が自由化の中心的役割を果たしている。

アジア太平洋では、3 つのブロックで競合的な自由化が生じている。1）ASEAN ＋ 3 FTA、2）ASEAN+6 EPA（経済連携協定）、3）アジア太平洋自由貿易圏（FTAAP）である。さらに、環太平洋戦略的経済連携協定（TPP）も台頭している。こうした自由化の取り組みの中で、大きな前進をみているのは TPP だけである。このため、日本は TPP への参加に関心を示している。東アジアの地域経済統合は、FDI（海外直接投資）を通じたビジネス主導による統合となっている。つまり、生産のネットワーク化が事実上の統合に変化している。

日本の FTA 戦略は EPA に重点を置いている。しかし、FTA は常にこの戦略の柱となってきた。他の要素には、投資や二国間協力、競争、政府調達などがある。これまでのところ、日本は域内、域外の 13 の国・地域と EPA を締結している。また、韓国、GCC（湾岸協力会議）諸国、オーストラリアと交渉をスタートさせた。日本はここからどのように進んでいくのか？　日本は、二国間 FTA ／ EPA の締結を通して、一方では統合本位のアプローチによる東アジアの広域的な統合（ASEAN ＋ 6）、他方ではルール本位のアプローチによる TPP への拡大を望んでいる。この 2 つの方向性が調和しながら、その後の FTAAP へとつながることが望ましい。

日本と EU の通商関係は、1991 年の日本・EC 共同宣言によって始まった。2001 年以降は、日・EU 協力のための行動計画が友好的でより協力的な関係を促した。したがって、2001 ～ 2010 年の 10 年間は協力の 10 年だったといえる。EU と日本は欧米型民主主義という同じ価値を共有している。したがって、EIA（経済統合協定）は単なる FTA ／ EPA 以上のものでなければならない。このため日本は、革新的な社会、環境に優しい社会、安全な社会のためのインフラ、貿易と投資の相互改善に関する共同作業を提案している。日本との FTA により、EU の名目 GDP は 5 兆 5,000 億米ドル増加する可能性がある。2011 年 5 月、両者は予備交渉である「スコーピング作業（scoping exercise）」を開始することで合意した。EU 側は非関税障壁、政府調達、投資の可能性、ならびに農業分野で目に見える改善を求める一方、日本側は、EU 市場における韓国との優遇措置の差を埋めるプロセスを前倒しするよう望んでいる。教授は、EIA の全体像をより明確にすること、全体のパッケージが WTO のルールに一致すること、「一括受諾（シングル・アンダーテイキング）方式」の原則を適用することを提案した。何かと批判される日本の鉄道車両・部品の対 EU 貿易収支については、日本は対英国でのみ黒字となっているだけである。

最後に渡邊教授は、TPP に弾みがついていること、日本と EU の EPA ／ EIA は EU にとって

東アジアとの連携強化に向けた強力な足場になりうること、スコーピング作業は交渉全体の不可欠な要素としてとらえるべきであると述べた。

スピーカー：ヒューベルト・クニーシュ（Hubert Knirsch）氏
日本とEUは世界で最も重要な経済地域に属しており、政治的にも強力な連携関係を有している。また、両者は往復で1,100億ユーロにのぼる良好な貿易関係を築いている。しかし、この関係は依然、その潜在力を十分に発揮していない。

日・EUはともにWTOとドーハラウンドを積極的に支持しており、これはドイツの貿易政策の確固たる優先課題でもある。ただ、WTOは関税の問題に重点を置いているが、今では貿易にとっての最大の障害は非関税障壁である。このため、EUは、特に韓国、南米諸国、メキシコ、インドとの二国間FTA戦略に乗り出している。EUは、ASEAN地域とのFTAを締結できていないが、シンガポールやマレーシアなど、個々のASEAN諸国との間では大きな前進をみている。したがって、日・EU FTAはより大きな構想の一環である。

2011年、日本とEUは、FTAのリスクと機会を分析するため、スコーピング作業を開始することを決定した。懸念されるのは、FTA交渉に失敗した場合、本来なら良好な両者の関係に傷がつく可能性である。しかし、スコーピング作業は同じ問題を抱えている。2011年12月、非関税障壁をテーマに3回目のスコーピング作業が行われた。日本は従来から関税は低いが、非関税障壁は高い。これまでのところ、EUが進展を求めている分野、特に基準、手続き、安全規制に関する相互認証協定の形でのオープンな規制に関するリストが交換された。一定の進展はあったものの成功が確保されたというには至らず、まだやるべきことは少なくない。しかし、これは時間の問題でなく、信頼と決意の問題である。EUと日本の経済界は年内の決着を図るため、信頼と決意を持って貢献している。

スピーカー：フリードリン・シュトラック（Friedolin Strack）氏
シュトラック氏はいくつかの点を指摘した。まず、WTOが極めて重要な枠組みであると強調した。しかし、ドイツのメルケル首相は2012年1月のダボス会議（世界経済フォーラム）で、ドーハラウンドの時代はもう終わったと述べている。氏は、二国間交渉については、課題に進展がなければ止めても問題はないと述べた。しかし、日本については交渉に入れば、結論は出るとの自信を示した。

2番目に、EUと日本の経済状況については、両者はFDIで相互に深く結びついている。しかし、工業製品の貿易関係はきわめて薄い。日・EU貿易には明暗両面が存在する。2009年から2010年にかけて貿易額は大幅に増加した。ドイツの対日輸出は20％伸びたが、輸入が60％も増加したため、貿易赤字は膨らんだ。ドイツは中国に540億ユーロも輸出しているが、対日輸出はわずか130億ユーロで、インド、韓国向けと大差ない。ドイツの巨額の貿易赤字は、大幅な非関税障壁が理由である。例をいくつか挙げる。

1）国際自動車規格は、世界全体で127の規格グループがある。そのうち日本が適用しているのはわずか44規格で、十分ではない。このため、他の市場に比べて欧州の自動車企業の数が

きわめて少ない。
2）日本は新規化学物質の登録の規制が厳しく、化学メーカーが排除される傾向がある。
3）日本は工業用繊維製品にきわめて特殊な認証基準を定めている。

氏は、両者が経済協定について協議する場合は完全に同意すると述べた。関税撤廃は結構なことだが、ドイツの産業界は特に非関税障壁の問題に直面している。このため、この面での進展も必要である。

3 番目に、ドイツ産業同盟（BDI）は、EU が交渉に入る前に日本は特定の分野に肩入れしていると主張している。交渉を進めるだけの価値があることをドイツの産業界に納得してもらうためには、市場開放をさらに進めることが重要である。今のところ、長期の交渉を行っているハイレベル会合で成果は上がっていない。交渉の前にいくつかの分野で進展がなければ、ドイツの産業界は関心を示さないだろう。

質疑応答

議論は、日・EU FTA の可能性についてのドイツ産業界その他の慎重姿勢に集中した。なぜこれほど長く難色を示しているのか？　あるパネリストは、閉鎖的な日本経済というイメージを払拭するのはきわめて難しいと説明した。しかし実態は逆で、日本は多くの欧州製品を日本市場に輸入している。さらにこのパネリストは、FTA 交渉に入るための前提条件があってはならないとも述べた。別のパネリストは、各業界団体を広く集めることは今なら可能であるということは、前進している証拠と述べた。

ある参加者は、日本と FTA 交渉を開始するには前提条件がなければならないと主張した。市場を開放するという（特に政府調達）日本からの明確なシグナルが必要である。1995 年以降、日本とのハイレベル対話ではわずかな成果しか上がっていない。ドイツは非関税障壁についてはきわめてオープンな市場であり、加盟国と産業界に交渉入りを説得するにはこれらの前提条件が必要である。別の参加者は、今の日本は世界市場に十分に統合されていないと付け加えた。上述の慎重姿勢は理解できるという。日本の輸入額は対 GDP 比で 12%、工業製品の比率は 6%にすぎない。一方、ドイツの輸入額は対 GDP 比で 32%、工業製品は 20%前後である。この参加者の見方によると、最大の障害は非関税障壁ではなく、日本語である。外国人が日本の人脈社会にうまく溶け込めないのは問題である。日本市場への参入コストはきわめて高いため、前提条件をつける欧州の戦略は正しい。別の参加者は、日本は輸入比率だけではなく、輸出比率もきわめて低いと指摘した。

あるパネリストは、EU･韓国 FTA は、日･EU FTA とはまったく異なると指摘した。韓国では、ドイツ産業界は、例えば機械産業などでの利害が鋭く対立している。

別の参加者は、日本で国際自動車規格の実施が進んでいないことについて、これらの規格は EU が定めたものであり、欧州に有利になっていると応じた。さらに、これらの規格は大企業向けであり、中小企業には問題が多い。あるパネリストは、FTA のパターンがきわめて複雑な道筋

をたどれば、結局は 5 ～ 6 年で WTO の協議に戻ることになるとの予想を述べた。それまでに、貿易の世界は中小企業にとって複雑になりすぎて、グローバル・ビジネスに対応できなくなるだろう。

ある参加者が、日・EU FTA は EU の「グローバル・ヨーロッパ」戦略にどのように合致するのかと質問した。これに対し、あるパネリストが「グローバル・ヨーロッパ」は新興国との交渉を優先させていると念を押した。しかし、実際には必ずしも楽に進められるわけではない。例えば、メルコスールとの交渉は困難である。インドとはある程度の前進をみている。ロシアはユーラシアのパートナー国をより重視している。また、中国との FTA はきわめて非現実的である。こうしたことから、EU は現在、結局はそれほど難しくないと考えられる日本、米国などの先進国も視野に入れている。別のパネリストは、「グローバル・ヨーロッパ」戦略は、日・EU 関係のケースに見られるように、価値の共有という概念も考慮していると強調した。

ある参加者が、米国と EU の FTA の進捗について質問した。この方向で何らかの取り組みが行われているのか？　あるパネリストが、自分は大西洋両岸の FTA に強い関心を持っていると述べた。最大の問題はやはり規制と非関税障壁の領域である。しかし、このパネリストは、スコーピング作業が始まるだろうという楽観的な見通しを示した。

ある参加者が、ミャンマーが政策を大きく変えるなか、EU はなぜ ASEAN 全体との FTA を完了させないのかと質問した。あるパネリストがこれに対し、欧州委員会が ASEAN との FTA 交渉権を有していると答えた。2009 年、それ以上の進展が不可能となったため、交渉を中断させることが決まった。まず、EU の政治的枠組みの合意が障害となっている。しかし、このパネリストは、最終的に地域本位に戻ることは可能との期待感を述べた。2 番目は、経済面の問題である。ASEAN 諸国の工業化の度合いは均一でなく、そうした多様な国の集団と交渉するのはきわめて難しい。TPP も多様な国を対象としている。その交渉で合意が得られるのであれば、EU・ASEAN 間の FTA には強い追い風になるはずだ。

ある参加者が、ロシアと中東はなぜ、広域地域の埒外にあるのかと質問した。これに対し、あるパネリストが、現時点では両地域・国はこの面では大きな役割を果たしていないと述べた。

ランチョン・スピーチ：アンドレアス・フォン・ステヒョー（Andreas von Stechow）大使

日・EU FTA は 2 大貿易国によって運営される。これが多国間主義に大きな亀裂を生むことになるだろうか？　あるいは、地域間 FTA はその名の通り、WTO の意味合いにおける多国間ということになるのか？　FTA の前提条件は、FTA は WTO の規則に厳密に合致しなければならないということである。ドーハラウンドが消滅したため、新しい局面が開かれつつあるのだろうか？　今後 10 年の国家間の政治・経済関係にとって、二国間主義は万能薬になるのか？

日本は第二次世界大戦の敗戦による政治・経済の崩壊から立ち直り、世界の貿易大国として台頭した。この例に匹敵するのはドイツだけであり、両国の復興は驚異的であった。その両国にとっ

