

other countries of the world, it is essential that Japan achieve a breakthrough on rice and then use this breakthrough to take the initiative in pressing the United States and European countries to liberalize their closed sectors too. So far, Japanese policy-making has seemed to be a

process of grudgingly moving inch by inch in response to pressure from the United States. For the future, it is essential that Japan effect the political and administrative reforms needed for it to take policy initiatives based on Japanese thinking and Japanese interests. ■

Yukitsugu Nakagawa is the executive director of the International Institute for Global Peace. He was formerly with the Bank of Japan and then the Nomura Research Institute from 1943 to 1988 as an economic and financial expert.

Perception-sharing

By Motoo Shiina

Now that the Cold War is over, many people are clamoring for a peace dividend. Yet the fact that no major wars have taken place over the last 45 years seems to me a dividend fully justifying the massive investment that has been made. To me, the question is not how to cut back on the investment but rather where and how we should invest now to continue to reap the dividend of peace.

There has been much talk of burden-sharing, responsibility-sharing, and other sharings to enable Japan to make an international contribution commensurate with its economic superpower status, including decision-sharing enabling Japan to take a greater part in making the decisions that affect the world's future. But even more important than and prerequisite to all of these other sharings is the idea of perception-sharing. It is imperative that Japan undertake to develop security perceptions that are at one with the rest of the world's.

The best security guarantee is to be found in creating conditions worldwide that discourage the exercise of military might. Very generally, military might is difficult to exercise in direct proportion to the size of the destructive force involved. To illustrate, many people are quick to brandish a knife when angry, but pushing the nuclear button compels a bit more thought. The deployment of opposing forces is, however, also a factor in the relationship between the destructive force

and the ease with which it is used. For example, with a balance in strategic weaponry, the threat of nuclear retaliation makes it difficult to use even small-scale military force, which is why the Cold War structures acted as a deterrent to the use of even conventional military force.

In a sense, the Gulf War was one indication that it is becoming increasingly easy to resort to the use of military force as Cold War structures collapse. During the Cold War era, the world was divided into two camps, one headed by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union, and there was little choice for the other states but to align themselves with one of these two superpowers. Now that the Cold War has ended, this structure has collapsed, at least in our minds, and states are less constrained by superpower considerations.

Given this, what are the security parameters in the post-Cold War era? While vigorous efforts must be made in arms control and disarmament, such negotiations are, in a sense, technical issues having more to do with numbers than with reality. Arms control and disarmament efforts alone are not enough, and it is clear that we must make an effort to conceive new security guarantees—especially in that there is greater potential for disorder when we revert to regional alliances and other multifaceted structures such as were suppressed during the Cold War era.

While many people think first of the

United Nations in this connection, it is very important to remember that the member states' military forces have a residual legitimacy. What this means is that there is an inexorable link between the national structure and military force, as has been made painfully explicit in the socialist countries. Unless this is kept firmly in mind, it may be impossible to hope to resolve all of our security concerns with the United Nations alone.

Second is the need for deterrence in the cause of world peace. As the Gulf War demonstrated, sophisticated technology is needed to create a credible deterrent. It would not be realistic to expect to achieve this within the United Nations, where many different countries with many different agendas gather.

Regardless of whether these new security guarantees are developed into a formal institution or whether they are left an informal structure, it is imperative that the countries with the greatest world presence (e.g. the G-7 countries) take the lead in any new security initiative. Japan should also be willing to accept a role within this initiative in line with its perception-sharing. ■

Motoo Shiina is the president of the Policy Study Group. He served as a member of the House of Representatives from Oct. 1979 to Jan. 1990.