て、多国間主義は唯一の道となってきた。日本は多国間主義に立ち戻っており、今やドイツと同じ志を共有する多国間主義的志向の国である。

2002 年以降、欧州委員会は二国間協定の交渉を再開し、ドーハラウンドからの方向転換を図っている。EU は、インド、韓国、ASEAN との交渉を開始した。一方、中国、日本、韓国、ASEAN、米国もさまざまな二国間協定の取り組みに乗り出している。日本などの高物価国間の FTA 交渉戦略は、低物価国との交渉戦略とは異なる。このため、通商戦略をより深く理解するためには、国民一人当たりの GDP を見ることが重要である。例えば、日本にはきわめて高価な高級車市場がある。フォルクスワーゲンの「ゴルフ」の価格はドイツより日本の方がはるかに高いが、これは高い関税のせいではなく、高級車として売られているからである。非関税障壁について議論する際にはこの点も考慮する必要がある。日・EU FTA のスコーピング作業は、互いをよく理解し、2 つの社会がどのように結びついているかを知るための手段である。

問題は、二国間主義への傾斜が多国間主義からの逸脱になるかどうかである。グローバルレベルでの成長を望んでいる中小企業は、FTA の乱立による「スパゲティボウル現象」とそれに伴う原産地規則の違いのために問題を抱えている。現在、多国間主義は衰退傾向にある。新興国・地域（BRIC 諸国）は、現在の世界の枠組みの中で公平な扱いを受けていないと感じている。古い大国が国連安保理で拒否権を発動し、ブレトン・ウッズ体制下で BRIC 諸国が正当に扱われないのは時代遅れとみなされている。その結果、BRIC 諸国が二国間的手法に立ち戻る恐れがある。これには何らかの対策が必要だ。国連のシステム内部から改革を始めなければならない。アナン・パンヤーラチュンの「ブルーリボン・レポート」は、国連安全保障理事会の改革について重要な提案をしていたが､無視された。世界が二国間主義への道を滑り落ちていかないよう、多国間のシステムにもっと正義を持ち込む必要がある。

日独両国は、この多国間主義という点では無理なく連携できる。両国とも多国間システムの価値と貿易のやり方について意見が一致している。両国は、貿易はフェアでなければならず、ウィン・ウィンの関係であるとの考え方に立脚しており、それが両国を緊密に結び付けている。日本とドイツはあらゆる主要セクターにおいて協力し、特に若者がこの取り組みを続けたいと思うよう仕向けなければならない。

セッションⅡ：福島の原発事故：日本とドイツのエネルギーミックスへの影響

モデレーター：エベルハルト・サンドシュナイダー（Eberhard Sandschneider）氏

スピーカー：田中伸男　日本エネルギー経済研究所　特別顧問
田中氏は、私たちがかつてない不確実性の時代に生きていると指摘した。中東産油地域の政治的混乱は石油市場の需給をタイトにするのか？　イランの状況は悪化するのか？　福島の原発事故がどのように影響するのか？　こうした動きを背景に、エネルギーの安全保障と持続可能性の問題が最も重要な政策課題として浮上している。
アジアの新興国・地域が引き続き世界のエネルギー需要を牽引している。2010 年から 2035 年までの間に世界のエネルギー需要は 3 分の 1 程度増加すると予想されており、その増加幅の 3

分の 2 を中国、インドなどのアジア諸国が占める見通しだ。再生可能エネルギーと天然ガスはますます重要になっており、これらの総計がエネルギー需要増加分のほぼ 3 分の 2 を満たすと考えられている。

石油輸入のニーズが変化し、石油安全保障への懸念も変わりつつある。米国の石油輸入は、国内の生産増と輸送効率の改善によって減少する見通しだ。その結果、EU の石油輸入は 2015 年前後に米国を上回る。その後、2020 年前後には中国が最大の輸入国になり、2032 年には最大の消費国になるとみられている。天然ガスについては、中国の需要は 2009 年に 97BCM（10 億立方メートル）でドイツと同程度だったが、2035 年には 502BCM に増加し、2009 年当時の欧州全体の需要と同じ水準になりそうだ。

電力投資は再生可能エネルギー中心だが、このエネルギーは高コストで資本集約型であり、投資の 60％を占めるのに対して追加発電量は 30％と効率が悪い。これ以上の措置がとられなければ、IEA（国際エネルギー機関）の「450 シナリオ」が許容する二酸化炭素排出量の全量が 2017 年までに既存の発電所や工場などによって「ロックイン（固定）」されてしまう。

原発がない場合は三重苦に陥る。再生可能エネルギーの推進にはつながるが、輸入額を押し上げ、エネルギーの分散化は進まず、気候変動との戦いがより困難になる。IEA の「新政策シナリオ」と比べた「低原子力ケース」では、2035 年までに石炭と天然ガスの需要は大幅に高まる。最も影響を受けるのは、原子力への依存を計画していた日本などの資源小国である。すべての原発が停止した場合、日本は 30BCM の天然ガスと日量 5 万バレルの石油を輸入しなければならない。ちなみにドイツは、2022 年までに原発を順次廃止していくために、はるかに多くの天然ガス（16BCM 増）が必要である。このため原子力は、自前のエネルギー資源が少ない（エネルギーの持続可能性が低い）国にとって重要な選択肢である。原子力は、エネルギー安全保障の実現に向けて再生可能エネルギーを補完する、極めて有用な資源である。

現在の IEA のシステムは機能しているのか？　世界の石油需要を IEA の備蓄でカバーできるかどうかを見ると、OECD（経済協力開発機構）以外の石油需要のシェアが高まっているため、IEA の備蓄放出でカバーできる世界需要の比率は低下している。したがって、中国やインドなどの国々も IEA に参加する必要がある。

最後に田中氏は、一方を犠牲にして他方のエネルギー安全保障を高めることはできないと述べた。日本と EU は連携する必要がある。21 世紀のエネルギー安全保障は、エネルギー源の分散化を伴う「包括的な電力供給の安全保障」であるべきだという。EU のモデルである集団的安全保障を成長著しいアジアに応用することは可能である。日本はまた、ロシアにどう対応すればいいかをドイツから学びたいと考えている。さらに、日本は新しい技術でも緊密に連携しなければならない。福島後の教訓を近隣アジア諸国と共有すべきである。原子力を放棄するのではなく、より安全なものにすることが重要である。グローバルなレベルでは、原子力は依然、エネルギー安全保障に必要である。したがって、ドイツはできる限り早く戻ってくるべきである。

スピーカー：ディートハルト・マーゲル（Diethard Mager）教授
教授は、ドイツは、「エネルギー革命（Energiewende）」による抜本的再編に直面していると述べた。このエネルギー・システムの転換は、福島の事故に先立つ 2010 年秋に発表された。ドイツは現在、きわめて意欲的なエネルギー政策目標を掲げている。総発電量に対する再生可能エネルギーの割合を 2050 年に 80％に高めるという目標である。これを達成するため、ドイツは新しい送電網、新しい発電所、より高度な蓄電技術などを必要としている。

新しいエネルギー・システムへの転換は始まったばかりである。これを成功させるためには、家庭と企業にエネルギーを安定的に、かつ手ごろな値段で供給することが重要である。また、技術的に中立で、市場志向且つコスト効率に優れた手段が必要である。さらに、独立したエネルギー委員会による包括的な監視報告も欠かせない。最後に、「エネルギー革命」の成功に向けて、民間部門の投資も必要とされる。

ドイツは、この転換プロセスの中で対応すべき 5 つの課題がある。
1. 送電網の問題（新しい電力ハイウェイ）：「送電網開発計画」が必要である。これを実現するため、政府は免許手続きを 10 年から 4 年に短縮したい意向である。
2. 発電能力の高い天然ガス、石炭ベースの発電所がもっと必要である。これは再生可能エネルギーによる発電の変動を相殺するのに必要である。この点で天然ガスはきわめて重要である。
3. ドイツでは再生可能エネルギーの供給が拡大している。しかし、拡大に伴うコストはきわめて高い。ドイツの消費者は、再生可能エネルギーの推進に 140 億ユーロ超を支払っている。このため、特に太陽光発電の分野でのコスト削減が重要である。補助金による助成期間後、市場に戻るためには柔軟な手段が必要である。
4. エネルギー効率の重要性が高まっている。しかし、この分野ではドイツは支援に頼っており、強制的措置はとっていない。「エネルギー効率基金」が設立された。
5. 新しい蓄電施設やスマートシティなどの革新的技術、新しい風力コンバータ、先端的な車載用燃料電池などを開発するため、エネルギー研究が重要である。

ドイツは、エネルギー供給の再編に向けて多大な努力を払っている。ドイツと日本は同じような状況に直面している。このため両国は、官民およびシンクタンクなどとも緊密に協力すべきである。

スピーカー：エベルハルト・フォン・ロッテンブルグ（Eberhard von Rottenburg）博士
ドイツのような高度な先進工業国がエネルギー転換プロセスをどのように進めていくのかを分析するのは興味深い。2022 年までに原発を順次廃止するとしたドイツ政府の決断は、ドイツ産業界に驚きをもって受け止められた。産業界はこの問題に関する国民的議論から影響を受けなかったわけではない。しかし、ドイツ産業同盟（BDI）は異なるエネルギー権益を持つ多彩なメンバーで構成されている。

BDI にとって、エネルギーミックスの問題はエネルギーの「マジック・トライアングル」の問題である。すなわち、信頼ができて、競争力があって、環境に優しいエネルギーが必要である。幅広いエネルギーミックスは常に望ましい。ドイツの原発の順次廃止は福島の事故の前から始

まっていた。2010 年 9 月、ドイツ政府は急進的なエネルギー構想を発表し、総発電量に占める再生可能エネルギーの比率を今後 40 年で 80％に高めるとした。BDI はこの決定を支持している。

福島の事故では、総需要の 10％前後に相当する 8,000 メガワットの電力が失われた。その結果、電力コストは上昇したが、電圧低下は軽微で、システムの安定は前に比べて若干落ちただけだった。ドイツは欧州の送電網とつながっている。フランスはエネルギーの 80％前後を原子力に依存している。このため、ドイツはこの冬の厳寒期、フランスからの電力輸入に頼った。

最後に博士は、ドイツ産業界にとっての現状を「制御されている緊急事態」と表現した。目下のところ、送電網にまったく余裕はない。博士はドイツ企業にとっての課題を 2 つ挙げた。1）再生可能エネルギーのコスト上昇が産業界にとって大きな問題となっており、将来、さらに上がる可能性がある。2）エネルギー転換プロセスの推進には追加の監視と運営が必要である。ドイツにはエネルギー担当省がないが、関係省庁は協力し、より緊密に連携すべきである。

質疑応答

ある参加者が、日本の国策としてのエネルギー戦略には原子力が含まれているのに、福島の事故後、1 基の原発も定期検査後の再稼動に至っていない点に言及した。日本政府はどのように国民を説得して原発を再稼動させるのか？　このままであれば、日本はドイツより速いペースでエネルギー転換プロセスに入ることになる。あるパネリストはこれに対し、日本政府は原発を利用しない場合、どういう事態に直面するかを国民に説明すべきだと答えた。例えば、イランが戦争に突入すれば、今の日本経済は大きな打撃を受けることになる。このパネリストは、日本は福島から学んでいるはずだと述べた。

ある参加者が、話題となった低炭素技術の投資コストについて質問した。この参加者の考えでは、原子力も安いエネルギーではない。これらの計算にはライフラインのコストを考慮しなければならないし、福島の事故で生じた経済損失も勘案すべきである。そうなると、原子力に競争力があるとはいえなくなる。今こそ日独両国が再生可能エネルギーの面で連携すべき歴史的なチャンスである。両国は再生可能エネルギーに関する共同プロジェクトを立ち上げるべきである。あるパネリストはこれに対し、持続可能なシナリオへの道筋は閉じられようとしていると述べた。CCS（carbon capture & storage：二酸化炭素回収貯留）は現実には機能していないし、再生可能エネルギーは、コストが低下しているもののまだ高いため、支援が必要である。この点で原子力は依然、強みがあり、安定的な選択肢であり、放棄すべきではない。福島の事故の数字を含めても原子力はまだ強みがある。こうした事故の発生頻度は低いことを思い起こしたい。

ある参加者が、原子力エネルギー分野の失業はそのまま雇用全体の失業に反映されるのか、それとも再生可能エネルギー・セクターで創出される新規雇用で相殺されるのかと尋ねた。これに対し、あるパネリストは、原子力セクターでは多くの雇用が失われたこと、その分は再生可能エネルギー分野で創出されていると答えた。しかし、再生可能エネルギーは今のところ、世論の支持によってのみ生きていられる状態である。つまり、その雇用は、補助金がなくても生き残れる市場原理に基づいたものではない。

ある参加者が、日本への天然ガス・石油輸入の 90％はホルムズ海峡を通過する必要があると指摘した。日本は、代替輸入先としてロシアと中国のガス・パイプラインをより重視すべきかも知れない。これに対し、あるパネリストが、ロシアへのガス・パイプラインは計画されてはいるが具体化していないと説明した。日本のガス価格は現在、米国の 4 倍、EU より 50％高い。これを変える必要がある。ひとつの方法は、ロシアからのガス・パイプラインの利用である。

ある参加者が、エネルギー効率に関するドイツ政府の次のステップについて質問した。建築セクターにはエネルギー効率改善への大きな可能性がある。あるパネリストは、政府はエネルギー消費を半減させる意向だと説明した。これは、特に建築セクターでは大きな問題となる。エネルギー効率改善の潜在性はきわめて大きく、ドイツのエネルギー転換プロセスの柱となっている。

ある参加者が複数のパネリストに対し、「ガス発電（power to gas）」構想を詳しく説明するよう求めた。この構想は、パネリストの 1 人が興味深い可能性と捉えていた。ドイツには、利用できるかもしれないガスの既存パイプライン・システムがある。一定の水素量を貯留することは可能だろう。

ある参加者が、アジア、米国、EU では時間当たりのエネルギー価格が投資の決定要因になる時代が来るのではないかと述べた。あるパネリストはこれに対し､時間当たりのエネルギー価格は、教育、社会基盤以外のひとつの要素にすぎないと答えた。ドイツはエネルギーのコストを一定レベルに抑えたいと考えている。工業国であるドイツを守る必要がある。

ある参加者は、エネルギー効率が変化していると述べた。国民 1 人当たりのコストを見る必要がある。あるパネリストはこれに対し、日独は「グリーン成長（環境と持続可能な経済成長）」について二国間で連携すべきだと指摘した。新興各国が生活スタイルを変えない場合、世界は深刻な事態に直面する。中国とインドをグローバルな枠組み（WTO、G10）に引き込むことを共通の関心事とすべきである。このパネリストはまた、日本は、IEA の枠組みに中国とインドを参加させるため、ドイツの支援を得られるとの期待感を示した。エネルギー安全保障にはより重層的なアプローチが必要であり、日独はこの問題で連携できよう。

セッションⅢ：日独は、グローバルな気候変動問題に取り組むための共通の枠組みの構築に向けて、どのような協力ができるか？

モデレーター：エベルハルト・サンドシュナイダー（Eberhard Sandschneider）氏

スピーカー：西村六善大使

西村大使は、国連気候変動ダーバン会議で 2015 年までに新たな合意文書を採択することが決定されたと指摘した。これにより交渉担当者は何が達成できるのか？　京都議定書は、先進国全体の排出量の 5％削減を目標に掲げており、これは、気温上昇 2℃以内といった目標に必要な取り組みとかろうじて一致する。京都議定書は意欲が前面に出ており、科学を優先したものではない。また、各国に責任を負わせる一方、本当の大量排出国は放置し、コストを支払わせず汚

染するに任せている。これが現実である。ニック・スターンはこう述べている。気候変動は市場が失敗した最たる例である。なぜなら市場がないからだと。中国とインドが京都議定書に参加した場合、両国は全参加国がさらに大幅に削減し、さらにコストを支払うよう要求するだろう。

2020 年、2030 年、2050 年の世界は 1960 年代と違っているだろう。確実な解決策がなければ、人々は退屈し、疲れ、意欲をなくし、否定論が幅を利かせるようになる。簡単でコストのかからない解決策がなければ、米国は参加しないし、EU も日本もそうだろう。汚染国に照準を合わせ、コストを支払わせなければ、持続性のある解決策は得られない。中途半端な解決策（ボトムアップの姿勢）は巨額の投資につながり、しかも望ましい目標の達成には至らないだろう。

大使は、パラダイムを“量の削減”から“地球全体の排出上限の枠内での排出量”に変更することを提案した。国別削減システムより、地球全体のカーボン・キャップを設けるべきである。地球全体の排出量を、2℃などの気温目標の枠内で炭素削減計画に盛り込むのである。次の交渉の場で、気候変動の防止に向けた廉価で容易で効果的な解決策が達成されることを期待している。

スピーカー：カルスタン・ザッハ（Karsten Sach）博士
ザッハ氏は、気候変動ダーバン会議は成功と考えてよいと述べた。成功とは相対的なものだからである。今後の道のりを考えれば小さなステップにすぎないが、ダーバンのために策定した目標のすべてを達成することは可能である。ダーバン会議で各国は、以下の主要点について合意した。

1. 全員が排出量削減に向けた法的拘束力を持つシステムで連携することに合意した。この合意は全加盟国を対象とする。この合意は 2015 年の採択をめざしている。これは京都議定書の第二約束期間を見越したものである。
2. 採用されている措置が十分でないことを全ての国が確認した。枠組みの中と外で目標レベルを引き上げる必要があることに全員が同意した。
3. 各国は、将来の合意に向けた基盤として多くの業務的措置をとることで同意した。なかでも、「緑の気候基金（green climate fund）」のためのインフラ構築を始めることで合意した。さらに各国は、技術と技術移転のネットワークの構築を約束した。

どのように先へ進めばいいのか？　196 カ国とハイレベルな目標を設定するのは難しい。グローバルな条約、枠組み、明確なターゲットが必要である。しかし、政治の世界では、個々の国における転換の政策課題と学習プロセスが必要である。国の行動を各国指導者の協力と結びつける必要がある。

事態を進展させるため、日本とドイツには何ができるのか？

1. EU はかねてから、炭素プライシング・メカニズムを EU 排出権取引システム（ETS）に連結させるよう日本に対し申し入れを行っている。これまでのところ EU は、オーストラリアとこの連結を進めることで大きな成果を上げている。

2. 日独のシンクタンクは、共同で将来のありうるシナリオを考案してもよい。
3. 日本は毎年年初に、来るべき 1 年の出来事を予想する「会合」を開く。これらの課題についての意見交換は常に知的な刺激となる。
4. これを大きく発展させ、気候変動問題についての日独対話の正式な場とすべきである。

スピーカー：ダニエル・クリンゲンフェルト（Daniel Klingenfeld）氏

クリンゲンフェルト氏は、各国は 2℃目標で合意したが、これまでの公約のままだと 3.5℃の世界に向かっていると指摘した。これには法的拘束力のない公約も含まれている。このため、提案されている申し入れと 2℃目標の必要性との間には大きな溝がある。消費ベースの CO2 排出量は増えている。多くの新興国、特に中国では排出量が増えている。したがって、有効な解決策のためには、新興国を含むすべての主要排出国を組み込むことが必要である。

ダーバン会議の大きな成果のひとつは、2020 年に発効する包括的合意を 2015 年までに策定するためのロードマップである。今のところは法律上の扱いが決まっておらず、手段の選択も今後に託されている。これは 2015 年までに決定する必要がある。2015 年に成功と呼べるのはどういう状況だろうか？　氏は、3 つの基準を挙げた。1）最大級の排出国、特に急成長しているインド、中国などの国に拘束力を持つ合意、2）遅くとも 2020 年までに世界の排出量が頭打ちになるような効果的な枠組み、3）2℃の目標に沿って世界の排出量を削減する長期的な仕組み。

日本とドイツは、再生可能エネルギーの開発とエネルギー効率戦略の面で主導権を強化することができる。そうすれば、他の国がそれを追随すべき模範とする可能性がある。ただ、これは重要なことだが十分ではない。諸外国に意欲を起こさせる解決策が必要である。それはグローバルなレベルでの公正さと取り組みの共有に関わるものである。最大級の排出国を取り込み、世界全体の排出量の絶対的削減を実現するには、より独創的な解決策を見つけなければならない。

質疑応答

ある参加者が、講演では技術開発の問題が取り上げられていないと指摘した。気候問題は技術の飛躍的進歩によって解決される可能性がある。あるパネリストはこれに対し、技術開発がきわめて重要である点には同意した。しかし、投資の価格を考えずに技術に投資するのは問題がある。このため、投資を行う前には必ず排出価格が決まっていなければならない。別のパネリストも、気候目標を実現するためには技術開発が重要という見方を支持した。ダーバン会議で、各国は枠組みの外での技術ネットワークを約束した。これは、物事が正しい方向に動いていることを示している。別のパネリストは、技術開発はコスト低減の手段になりうると指摘した。これにより、グローバルなコンセンサスがなくても進展を図ることが可能である。

ある参加者は、中国とインドに排出レベルの削減を義務付けるべきだとの考え方を支持した。しかし彼は、多くの批評家はこれを非現実的な発想と見なすだろうと述べた。これに対し、あるパネリストは確かにあまり楽観的になれないと同調した。両国は一貫して立場の違いを主張している（自国は後発国であり、先進国はすでに大量に排出してきた）。両国が前向きになった

としても、ほとんど何もしないだろう。国別削減システムが気温目標に達しないとみられるのもそれが理由だ。したがって、このパネリストは、本気で2℃目標を達成したい場合は、世界全体の排出量に上限を設けることを提案するという。ある参加者が、中国とインドを含むべきだと再び指摘した。G7は、新興国、途上国を含むすべての国に対し、温室効果ガスの排出削減に向けた法的拘束力のある量的義務を守ると確約するよう求めるべきである。G7は、確約に消極的な国には、例えば投資を制限するなどしてもよい。あるパネリストは、中国とインドは参加させるべきだが、同じ扱いであってはならないと応じた。中国は一人当たり排出量がフランスより多いため、中国には参加を求める必要がある。しかし、インドは一人当たりの排出量が2トン未満であるため、まったく違う部類に入る。しかし、このパネリストは中国について楽観的だった。中国は経済成長への悪影響を防ぐため、エネルギー効率の改善を望んでいるからだ。

ある参加者が、EUが別の炭素プライシング・メカニズムへのリンクを日本に申し入れている件について質問した。これに対する日本の反応はどうか？　あるパネリストが、迅速に有効な対策を打つ必要があること、また、この二国間のアプローチでは時間をロスすることになると指摘した。別のパネリストは、日独は連合を組むことを考えるべきだと述べた。日本がこの申し入れを受け入れれば、市場に強力なシグナルを送ることになる。反対に、ドイツに極めてよく似た国である日本への対応ができなければ、将来の協力はおぼつかないとみなされよう。

ある参加者が、グローバルな排出市場の構想は誰もが実施できるようなものかと質問した。ドイツでは炭素市場が悪用されている。あるパネリストはこれに対し、将来に向けた効果的な監視システムを自分が提案するつもりだと応じた。EUの排出権取引システム（ETS）にはいくつかの問題がある。目標が十分に意欲的とはいえないうえ、価格が低すぎる。しかし、悪用は犯罪行為であり、したがってシステム自体は問題視しないが、防犯対策は問題視する。

ある参加者が、排出権取引システム（ETS）の運用では、例えばEUと日本といった具合に特定地域を含むことはありうるのかと質問した。あるパネリストはこれに対し、炭素への課金が排出を抑える最良の方法だと答えた。国レベルでの価格設定より、数カ国での炭素課金のほうが望ましい。しかし、やはり最もよい方法はグローバルな炭素市場である。気温目標を達成するにはグローバル・キャップを設けるべきである。ただし、管理経済の感じを与えるため、国々にグローバル・キャップを分割するのは望ましくない。別のパネリストは、グローバルな排出権取引システムを通して、どの企業、どの人にとって削減が最も容易かを見極めることができると付け加えた。

ある参加者が、2℃の目標を超えてしまった場合、どういうことが起こるのかと質問した。この目標を達成できなかった場合、適応プログラムを考慮すべきではないか。あるパネリストが、現時点ではリスク分析とリスク評価について完全に把握しきれていないと述べた。自分たちがどういう種類のリスクなら引き受けてもよいと思うのかを話し合う必要がある。適応プログラムは、2℃の目標を達成した場合でもきわめて重要である。この気温は世界全体の平均値にすぎないため、一部の地域では気温の上昇幅がそれ以上になる。

閉会の辞

ポール・フォン・マルツァーン大使（Amb. Paul von Maltzahn）

マルツァーン大使は、本シンポジウムのセッションⅠから、日独 FTA は時間の問題ではなく、信頼と決意の問題であることがわかったと述べた。エネルギー戦略については（セッションⅡ）、ドイツは、原子力を順次廃止し、再生可能エネルギーの利用を増やすエネルギーミックスへと大きく舵を切った。大使は議論から、福島の事故を受けて再生可能エネルギーに関する日独共同イニシアチブの機運が高まっているとの感触を得た。気候変動の分野では（セッションⅢ）、参加者は全員、二酸化炭素排出量にグローバル・キャップを設ける必要があるとの点で一致した。このため会議の最後に、日独間に大きなシナジーが生じた。

畠山襄　国際経済交流財団　会長

畠山氏は、最も心に残ったいくつかの点を取り上げたいと述べた。まず、ドイツ側が、日本には依然、非関税障壁があるとした点である。しかし、氏はスコーピング作業についてはきわめて楽観的だった。ドイツ側が、日・EU FTA は EU とインド、EU と米国の FTA より困難ではないと指摘した点には希望を持った。また、その意味で中小企業の役割を重視することも欠かせない。エネルギーの分野で氏が最も強い印象を受けたのは、日本の原子力発電所が定期検査を機に相次いで停止し、このまま地元の反対で再稼動しなければ、ドイツよりはるかに速いペースで原発への部分的依存からゼロ依存へのエネルギー転換を完了することになるという指摘だった。ただ、現段階ではこれは日本政府の意思ではないと氏は述べた。

以下の要約は、ドイツ DGAP 側で作成したものである
（英文サマリー）

Final Summary for JEF DGAP Symposium
How Germany and Japan Cooperate in Major World Issues?

Berlin, February 16, 2012

Welcome and Introduction

Amb. Paul von Maltzahn

Ambassador von Maltzahn emphasized that the symposium would deal with major global issues. Japan had been shaken by a triple catastrophe: the earthquake, the tsunami as well as the nuclear incident. In this symposium we would deal with the consequences of the crises. In addition, Japan had also started a very active policy of free trade agreements (FTAs). Global climate change was also an important issue. In Europe, this problem had been put on the back burner due to the persisting Euro zone crisis. Now we should try to put the record straight again.

Noboru Hatakeyama

Mr. Hatakeyama introduced a new governance model to reform the existing G8 and G20. At the G8 Heiligendamm summit in 2007, Germany had invited a group of five emerging countries to participate (G5). This outreach had lasted for two years until the summit in Italy where the process had been extended. However, there had been no objective criteria for the G8 plus the G5 and therefore no le-gitimacy by international standards. Originally, the G7 used to have objective standards for participation which included the largest economies; however this had changed with the decline of Canadian economy since 1995 below the 7th in the world GDP ranking and the inclusion of Russia that had never gone up high-er than No.8 since 1998. He therefore proposed a new group of G10 which was to be selected by objective criteria, such as a country's GDP share in relation to the world's as well as a country's population share in relation to the world. Ten countries seemed to be a reasonable size to deal effectively with global govern-ance. Based upon 2008 data, if we select member countries in the G10, it will be comprised of the G7 countries with the exception of Canada (G6) and the four BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 2015 would be a good starting point for the G10. In 2015, Germany would host the G8 meeting and no country seems better suited to take the chair because Germany demonstrated its deep understanding through formulating G5.

Session 1: The FTA between the EU and Japan: Benefits and Risks

Naoyuki Haraoka

Mr. Haraoka stressed three points of reference for the discussion: 1) the current status of the bilateral FTA between the EU and Japan; 2) trade and investment as part of a future growth strategy; and 3) the complementarity of FTAs with WTO articles, in particular GATS plus provisions in some FTA agreements.

Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe

The speaker emphasized that his vision of the world economy comprised three mega-regions: The EU, the Americas (including NAFTA and Mercosur) as well as East Asia (ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6). In addition, there were inter-regional coopera-tion agreements: APEC between Asia and the American region, ASEM between the EU and Asia as well as the Transatlantic Marketplace and the Transatlantic Economic Council between the EU and the US. As the Doha Round was in a deep freeze, regional agreements now played a major role in liberalization.

In Asia Pacific, competitive liberalization was taking place in three blocks: 1) ASEAN+3 FTA, 2) ASEAN+6 EPA and 3) the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). In addition, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was emerging. Within these liberalization initiatives, only the TPP was making major progress. There-fore Japan was interested in joining it. Regional economic integration in East Asia had been a business-driven integration through FDI. The production networking had then turned into a de facto integration.

Japan's FTA strategy focused on the economic partnership agreements (EPA). However, the FTA had always been in the middle of this strategy. Other aspects included investment, bilateral cooperation, competition, and government pro-curement. So far, Japan had concluded EPAs with 13 countries in the region and elsewhere. It had started negotiations with Korea, the GCC and Australia. How would Japan proceed from now on? Through the completion of bilateral FTAs/EPAs, Japan wanted to expand to a wider East Asian integration (ASEAN+6) with an integration-oriented approach on the one hand, and an Asia Pacific Agreement (TPP) with a rule-oriented approach on the other hand. The sym-metry of the two directions would then hopefully lead to a FTAAP.

Japan-EU trade relations had started with the Japan-EC Joint Declaration in 1991. The Action Plan for Japan-EU Cooperation from 2001 had led to a friendly and more cooperative relationship. The decade from 2001 until 2010 had thus been a decade of cooperation. EU and Japan shared the same values of Western democ-racy. Therefore, the EIA should be more than a mere FTA/EPA: Japan had there-fore proposed joint works on innovative society, environmental-friendly society, infrastructure for secure society as well as mutual improvements on trade and investment. Through a FTA with Japan, the nominal GDP for the EU could in-crease by 5.5 trillion USD. In May 2011, both sides agreed to launch a "scoping exercise". The EU was looking for tangible improvements in NTBs, government procurement, investment possibilities as well as in

agriculture while Japan want-ed to accelerate the process to fill in the preferential gap with Korea in the EU market. The speaker suggested that the EIA should be more clearly defined, that the entire package should be consistent with WTO rules and that the principle of "single undertaking" should be applied. With respect to the often criticized rail-way products trade balance of Japan with the EU, Japan only had a trade surplus with the UK.

Concluding, the speaker stressed that the TPP had been gaining momentum, that the Japan-EU EPA/EIA could be a solid platform for the EU to strengthen its ties with East Asia and that the scoping exercise should be defined as an integral part of the entire negotiations.

Hubert Knirsch

Japan and the EU belonged to the most important economies in the world and had a strong political partnership. Both also enjoyed good trade relations, con-sisting of 110 billion Euros both ways. However, the relationship was still below its potential.

Japan and the EU were both active supporters of the WTO and the Doha Round which was a firm priority of German trade policy. However, the WTO focused on the question of tariffs, while nowadays NTBs were the most important barrier to trade. Therefore, the EU had launched a strategy of bilateral FTAs among others with Korea, South American countries, Mexico, and India. The EU had been una-ble to conclude an FTA with the ASEAN region; however, there was good pro-gress with individual ASEAN countries like Singapore and Malaysia. The EU Japan FTA was therefore part of a wider picture.

In 2011, the EU and Japan had decided to launch a scoping exercise in order to analyze the risks and opportunities of such a FTA. The danger was that if you failed in the FTA negotiations, you could risk an otherwise good relationship. But the scoping exercise had the same problem. In December 2011, the third round of scoping had taken place, focusing on NTBs. Japan had traditionally low tariffs, but high NTBs. So far, there had been an exchange of lists of areas where the EU wanted progress: among others on open regulations in form of mutual recogni-tion agreements on standards, procedures, and safety regulations. There had been some progress, but success was still not ensured, there was still some work to do. However, this was not a question of time, but a question of good-will and determination. The business community in the EU and Japan had contributed with good-will and determination so that it could happen this year.

Friedolin Strack

Mr. Strack emphasized several points. First, he stressed that the WTO was a very important framework. But the German Chancellor Angela Merkel had said in Da-vos in January 2012 that the time for the Doha Round was over now. With re-spect to bilateral negotiations, he stressed that it was no problem to drop them, if there was no progress on the issue. However, he was confident, that if we en-tered into negotiations with Japan, we would reach a conclusion.

Secondly, regarding the economic situation of the EU and Japan, both countries were strongly interlinked with respect to FDI; however, they were only little in-terlinked with regard to trade in industrial goods. EU-Japanese trade had positive and negative aspects: From 2009 until 2010 trade had increased strongly: German exports to Japan had increased by 20%, while German imports had increased by 60%. So the trade deficit was remarkable. Germany exported 54 billion Euros to China, but only 13 billion Euros to Japan, little more than to India and Korea. Germany had such a large trade deficit because of the high amount of informal trade barriers. Some examples:

1) Within the international automotive standards (OEM), there were 127 standard groups worldwide. Of these, Japan applied only 44 and this was not enough. Therefore the number of European automotive companies was very low in com-parison to other open markets.

2) Japan had high regulations for the registration of new chemical substances which tended to exclude manufacturers from chemical industries.

3) Japan had very specific certification requirements for industrial textiles.
The speaker emphasized that he fully agreed if both sides talked about an eco-nomic agreement. It was fine to abolish tariffs. However, German industries had problems particularly with NTBs; therefore progress in this area was also neces-sary.

Thirdly, the BDI insisted that Japan made commitments in certain areas before the EU entered into negotiations. The implementation of better market access was important to convince German industries that negotiations were worthwhile. So far, there had been no success within the high-level groups who had been negotiating for a long time. If there was no progress in some areas ahead of the negotiations, the German industry would not be interested.

Session I Q&A

The discussion focused on the reservations by German industries and others re-garding a possible FTA between the EU and Japan. Why had these reservations persisted for such a long time? One panelist explained that it was very difficult to fight the image of a closed Japanese economy. In contrast, Japan imported many European products into the Japanese market. In addition, he stressed that there should be no preconditions for entering into FTA negotiations. Another panelist mentioned that it was a good sign of progress that it was now possible to bring the respective industry associations together.

A participant stressed that there had to be preconditions for opening FTA negoti-ations with Japan. Clear signals from Japan to open up its markets (particularly government procurement) were needed. Since 1995 there had been only few successes in the high-level dialogue with Japan. Germany was a pretty open market on NTBs and it needed these preconditions to convince member states and business to enter into negotiations. Another participant added that Japan was not sufficiently integrated into world markets right now. The reservations that were mentioned could be measured: Japanese imports as a share of GDP were 12%, the share of manufactured goods was only 6%.

In comparison, the share of German imports to GDP was 32% and the manufacturing imports around 20%. In his view, the main obstacles were not NTBs but the Japanese language. It was a problem for foreigners to integrate successfully into Japanese network societies. As it was very expensive to enter the Japanese market, the European strategy for preconditions was the right way. Another participant explained that not only the Japanese import ratio but also its export ratio was very low.

A panelist pointed out that the FTA between EU and Korea was completely dif-ferent from the FTA between the EU and Japan. In Korea, the German industries had strong offensive interests, e.g. in machinery.

Another participant replied with respect to the low implementation of interna-tional automotive standards in Japan that these had been established by the EU and worked to the European advantage. In addition, these standards were for big companies and a problem for SMEs. A panelist predicted that the very complex road of FTA patterns would bring us eventually back to the table of the WTO in five to six years. By then, the trade world would be too complex for SMEs to cope with global business.

A participant asked how a FTA between the EU and Japan would fit into the Global Europe strategy of the EU. A panelist confirmed that Global Europe put a priority on negotiations with emerging countries. But in practice, it was not al-ways easy to proceed. The negotiations with Mercosur were difficult; there was some progress with India; Russia was more focused on its Eurasian partners; and a FTA with China was very unrealistic. So the EU was now also looking at estab-lished economies such as Japan and the US which did not seem to be so difficult after all. Another panelist stressed that Global Europe had also introduced the concept of shared values, which was the case in the EU Japanese relationship.

A participant asked about the progress of a FTA between the US and the EU. Was there any effort made in this direction? A panelist stressed that he was very interested in a transatlantic FTA. The main problems were also in the area of reg-ulations and NTBs. However, he was optimistic that we would enter into a scop-ing exercise.

A participant inquired why the EU did not conclude a FTA with ASEAN as a whole, particularly since Myanmar had now changed its policy. A panelist an-swered that the European Commission had a mandate to negotiate a FTA with ASEAN. In 2009, it had been decided to suspend the negotiations as it had not been possible to make any more progress. First, the political framework agree-ments of the EU were an obstacle. But he hoped that it was possible to return to a regional basis eventually. Secondly, there were also economic aspects: The ASEAN countries were industrialized to a different degree. It was very difficult to negotiate with such a diverse group of countries. The TPP also included a diverse set of countries. If it was possible to conclude these negotiations, it would be a strong push for a FTA between the EU and ASEAN.

A participant asked why Russia and the Middle East had been left out of the mega-regions. A panelist emphasized that so far both countries/regions were no major players in this aspect.

Luncheon Speech: Amb. Andreas von Stechow

The FTA between the EU and Japan was managed by two big trading nations. Would this bring a deadly blow to multilateralism? Or were FTAs between re-gions by definition multilateral in the sense of the WTO? A precondition for FTAs was that they had to strictly conform to WTO rules. The Doha Round was dead, so were we approaching a new area? Was bilateralism a panacea to next decade's political and economic interaction of nations?

Japan's rise in world trade after its complete economic and political destruction in WWII was only comparable with that of Germany and the rise of both countries had been spectacular. For both, multilateralism had been the only way. Japan had reverted to multilateralism and was now a like-minded country and multilat-erally-oriented like Germany.

Since 2002, the European Commission had started to negotiate bilateral agree-ments again, thus diverting from the Doha Round. The EU had initiated negotia-tions with India, Korea and ASEAN. Meanwhile China, Japan, Korea, ASEAN and the US had also started numerous bilateral trade initiatives. The strategies for FTA negotiations between high-price countries such as Japan were different from those with low-price countries. It was therefore important to look at per capita GDP to better understand the trade strategy. For example, Japan had a very ex-pensive luxury car market. The VW Golf cost a lot more in Japan than in Germa-ny, but not because of high tariffs but because it was sold as a luxury car. We also had to consider this aspect when talking about NTBs. The scoping exercise for a FTA between the EU and Japan was a means to understanding each other better and to explaining how the two societies were linked.

The question was whether more bilateralism diverted from multilateralism. SMEs which wanted to grow on a global level had problems because of the "spaghetti bowl" of FTAs and their different rules of origin. Today, there was a downhill trend of multilateralism. The new actors (BRIC countries) did not feel justly rep-resented in the existing global fora. It was seen as untimely that old super pow-ers had a veto-right in the UN-SC and no proper representation of BRICS was accepted in the Bretton Woods Institutions. There was a risk that the BRIC coun-tries would turn to bilateral ways as a result. Something needed to be done about this. The reforms had to start from within the UN system. The "Blue Ribbon Re-port" by Anand Panyarachun had been trashed although it contained an im-portant reform proposition of the UN Security Council. We had to bring more justice into the multilateral system to prevent a slide downhill a road of bilateral-ism.

Germany and Japan were natural partners in this multilateral aspect. Both agreed on the values of the multilateral system and on how to conduct trade: both were of the opinion that trade had to be fair, that trade was a win-win situation. This brought both countries closely together. Japan and Germany had to cooperate in all major sectors and they had to motivate especially young people to continue this effort.

Session 2: The Nuclear Incident in Fukushima: Consequences for the En-ergy Mix in Germany and Japan

Nobuo Tanaka

Mr. Tanaka stressed that we were living in a time of unprecedented uncertainties: Would political unrest in producing regions make the oil market tighter? Would the situation with Iran deteriorate? What were the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident? These developments had pushed the issue of energy security and sustainability on top of the agenda.

Asian emerging economies continued to drive global energy demand: From 2010 to 2035 global energy demand would increase by one-third, with China, India and other Asia accounting for two thirds of the predicted growth. Renewables and natural gas would become increasingly important and would collectively meet almost two-thirds of the incremental energy demand.

The changing oil import needs were about to shift concerns about oil security: US oil imports would drop due to rising domestic output and improved transport efficiency. As a consequence, EU imports would overtake those of US around 2015. China would then become the largest importer around 2020 and the largest consumer in 2032. With respect to gas, China's demand had been 97 BCM in 2009, the same as Germany. In 2035, the demand would grow to 502 BCM, the same as Europe as a whole in 2009.

The power investment focused on renewables, but they were costly and capital intensive, representing 60% of investment for 30% of additional generation. Without further action, by 2017 all CO2 emissions permitted in the 450 scenario would be "locked-in" by existing power plants, factories, etc.

There was a trilemma without nuclear power: It would give a boost to renewa-bles, but it would increase import bills, reduce diversity and make it harder to combat climate change. By 2035 in the "Low Nuclear Case" compared with the "New Policies Scenario" coal and natural gas demand would increase strongly. The biggest implications would be for countries with limited energy resources that planned to rely on nuclear power such as Japan: If all nuclear power stations stopped, Japan needed to import 30 BCM of gas and 50 kbd of oil. Germany in comparison needed much more gas (16 BCM) to phase out its nuclear energy by 2022. Nuclear energy was therefore an important option for countries with lim-ited indigenous energy resources (low energy sustainability). Nuclear energy would be a very good complement for renewables to achieve energy security.

Did the current IEA system work? When you looked at the IEA stockholding cover of global oil demand, you could see that the growing share of non-OECD oil demand resulted in declining global demand cover from IEA stocks. Such coun-tries as China and India therefore also needed to join the IEA.

Concluding, he stressed that one could not enhance energy security by risking someone else's: EU and Japan needed to work together. Energy security for the 21st century

needed to be a “comprehensive electricity supply security” with di-versified sources. The EU model of collective security could be applied to grow-ing Asia. Japan also wanted to learn from Germany how to deal with Russia. In addition, Japan also had to work closely with new technologies. It should share the lessons after Fukushima in neighboring Asia: It was important not to give up nuclear power, but to have safe nuclear power. On a global level, nuclear energy was still necessary for energy security. Therefore, Germany should come back as soon as possible.

Prof. Diethard Mager

The speaker stressed that Germany was facing fundamental restructuring due to the “Energiewende”, the transformation of our energy system, which had been presented in the fall of 2010, even before the incident in Fukushima. Germany had very ambitious energy policy objectives: In the power generating sector, Germany wanted to have at least 80% out of renewable energies in 2050. To achieve this, Germany needed new power grids, new power plants, more storage technologies, etc.

Germany was at the beginning of the transformation into a new energy system. In order to be successful, we needed to ensure that the energy supply remained secure and affordable for private households and industry. We also needed tech-nology-neutral, market-oriented and cost efficient instruments. In addition, a comprehensive monitoring report by an independent energy commission was necessary. Lastly, also private sector investment was needed to make the “Ener-giewende” successful.

Germany faced five challenges in this transformation period that it needed to deal with:

1) The electricity grid question (new electricity highways): Germany needed a “grid development plan”. In order to achieve this, it wanted to shorten its licensing procedures from ten to four years.
2) Germany needed more gas and coal-based power stations with high ca-pacity. It was necessary to offset the fluctuations of energy coming from renewables. Gas was very relevant in this aspect.
3) Germany was in a good process of expanding the supply of renewable energy. However, the expansion was very expensive: In Germany, con-sumers paid more than 14 billion Euros on the promotion of renewables. Therefore cost reductions were important, particularly in the area of pho-tovoltaic. Flexible instruments were needed to return to the markets after a period of subsidies.
4) Energy efficiency was becoming increasingly relevant. However, in this ar-ea Germany relied on support and not on compulsory measures. An “en-ergy efficiency fund” had been set up.
5) Energy research was important to look for new storage facilities, new and innovative technologies such as smart cities, new energy wind converters, advanced fuel cells for automobiles, etc.

Germany had made a tremendous effort to restructure its energy supply. Ger-many

and Japan faced similar situations; therefore both should be in close coop-eration with public and private sectors as well as with think tanks.

Dr. Eberhard von Rottenburg

It was interesting to analyze how a highly-industrialized country like Germany managed the energy transformation process. The decision of the German gov-ernment to phase out its nuclear energy until 2022 had been a surprise for Ger-man industries. They had not been unaffected by public discussions on this issue. However, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) consisted of a variety of members with different energy interests.

For the BDI, the question of the energy mix depended on the magic triangle of energy: we needed reliable, competitive and environmentally friendly energy. It was always good to have a broad mix of energy. The nuclear phase out in Ger-many had started before the incident of Fukushima. In September 2010, the German government had presented a radical energy concept: 80% of the energy should come from renewables over the next 40 years. The BDI had supported the German government in this decision.

The accident in Fukushima had cut 8.000 Megawatt of electricity, around 10% of total demand. Prices rose as a consequence, but there had been only a tiny drop-out and the system had been slightly less stable than before. Germany was con-nected to the European power grid. France received around 80% of its energy from nuclear energy. In the cold weeks of this winter, Germany therefore relied on France for its energy imports. Concluding, the speaker described the present situation as a "controlled emer-gency situation" for German industry. At the moment there was no more single reserve in the grid. He mentioned two challenges for German business: 1) the rising costs for renewables posed a severe problem for German industry and it might rise even higher in the future. 2) Extra monitoring and steering was neces-sary to lead through the energy transformation process. Germany had no energy ministry, but the affected ministries should cooperate and work together more closely.

Session II Q&A

A participant mentioned that despite the fact that Japan's national energy strategy included nuclear power, not one of the nuclear plants had been restarted after regular checkups in Japan after the incident in Fukushima. How was the Japanese govern-ment going to convince the public to restart any new nuclear plant? If this wasn't changing, Japan would be faster than Germany in the energy transformation pro-cess. A panelist answered that the Japanese government should explain to the public what kind of consequences it would face if nuclear power was not used. For example, if Iran went to war, it would be a catastrophe for the Japanese economy at the moment. He was convinced that Japan had learned from Fuku-shima.

A participant inquired about the investment costs for low-carbon technologies that were mentioned. In his view, nuclear energy was also not a cheap option. We had to

consider the life-line costs in these calculations. In addition, we need-ed to include the economic loss as a result of the Fukushima incident. Then, nu-clear energy would no longer be competitive. Both Germany and Japan now had a historic opportunity to work together on renewable energies. They should both start a joint project on renewables. A panelist answered that the door to the sus-tainable scenario was closing: CCS was not really working; renewable energies were costly, even when the costs were coming down. Therefore we needed a backup: Nuclear energy was still relatively competitive in this aspect and it was also a stable option which we should not give up. Even if we included the fig-ures of Fukushima, nuclear energy remained competitive. One had to bear in mind the low frequency of these occurrences.

A participant asked whether the loss of jobs in the area of nuclear energy was an overall job loss or whether it was compensated by new jobs created in the re-newable energy sector. A panelist answered that many jobs had been lost in the nuclear energy sector, and that jobs had been created in the area of renewables. However, renewables so far could only live on public support. Therefore they were not market-based jobs which could survive without subsidies.

A participant stressed that 90% of the gas and oil imports to Japan had to pass the Strait of Hormuz. Maybe Japan should focus more on Russian and Chinese gas pipelines as an alternative. A panelist explained that a gas pipeline to Russia had been planned, but that it had not materialized. Japanese gas price at the moment was four times higher than in the US and 50% higher than in the EU. This needed to change; one way would be through gas pipelines from Russia.

A participant inquired about the next steps of the German government with re-spect to energy efficiency. There was a huge potential for energy efficiency in the building sector. A panelist emphasized that the government wanted to reduce the energy consumption by half. This was a serious challenge, particularly in the building sector. There was an enormous potential for energy efficiency which was a central part of the energy transformation process in Germany.

A participant asked the panelists to elaborate on the idea of power to gas. This idea was seen as an interesting possibility by one of the panelists. Germany had an existing pipeline system for gas which might be used. It would be possible to store a certain amount of hydrogen.

A participant wondered if a time would come when energy price per hour was the decisive factor for investment in Asia, the US or the EU. A panelist answered that energy price per hour was only one aspect besides education, infrastructure, etc. Germany wanted to keep the costs for energy at certain level. We needed to keep Germany as an industrial country.

A participant mentioned that energy intensity had changed. We needed to look at the per capita costs. A panelist answered that Germany and Japan should work together bilaterally on “green growth”. If the emerging economies did not change their way of life, we would all be in deep trouble. It had to be a common con-cern to engage China

and India into the global framework (WTO, G10). He also hoped that Japan would get the support of Germany to involve China and India in the framework of the IEA. We all needed a more multi-layered approach to energy security and Germany and Japan could work together on this issue.

Session 3: How Japan and Germany Can Cooperate to Build Up a Common Framework to Address the Issue of Global Climate Change?

Amb. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura

Ambassador Nishimura pointed out that it had been decided at the climate con-ference in Durban to create a new agreement starting by 2015. What could nego-tiators achieve through this? The Kyoto Protocol aimed at a 5% reduction for in-dustrial countries which was barely fitting the efforts needed for targets like the 2°C goal. The Kyoto Protocol was ambition driven, but not science driven. It also threw responsibility to governments while it let the true polluters stay idle and pollute free of charge. This was the reality. Nick Stern had said that climate change was the greatest example of market failure, because there was no market. If China and India were to join the Kyoto Protocol, they would demand that eve-ryone cut even more deeply and pay more.

The world will be different by 2020, 2030, 2050 from 1960s. Without sure solu-tions people would get bored, tired and deserted and breed denialism. Without easy and cheap solutions, Americans would not come on board and the EU and Japan neither. Without taking aim at the polluters and making them pay, there would be no durable solutions. Half solutions (bottom-up attitude) would result in huge investments and yet would not achieve the desired targets.

He was proposing to change the paradigm from reduction to emissions-within-global-cap paradigm. There should be a global carbon cap rather than national abatement systems. The global emissions should be contained within the carbon budget for temperature target like 2 °C. The hope was that the next round of ne-gotiations would achieve cheap, easy and effective solutions to prevent climate change.

Dr. Karsten Sach

Mr. Sach emphasized that the climate conference in Durban could be seen as a success because success was relative: Compared to where we needed to go, it had been only a small step. However, we were able to achieve all the goals we had set out for Durban. In Durban, countries had agreed on the following main points:

1) There had been an agreement that all countries should go together in a legally binding system to reduce emissions. This agreement should cover all member states. There was a window for this agreement until 2015. This allowed for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
2) There was an acknowledgment of all countries that the steps that were taken were not enough. Everyone agreed that there was the need for rais-ing ambition

levels within the framework and outside.

3) Countries had agreed on a number of operational steps as building blocks for a future agreement. Among others, countries had agreed to start build-ing the infrastructure for a Green Climate Fund. In addition, countries had committed to creating technology and transfer networks.

How to move forward? It was difficult to create a high level of ambition with 196 countries. We needed a global treaty, a framework, and clear targets. But in poli-tics, we also needed transformation agendas within the individual countries and a learning process. National action needed to be combined with leadership coop-eration.

What could Japan and Germany do to move things forward?

1) There was a standing offer from the EU to Japan to link its carbon pricing mechanism to the EU emission trading system (ETS). So far, the EU had been quite successful in developing this linkage with Australia.
2) German and Japanese think tanks could develop possible future scenarios together.
3) Japan always had a "sketching meeting" early in the year about what would happen in the upcoming year. An exchange on these issues was always intellectually inspiring.
4) There should be a much more formal setting of dialogue between Ger-many and Japan on climate change issues.

Daniel Klingenfeld

Mr. Klingenfeld emphasized that countries had agreed on a 2°C target, but ac-cording to the pledges so far, we were heading for a 3.5°C world. This included even the non-binding pledges that were made. So there was a large gap between the offers that were on the table and the necessity of the 2°C target. There was a growing consumption-based CO2 footprint. In many emerging countries, particu-larly in China, emissions had gone up. For an effective solution it was therefore necessary to integrate all major emitters, including the emerging countries.

One major outcome of the Durban climate conference had been a roadmap to craft a comprehensive agreement until 2015, taking into effect in 2020. So far, the legal status had not been decided and the choice of instruments remained open. This needed to be decided by 2015. What could be called a success in 2015? The speaker proposed three benchmarks: 1) an agreement that would bind the largest emitters, especially the fastest-growing ones like India and China; 2) an effective framework that would bring about the global emissions peak by 2020 the latest; 3) a long-term structure that would reduce global emissions in line with the 2°C guard rail.

Germany and Japan could strengthen their leadership in renewable energy de-ployment and energy efficiency strategies. This could be a role model for other countries to follow suit. Even though this was important, it was not enough. We needed solutions to

motivate others. This was about fairness and effort-sharing on a global level. In order to integrate the largest emitters and to bring about absolute global emission reductions you needed to find more creative solutions.

Session III Q&A

A participant pointed out that the issue of technology and development had not been mentioned in the presentations. There was a possibility that the climate problem could be solved though a technological breakthrough. A panelist agreed that technology development was indeed crucial. However, there was a problem to invest in technology without regarding the price of the investment. Therefore, there must be a price on emissions before an investment was made. Another panelist also subscribed to the view that in order to achieve the climate targets, technological development was important. In Durban, countries had committed to technology networks outside the framework. This was a signal that the devel-opment was moving in the right direction. Another panelist stressed that technol-ogy development could be a means to lower costs. Through this, progress was possible without any global consensus. However, this could only be seen as a second-best strategy because it was necessary to "lock in" the progress that had been made so far.

A participant supported the idea that China and India should be bound to cut their emission levels. However, he argued that many critics would regard this as an unrealistic idea. A panelist agreed that he was not very optimistic about this. Both countries continued to use the argument about their difference (they came late; advanced countries had already polluted so much). Even if both countries came forward, they would do only little. This was also why the national abate-ment systems would not achieve the temperature goal. He would therefore pro-pose to put a cap on global emissions if we really wanted to achieve the 2°C tar-get. A participant reiterated that China and India had to be included. The G7 should request a commitment for every country including emerging and develop-ing countries to observe a binding quantified obligation to reduce GHG emission. The G7 could restrict investment e.g. into countries which were not willing to commit. A panelist agreed that China and India should be on board but not on the same fitting: China had more emissions per capita than France so we needed to get China on board. India however, had less than 2 t per capita and was as such in a totally different category. Nonetheless, he was optimistic about China which wanted to become more energy efficient in order to prevent any negative impact on its growth.

A participant inquired about the EU's offer to Japan to link the different carbon pricing mechanisms. What was Japan's reaction to this? A panelist argued that we needed do something effective quickly and that we would lose time through this bilateral approach. Another panelist stressed that Germany and Japan should try to form a coalition. It would send a strong signal to the markets if Japan accepted this offer. On the other hand, if we did not manage to deal with Japan, which was a very similar country to Germany, it

could be seen as a bad sign for future cooperation.
A participant asked how foolproof the idea of a global emissions market could be implemented. In Germany there had been a misuse of the carbon market. A panelist answered that he would propose an effective monitoring system for the future. The EU ETS had several problems: the targets were not ambitious enough and the price was too low. However, the misuse had been a criminal offense and as such would not speak against the system but against the security precautions.

A participant wanted to know whether the ETS could be operated to include cer-tain areas, e.g. the EU and Japan. A panelist replied that a price on carbon was the best way to mitigate emissions. It was better to put a price on carbon on sev-eral countries than to put the price on a national level. But the best way was still a global carbon market. We had to cap globally to achieve our temperature ob-jectives. However, we should not divide the global cap to different countries as this was going to give a sense of managed economy. Another panelist added that you could find out through a global emission trading system for which compa-nies and people it would be most easy to reduce.

A participant asked what would happen if we reached above the 2°C target. If we missed this goal, it could be worthwhile to think of adaptation programs. A panelist pointed out that we did not have a complete picture about the risk anal-ysis and risk evaluation so far. We needed to discuss what type of risks we were willing to take. Adaptation programs were very important, even if we achieved the 2°C target. This temperature was just an average worldwide, so in some re-gions the temperature rise would be even higher.

Closing Ceremony

Amb. Paul von Maltzahn

Ambassador von Maltzahn emphasized that he had learned from the first session of the symposium that the FTA between Germany and Japan was not a question of time but a question of good-will and determination. Regarding the energy strategy (second session), Germany had changed its energy mix away from nu-clear energy towards the use of renewable energies. He had learned from the discussion that after the incident in Fukushima, there could now be an oppor-tunity for a joint German Japanese initiative on renewable energies. In the area of climate change (third session), the participants had all agreed on the need for a global cap on carbon emissions. So at the end of the conference, a lot of syner-gies between Germany and Japan had emerged.

Noboru Hatakeyama

Mr. Hatakeyama mentioned that he wanted to stress some points he was most impressed by: German side statement that Japan still had NTBs. Nonetheless he was quite optimistic about the scoping exercise. It was an encouraging sign that a German told that the FTA between the EU and Japan might not be more diffi-cult than other FTAs between the EU and India or the US. It was also vital to stress the role of SMEs in this context. In

the field of energy, he was mostly im-pressed by the statement that if Japanese nuclear power plants were shut down one after another on the occasion of regular inspection and would not start again due to the oppositions from local communities, Japan would have completed the energy transformation from partly nuclear dependent to non nuclear dependent much earlier than Germany. At this stage, this is not the intention of Japanese Government, he said.

7. 発表資料

セッション 1

① Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe,
Keio University

"Strengthening and Institutionalizing Japan – EU Economic Relations"

セッション 2

② Mr. Nobuo Tanaka
Global Associate for Energy Security and Sustainability;
The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan; Former Executive Director of the International Energy Agency

"What can we do together for Energy Security & Sustainability in the 21st Century?"

セッション 3

③ Amb. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura
Visiting Fellow at Japan Institute for in charge of Climate change;
Former Ambassador in charge of for Global Environment and Chief Climate Negotiator in Japan; Former Ambassador to OECD and to Mexico

"After 2020, the same game or what?"

④ Mr. Daniel Klingenfeld
MPP, M.Sc., WBGU Research Analyst, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)

"The Urgency to Reach more than another Deal Japan's and Germany's Role in International Climate Policy "

①Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe

Strengthening and Institutionalizing Japan – EU Economic Relations

Prof. Yorizumi WATANABE
Faculty of Policy Management
Keio University
Berlin, February 16, 2012

Outline

- Recent Development in Asia-Pacific: APEC 2010/2011 and beyond
- Japan's FTA: Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)---Achievements and Challenges
- Japan – EU Economic Relations: from Conflicts to Cooperation
- Institutionalizing Cooperation through Japan-EU Comprehensive Partnership Agreement

Three Mega-Regions



Competitive Liberalization in Asia-Pacific

ASEAN+3 FTA
(ASEAN, Japan, China, Korea)

November 2004
Proposed by China at ASEAN+3 Summit

Population (thousand)	2,059,400
Trade (million $)	2,533,847
GDP (million $)	9,899,420
Intra-regional trade	43.1%

ASEAN+6 EPA
(ASEAN , Japan, China, Korea India, Australia, New Zealand)



August 2006
Proposed by Japan at ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting

Population (thousand)	3,207,960
Trade (million $)	2,893,252
GDP (million $)	13,835,060
Intra-regional trade	43.6%

Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)



November 2006
Proposed by the US

Population (thousand)	2,677,790
Trade (million $)	8,469,530
GDP (million $)	35,412,050
Intra-regional trade	67.1%


APEC-wide Free Trade
Emergence of TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)
FTAAP
(ASEAN、日中韓、NAFTA、ペルー、チリ、香港、台湾、ロシア、[illegible])
NAFTA
(アメリカ・カナダ・メキシコ)
ASEAN＋3(日中韓)
ASEAN
(インドネシア、フィリピン、ベトナム、タイ、マレーシア、カンボジア、ラオス、シンガポール、ブルネイ)
ASEAN＋3(日中韓)＋3(印豪NZ)
FTAA
MERCOSUR
(アルゼンチン、ウルグアイ、パラグアイ、ブラジル、ベネズエラ)
P4・P9 (TPP)
(NZ、シンガポール、ブルネイ、チリ、＋米、豪、ペルー)
APEC参加メンバー：ASEAN7カ国(ブルネイ、インドネシア、マレーシア、フィリピン、タイ、ベトナム、シンガポール)、日本、韓国、中国、中国香港、チャイニーズタイペイ、メキシコ、パプアニューギニア、豪、NZ、米、カナダ、ペルー、チリ、ロシア、
12-03-12
Yorizumi Watanabe, Keio University


地域経済統合の深化 APEC-wide Economic Integration
FTAAP(アジア太平洋自由貿易圏)構想の実現に向けた具体的取組
・日中韓FTA、ASEAN+3(EAFTA)、ASEAN+6(CEPEA)、TPP等の広域連携をFTAAPにつなげる
・日本は、09年12月に新成長戦略(基本方針)において、以下を閣議決定。
「2020年を目標にFTAAPを構築する。我が国としての道筋(ロードマップ)を策定する」
ASEAN＋3(EAFTA)
(ASEAN・日・中・韓)
FTAAP構築に向けた広域経済連携の推進
日中韓(Japan, China, Korea)
TPP(環太平洋経済連携協定)
ASEAN＋6(CEPEA)
(ASEAN・日・中・韓・印・NZ・豪)
FTAAP(APEC)
ベトナム
ブルネイ
米国
TPP
シンガポール
ペルー
チリ
豪州
ニュージーランド
12-03-12

Intra-regional Trade (%)

		East Asia	EU(15)	NAFTA
Export	1980年	33.9	61.0	33.6
	2003年	50.5	61.4	55.4
Import	1980年	34.8	56.9	32.6
	2003年	59.7	63.5	39.9

Source：Japan Economic Journal（5/11/2004）

Regional Economic Integration in East Asia and TPP

- Business-driven integration through FDI
- Production networking = *de facto* integration
- How to consolidate and improve the merits of such development ?
- ⇒ Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) since 2001
- APEC as an Incubator of free trade/investment
- TPP to legally bind liberalization efforts within APEC ⇒ FTAAP by 2020

Economic Partnership Agreement
EPA: Japan's FTA Strategy



Substance of Japan's EPA

		Trade in goods			Trade in service				Investment				Government Procurement	Intellectual Property	Competition	Improvement Of Business Environment	Cooperation	Energy and Mineral Resources
		Market Access	SPS/TBT	Mutual Recognition	Market Access	National Treatment	MFN Treatment	Movement of Natural Person	National Treatment	MFN Treatment	Prohibition of performance requirements	Dispute Settlement between state and investor						
ASEAN	Vietnam	○	○		○	○		○			○				○	○	○	
	Philippine	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○			○	○	○	○	
	ASEAN	○	○														○	
	Brunei	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○				○	○	○
	Indonesia	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
	Thailand	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	
	Malaysia	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	
	Singapore	○		○	○	○		○	○		○	○	○	○	○			
Latin America	Chile	○	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
	Mexico	○	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	
EFTA	Switzerland	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		

Japan's FTA/EPA Achievement so far

- Japan-Singapore EPA (in force since 2002.11)
- Japan-Mexico EPA (negotiations started in 2002.11, in force since 2005.4)
- Japan-Malaysia EPA (in force since 2006.7)
- Japan-Chile EPA (negotiations started in 2006.2, in force since 2007.9)
- Japan-Thailand EPA (agreement in substance 2005.9, in force 2007.11)
- Japan-Indonesia EPA (negotiations started in2005.7, in force 2008.7)
- Japan-Brunei EPA (negotiations started in 2006.6, in force 2008.7)
- Japan-ASEAN EPA (negotiations started in 2005.4, in force 2008.12)
- Japan-Philippines EPA (agreement in substance 2004.11, in force 2008.12)
- Japan-Switzerland EPA (negotiations started in 2007.5, in force 2009.2)
- Japan-Vietnam EPA (negotiations started in 2007.1, signed 2008.12)
- Japan-India EPA (negotiations started in 2007.1, agreed in substance 2010.10)
- Japan-Peru EPA (negotiations started in 2009.5, agreed in substance 2010.11)

- Japan-Korea EPA (negotiations started in 2003.12, suspended in 2004.11)
- Japan-GCC EPA (negotiations started in 2006.9)
- Japan-Australia EPA (negotiations started in 2007.4)

Direction of Japan's EPA strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region



Japan-EU Trade Relations
--- From Conflict to Cooperation ---

- The Japan-EC Joint Declaration in 1991: wider cooperation encompassing from economic matters to political dialogue
- The Decade of Japan-EU Cooperation (2001-2010)
- The Action Plan for Japan-EU Cooperation in December 2001
- Shared Common Values: Democracy, Human Rights, Rule of Law, Market Economy

Japan's Concept on EIA

- Japan and EU are close partners sharing the same values of western democracy such as human rights, market principles, rule of law
- Both Japan and EU are heavily involved in the regional integration in respective regions
- Japan should like to share the notion of "Four Freedoms" sought by EC during last 50 years
- Even closer relations between Japan & EU shall be beneficial also to the multilateral system
- EIA should be more than mere FTA/EPA

Japan's Proposals on EIA

- Joint works on Innovative Society: cooperation in IPRs, in building next-generation networks, human resource exchanges, etc
- Joint works on Environment-friendly Society: cooperation in rule-making, climate change
- Joint works on infrastructure for secure society :secure trade, wider scope for MR, e-commerce
- Mutual improvement on Trade & Investment: elimination of duties, more investment, etc.

Possible Benefit of FTA for EU (RIETI Study)

- Nominal GDP (US$ trillion, 2010): 5.5 with Japan compared to 1.0 with Korea, 1.7 with India
- FTA's Impact on EU's Real GDP (%): 0.12 with Japan compared to 0.07 with Korea, 0.09 with India

The Japan-EU Summit May 27-28 2011

- An agreement on the launch of preliminary talks: "scoping exercise"
- EU seeks tangible improvement in NTMs (Non-Tariff Measures), Government Procurement, more Investment Possibilities, and Agriculture
- Japan wants to accelerate the process to fill in the preferential gap with Korea in the EU market

Some Suggestions

- EIA should be more clearly defined; to the Japanese side EIA=FTA/EPA + more cooperation,
  to the European side EIA=FTA/EPA – tariffs ?
- Any agreement between Japan and the EU should be consistent with the WTO rules
- The principle of "Single Undertaking" should be applied from the outset of the negotiations i.e. "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"

Railway Products trade balance of Japan with the European countries
(Source : Trade statistics of the Ministry of Finance, Japan)

Nations	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Average	Total
France	−811	−490	−528	−44	−330	−892	111	−3,394	−236	−164	−678	−6,778
Germany	−2,150	−2,645	−2,405	−834	−1,308	−2,325	−2,380	−3,455	−248	−318	−1,807	−18,069
Italy	−1,556	−27	−733	−2,493	−1,285	−2,815	−608	−899	−1,314	−2,146	−1,388	−13,876
U.K.	−572	−284	−582	−322	−513	−1,523	5,555	14,975	14,026	−54	3,071	30,706
Austria	−1,258	−1,225	−1,078	−679	−3,622	−5,312	−4,619	−4,598	−5,908	−4,953	−3,325	−33,252
EU Total	−5,639	−4,868	−3,527	−1,666	−7,628	−14,477	−3,613	2,141	6,202	−8,375	−4,145	−41,451
World Total	50,214	36,507	32,145	77,940	127,812	69,685	57,899	81,443	55,797	47,998	63,744	637,440

JPY in millions

Today's Conclusion

- TPP has been gaining a momentum: US seems successful in associating herself with the dynamic development of the Asian economy
- Japan-EU EPA/EIA could be a solid platform for EU to strengthen its economic ties with East Asia
- The Scoping Exercise should be defined as an integral part of the entire negotiations towards a possible Japan – EU EPA/EIA

Thank you for your attention
--- Free Trade for a Better Future ---
ご清聴有難うございました。

②Mr. Nobuo Tanaka





Asian emerging economies continue to drive global energy demand

IEA WEO 2011



Global energy demand increases by one-third from 2010 to 2035, with China, India and other Asia accounting for two thirds of the growth

3

Natural gas & renewables become increasingly important

IEA WEO 2011



Renewables & natural gas collectively meet almost two-thirds of incremental energy demand in 2010-2035

4

Changing oil import needs are set to shift concerns about oil security

IEA WEO 2011



US oil imports drop due to rising domestic output & improved transport efficiency: EU imports overtake those of the US around 2015; China becomes the largest importer around 2020

5

Asian demand for gas grows much faster.

Figure 2.18 • Natural gas demand and the share of imports by region in the New Policies Scenario, 2009 and 2035



IEA WEO 2011

Note: Other Asia had net natural gas exports of 56 bcm in 2009.

China's demand is 97 BCM in 2009, same as Germany,
In 2035 it grows to 502 BCM same as Europe as a whole in 2009

6

Power investment focuses on low-carbon technologies but it is costly.



Renewables are often capital-intensive, representing 60% of investment for 30% of additional generation, but bring environmental benefits & have minimal fuel costs

7

The door to 2°C is closing, but will we be "locked-in" ?

WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011



Without further action, by 2017 all CO_2 emissions permitted in the 450 Scenario will be "locked-in" by existing power plants, factories, buildings, etc

8

Second thoughts on nuclear would have far-reaching consequences in Security

IEA WEO 2011

- "Low Nuclear Case" examines impact of nuclear component of future energy supply being cut in half
- Gives a boost to renewables, but increases import bills, reduces diversity & makes it harder to combat climate change
- By 2035, compared with the New Policies Scenario:
  - *coal demand increases by twice Australia's steam coal exports*
  - *natural gas demand increases by two-thirds Russia's natural gas net exports*
  - *Renewables power increases by 550TWh = 5 times of RE in Germany*
  - *power- sector CO_2 emissions increase by 6.2%*
- Biggest implications for countries with limited energy resources that planned to rely on nuclear power. Japan needs to import 30 BCM of gas and 50kbd of oil if all nuclear power stations stop. (It means $40 Billion .)

9

Germany may needs much more Gas to phase out Nuclear by 2022



Germany needs to import 16 BCM of gas to achieve electricity mix with 10% demand reduction, no nuclear, 35% renewables and CO2 at the target level

10

Power grid in Europe



Source : IEA "Electricity Information 2010"
Indicative value for Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) in Continental Europe

11

Power grid in Japan



Source: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electric Power System Council of Japan, The International Energy Agency

12

Energy mix as Energy Security Mix



Nuclear is an important option for countries with limited indigenous energy resources (low energy sustainability).

13

Does current IEA system continue to work?



Growing share of non-OECD oil demand results in declining global demand cover from IEA oil stocks

14

Russia's focus will move to the East

IEA WEO 2011

Russian revenue from fossil fuel exports



An increasing share of Russian exports go eastwards to Asia, providing Russia with diversity of markets and revenues

15

Current and Future routes of China's Importation of Oil and Gas

Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts

16

Connecting MENA and Europe: Desertec as "Energy for Peace"



Source: DESRETEC Foundation

17

Existing and proposed ASEAN Power Grid Interconnections

18

Energy for Peace in Asia ? A New Vision

Demand Leveling (Time Zone & Climate Difference)
Stable Supply (through regional interdependence)
Fair Electricity Price

Phase 3

Asia Super Grid

Total 36,000km

Presentation by Mr. Masayoshi SON

19

One cannot enhance energy security by risking someone else 's: EU and Japan can work together for,,,

-Energy Security for the 21st Century must be Comprehensive Electricity Supply Security with Diversified sources, such as oil, gas, renewables, cleaner coal and safer nuclear, under sustainability constraints.

-EU Model of Collective Energy Security can be applied to the growing Asia.

- Enlarge IEA' s oil emergency preparedness to Asia and other fuels
- Develop Regional Power Grid interconnection & Gas Pipelines

-Deploy a green growth paradigm by Efficiency, decentralized Renewables, EVs, Smart Grids, Storage, etc.

-New technologies help; hydrogen economy, Methane-hydrate , 4G Nuclear power, Super-conductivity grid, CCUS, etc .

-Develop unconventional gas resources and infrastructure.

-For coal to remain the backbone of power supply, CCS readiness & highly efficient power plants are needed.

-Japan' s role after Fukushima: Share the lessons learned for safer Nuclear Power deployment in neighboring Asia.

20

Annex

21

Low Nuclear Case

IEA WEO 2011

Table 12.3 • Key projections for nuclear power in the New Policies Scenario and the Low Nuclear Case

	Low Nuclear Case			New Policies Scenario		
	OECD	Non-OECD	World	OECD	Non-OECD	World
Gross installed capacity (GW)						
in 2010	326	68	393	326	68	393
in 2035	171	164	335	380	252	633
Share in electricity generation						
in 2010	21%	4%	13%	21%	4%	13%
in 2035	9%	5%	7%	21%	8%	13%
Gross capacity under construction (GW)*	14	54	69	14	54	69
New additions in 2011-2035 (GW)**	6	84	91	111	167	277
Retirements in 2011-2035 (GW)	176	42	218	71	36	107

*At the start of 2011. **Includes new plants and uprates, but excludes capacity currently under construction.

22

$39 Trillion and more Investment is needed for energy Infrastructure

IEA WEO 2011

Figure 2.21 • Cumulative investment in energy-supply infrastructure by region in the New Policies Scenario, 2011-2035



23

③Amb. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura

After 2020, the same game or what?

Yoshi Nishimura
(All personal views)

Can **national reduction obligation system** achieve temperature targets and keep economies thriving?

KP is for 5% reduction and barely fitting to awesome efforts needed for targets like 2℃
KP is ambition driven and not science driven,
KP throws responsibility to governments; governments busy doing interventionist PAM. KP lets true beneficiaries (polluters) stay idle and pollute Commons free of charge.
"Market failure" (Nick Stern and W. Nordhaus etc). There is no market…
China and India, joining KP, would demand AI countries cut even more deeply
KP is entirely reduction system and climate financing is a separate business
…Despite genuine intentions, raising a large climate funding seems unlikely…yet…

….The AI **governments** almost inevitably must cut even more and pay more. Is this tenable? And, can we achieve any target?

Not because AI governments don't like to cut more and pay more, **but because…**

The world is totally different by 2020, 2030, 2050 from 1960s…
Without sure solutions, people get bored, tired, deserted and breed denialism
Without easy and cheap solutions, int'l bureaucracies prosper and governments perish
Without easy and cheap solutions, Americans won't come on board..EU, JPN either.
Without taking aim at the true responsibles and make them pay, no durable solutions
Half solutions (bottom-up attitude), despite huge investment, not achieving decent targets…Is this tenable for tax payers of today and those of 2050-2100 who suffer the consequences? Is this at all tenable politically, economically and morally?

Should paradigm changes and radical departure takes place, it is possible to:

---stop it before 2C or any agreed temperature targets
---make polluters accountable and let them pay, the most cost effective solution…
---let market succeed and relieve governments from unjustified duty to intervene…
---provide last chance for the poorer to get out of energy poverty and poverty writ large
---shift from age-old North-South binary to the New United World for the poorest.

How paradigm should be changed? ….Assembly of Governments would legally :

---cap global emissions with the target (like 2℃) ensuring carbon budget,
---put collective property right on such budget,
---establish an upstream global carbon market,
---sell by auction the limited carbon budget as allowances,
---enforce global CO2 emissions to be done with allowances,
---earn new revenue from such sales,
---send them to governments in need, i.e., poorer countries (new built-in financing),
---establish a simple and effective compliance system to eliminate frauds.

It's simply like an upstream ETS extended from national to global context. ETS excels and benefits all players if done globally… ➜ **Global cap and global market**…easy to manage…effective price signal based on supply & demand…no price manipulations…

A quote: definitely we need "*fresh, outside-of-the-box ideas…This is a time for new proposals for future international climate policy architecture, not for incremental adjustments to the old pathway...".* Robert Stavins of Harvard…

➜ Current national reduction system is a Westphalian world where national interests militate against each other…could fail our climate battle…
➜Market (with safety net for poorer countries) could be a way to avoid such failure, save the planet and economies of the world…





④Mr. Daniel Klingenfeld



Growing consumption-based CO_2-Footprint



(Peters et al. PNAS 2011)

A Roadmap for 2015 as Major Outcome of Durban

COP17/CMP7
UNITED NATIONS
CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE 2011
DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA

„Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action"

- **Roadmap to craft a comprehensive agreement until 2015, taking effect in 2020**
- **Legal status to be determined**
- **The choice of policy instruments remains open**

What can be Called Success in 2015?

… another document to which all Parties can agree? – It depends!

- An agreement that binds the largest emitters, especially the fastest-growing ones
- An effective framework to bring about the global emissions peak by 2020 at the latest
- A long-term structure for reducing global emissions in line with the 2°C guard rail

The Role of Japan and Germany

- **Strengthen leadership in renewable energy deployment and energy efficiency strategies**
- **Role model for other countries to follow suit**

➡ **Very important – But not enough!**

Fairness and Physics – Create global structures to integrate the largest emitters and to bring about absolute global emission reductions

Thank you very much for your attention!

8．成　果

本フォーラムの成果としては以下の点があげられる。

①ドイツは EU27 カ国の中でも政治・経済の両面で主導的役割を示しており、EU を主導する立場にもある。今回、ドイツに於いて、現下の大きな課題である「日･EU FTA」、「福島後の今後のエネルギー政策」、「気候変動問題」について両国の有識者の間で忌憚のない意見交換が行われたことは第一の成果であった。

②第一セッションでは、冒頭に日独双方から FTA の現状、日 EU-FTA の展望について発表があり、その後出席者を交えて議論が行われた。主な意見としては、東アジアの経済統合は、重層的に進んでいる（ASEA+3、ASEAN+6、FTAAP)。日本は APEC 全域の FTA（FTAAP）構想への布石とされる環太平洋経済連携協定（TPP）への参加に向けて交渉に入る旨を表明した。これらの重層的な枠組みが相互に補完的で競争的なかたちで存在し、貿易や投資の自由化を進めていくことが重要である等の見解が示された。日・EU FTA については、ドイツでは自動車業界等を中心に反対も強いものの、EU と日本との FTA 交渉はインドや米国との FTA 交渉に比べれば難しいものではないだろうとの好意的な見方も示されるなど､ドイツ側からも賛成の声が多かった｡現在進められている“スコーピング協議”の進展に期待が示された。また、成長戦略としての投資、特に SMEs による投資の拡大を図るべく、グローバルな統一基準の設定の必要性などの課題が呈された。本セッションを通じ、日・EU FTA に関する両国の見解が慎重意見を含め明らかになったことは大きな成果で、これらは今後の交渉にも資すると考えられる。

第二セッションでは、日独のエネルギー政策の相違が明らかにされるとともに、ドイツ側の日本のエネルギー政策、とりわけ原子力発電政策に関する高い関心が示された。ドイツ側からは、ドイツ政府は脱原発の方針を表明し、2010 年 9 月には、2050 年までに総電力消費量に占める再生可能エネルギーの割合を 80％にするという新エネルギー戦略を掲げた。再生可能エネルギーの拡充は、エネルギー効率の向上、送電網の拡充、新たな蓄電技術の開発と並行して取り組まれるが、これらの技術開発にはコストが相当かかるため、民間の投資を呼び込む必要がある。日独は同様の状況に直面しているので、官民双方が協力していくことが重要である等の指摘があった。日本側からは、福島での原発事故を経験し、エネルギー政策の見直しが進んでいる。日本は石油やガスの大半を政情が不安定なホルムズ海峡周辺国からの輸入に頼り、風力や太陽光発電には限界があるという現実から、エネルギーの安定確保は大きな課題である。「エネルギー安全保障」を重視し、電源を最適に多様化する政策を進めつつ、安定した電力を確保するには、原子力発電も選択肢の一つであるという見解が示された。世界のエネルギー安全保障の観点からも、より重層的な

アプローチが必要で日独が協力していくことが重要であるとの指摘も示された。これらの議論は我が国の今後のエネルギー政策を立案する上でも大いに参考になると考える。

第三セッションでは、気候変動について議論されたが、とりわけ温暖化ガスの総排出量規制とその配分については活発に意見交換が行われ、日独双方の関係者に参考になったと思われる。まず、南アフリカ・ダーバンでの COP17（第 17 回国連気候変動枠組み条約締結国会議）について、京都議定書を延長（2012 年末の期限を延長）し、2020 年までに米国や中国など温暖化ガスの大排出国すべてが参加する新しい枠組みをつくることで合意した点で一応の成果をあげることができたとのコメントがあった。温暖化ガスの総排出量については、グローバルで規制（キャップ）する必要があり、そのためには中国やインド等の新興排出国をこの枠組みに取り込むことが重要だという見解で一致した。また、炭素取引を行うグローバル市場の創設が提唱され、「炭素の値付け」を各国単位ではなくグローバルで行えば、投資を呼ぶであろうとの見解が示された。また、温暖化対策に不可欠な要素として技術開発の必要性が指摘された。日独は環境技術の面で世界をリードする立場であるので、これらの意見は今後日独両国が「気候変動」面での政策を立案する際の大きな参考になると判断される。

③日本側出席者に実施したアンケートでは、「日本の原子力政策について、エネルギーの専門家（責任ある立場の方）が適切にドイツ側の聴衆にも説明されたことが時節柄意義深かったと思う」というコメントがあった。さらに、「貿易・投資のセッション（セッション 1）ではもう少し議論を煮詰める時間がほしかった」という意見や、「東アジア、アジア太平洋地域のことが必ずしも欧州では知られていないので、日本の役割を中心に議論できるフォーラムの開催を検討してほしい」という意見があった。これらのコメントは今後の事業運営の参考としたい。また、会議運営面については、「大変効率的に行われたと思う」「何も問題はなく、皆友好的で親切な対応であった」というコメントをいただき、会議の準備から当日の運営体制に亘り、ドイツ側共催団体の尽力もあり大変良いかたちで会議を実施することができたと考える。
弊財団では今後も「日欧の経済関係強化」のため、時宜にあったテーマを設定し本フォーラムを開催していきたい。

また、財団では成果の広報活動について、財団ホームページにおいてなるべく詳細な内容を掲載し、その成果を広く普及させるよう努めている。

9 . 共催団体紹介

＜日本側＞
財団法人　国際経済交流財団
Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

The Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) was established in July 1981 to deepen understanding between Japan and other countries through activities aimed at promoting economic and technological exchange. JEF commemorated its 30th anniversary in 2011.
With this goal in mind, JEF engages in a broad range of activities; it provides information about Japan and arranges venues to exchange ideas among opinion leaders from many countries in such fields as industry, government, academia and politics in order to build bridges for international communication and to break down the barriers that make mutual understanding difficult.

URL: http://www.jef.or.jp

＜ドイツ側＞
ドイツ外交評議会
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) has been Germany's national network for foreign policy since 1955.
As an independent, non-partisan, and nonprofit membership organization, think tank, and publisher, the DGAP takes an active part in the political decision-making process and promotes understanding of German foreign policy and international relations.
More than 2,400 members – among them renowned representatives from politics, business, academia, and the media – as well as more than 80 companies and foundations support the work of the DGAP.

The DGAP's goals are:
- to promote and contribute to the foreign policy debate in Germany
- to advise decision makers from politics, business, and civil society
- to inform the public on foreign policy questions/issues
- to strengthen the German foreign policy community
- to advance Germany's foreign affairs status in the world

URL: http://www.dgap.org

１０. 事務局

＜日本側＞

財団法人国際経済交流財団　Japan Economic Foundation(JEF)
住 所：〒 104-0061　東京都中央区銀座 5-15-8 時事通信ビル 11 階
ＴＥＬ：03- 5565-4824 FAX:　03-5565-4828
ＵＲＬ：http://www.jef.or.jp
担 当：理事　　業務担当　　斎藤　伸一
　　業務部交流事業課　　渡辺　昌子
　　業務部交流事業課　　丹羽　飛鳥

[業務運営委託先]
株式会社 JTB コミュニケーションズ
住 所：〒 141-8657　東京都品川区上大崎 2-24-9
ＴＥＬ：03-5434-8595　FAX：03-5434-8694
担 当：イベントコミュニケーション 1 局
　　プロデューサー　　嶋倉　麻子
　　黒木　桃子

＜ドイツ側＞

ドイツ外交評議会
German Council on Foreign Relations/ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. (DGAP)
住所：Rauchstraße 17/18, D-10787, Berlin, Germany
TEL ：+49 (0)30 25 42 31 26　FAX：+49 (0)30 25 42 31 16
URL ：http://www.dgap.org/
担当：Dr. Claudia Schmucker, Head of Program, Globalization and World Economy Program, DGAP
　　Mr. Stefan Dauwe, Managing Director of the DGAP Consulting GmbH

平成 24 年 3 月

財団法人 国際経済交流財団
JAPAN ECONOMIC FOUNDATION（JEF）