

# Peace-keeping, Peace-making, Peace-building

By Hisao Iwashima

**A**lthough I have never been professionally involved with the United Nations peace-keeping operations (PKO), I did spend the years 1968 to 1970 in the United States doing research on international political communication as a Fulbright Senior Research Fellow, and it was then that I became interested in the emerging field of peace research.

It was about this same time that I joined the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). Seeing in the IPRA newsletter that the International Peace Academy (IPA) of New York planned to hold a four-week peace seminar in Helsinki in 1971, I signed up for it and spent a month studying peace under the midnight sun. This was the start of my PKO connection. The IPA Helsinki seminar was attended by about 60 people from half as many countries, including the Scandinavian countries, Canada and other countries that were PKO participants. It was a month of very specific, directed activities including simulations and game theory, and I found it very informative.

At the time, there was virtually no interest in peace studies in Japan, either

within the defense establishment or elsewhere in the government. However, I retained an interest in this field and continued collecting materials on peace-keeping as a possible future role for Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) all of the time I was at the National Defense College (now the National Institute for Defense Studies) until my retirement in March 1987 as director of the War History Department.

In March 1973, I published "A Thought on Peace Strategy: Peace-keeping, Peace-making and Peace-building" in the *Journal of Defense* (Vol. 11 No. 3/4). This essay was well received, and my views remain essentially the same as they were then. I spent July and August 1975 on a Ford Foundation grant that enabled me to study at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and I also had the opportunity (August to October 1987) to teach at the University of Stockholm's Pacific-Asia Study Center, during which period I took the time to visit the Swedish Directorate of Peace-keeping and to study the Nordic Peace-keeping Standby Forces.

Likewise, when I was sent by the Japan Foundation to lecture at a number of

Canadian universities in March 1976, I took the opportunity to collect PKO research materials and to discuss PKO issues with the Peace and International Security Research Institute and other scholars there. The comparison of the Nordic model and the Canadian model was most instructive. I have long thought that the Japanese SDF might someday be involved in PKO and have thought long and hard about whether it would be better for the SDF to be involved as SDF brigades (the Canadian model) or as a separate organization of individual volunteers (the Nordic model).

## Building a climate for peace

The media are now full of stories and analytical articles about PKO, but I feel that they are only discussing one small part of the PKO agenda. To me, peace-keeping has to include (i) peace-keeping to put out and contain the immediate conflicts, (ii) peace-making aimed at social stability in the region over the medium term, and (iii) peace-building based on long-term perspectives and solutions. It is only the first of these that is being discussed in Japan, which makes for a very shortsighted debate over interim measures. My own studies have convinced me that the rest of the world is at least also thinking of medium-term peace-making for social stability, if not the longer-term goal of peace-building.

As a result, the rest of the world is coming to realize that military activity by military personnel is not in itself enough. Military force is needed, of course, but it must be supplemented by, or even supplemental to, health-care specialists, economists, educators, police, negotiators and perhaps even religious leaders to minister to the spirit. There is increasing recognition worldwide that PKO cannot concentrate only on achieving and maintaining ceasefires but must also be aware of the longer-term needs to create a climate conducive to peace, to reform soci-



Photo: Teisuo Sakuma

Participation of the SDF in United Nations peace-keeping operations is one of the most controversial issues being debated among the Japanese people.

ety, and to revolutionize the warring parties' thinking. This is the kind of training that must be developed and provided not only to the military personnel but to all PKO personnel.


Although space considerations make it impossible for me to explain this in full theoretical detail, the relationship among the different means needed for peace-keeping and the three time frames that they serve is shown in Fig. 1. As seen, the short-term impact is provided by visible means, and the means gradually become less visible as the time frame grows longer. Specifically, the immediate impact is achieved with a show of strength, while the medium-term impact relies on such symbolic means as print and visual media and the long-term impact derives from music, philosophy, religion and other aspects that make themselves felt subconsciously.

In the short term, military force is frequently used to contain violence, but in the medium term, we have economic advances, technological progress, foreign policy, and mediation and other external forces playing the lead role in creating a climate in which conflicts do not escalate into warfare and in which law and order can be promoted to stabilize the livelihoods of the people involved. Finally, in the long-term peace-building effort, we should continue a determined and long-range effort to change people's approaches and to turn their minds toward peace through cultural and philosophical means.

The Nordic and Canadian authorities seem agreed that PKO cannot be successful or even sustainable, even if it does succeed in temporarily quelling the disturbance, unless these medium- and long-range means are also brought to bear in keeping with a coherent philosophy of peace.

In effect, the time is long past when military professionals could impose peace with their military capabilities and organizational skills alone. Far from leading to stability, military-based PKO can all too easily exacerbate the conflict and prove counterproductive. It is clear that PKO must not be something imposed from outside but must be prepared to "go

Fig. 1 Relationship Among PKO Means and Time Frames



local" and to live with the people until they see peace as the natural state of affairs.

### Misguided Diet debate

Looking at the debate in the Japanese Diet in light of this knowledge about PKO, I get the feeling that the Diet members have been so preoccupied with arguing about legal and technical details that they have not had the time or inclination to discuss the important issues. Even though a number of prominent Diet members have gone overseas on inspection missions, the results make me wonder where they have gone and what they have seen. This is the same wretched political system that makes it so difficult to make progress on so many other things.

First is that the debate over the PKO and the need to take part in PKO did not arise from within Japan but arose because of a shallow desire to win friends overseas by contributing to the international community not just in terms of money and materials but also in personnel terms.

Second is that the tail was wagging the dog and that the whole debate started not with a discussion of what PKO are and why Japan should or should not take part but with a focus on whether or not the SDF should take part as SDF units.

Third is that the PKO legislation was submitted to the Diet with the expecta-

tion that it would be held over at best and be defeated at worst. It was submitted not for its own value but as a bargaining chip in the jockeying for power among the different parties and among the different factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This is the same thing that happened to the legislation for political reform, and, as expected or planned, the House of Representatives Special Committee on International Peace Cooperation decided on October 3 to hold the PKO legislation over for the session that convened in early November. And there is no guarantee what will happen on its next outing. The media have discussed the ins and outs of the Diet debate at great length, and I think the general flow can be summarized as shown in Table 1.

Table 2 gives the results of an opinion survey done by the *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper this June. There has been a conspicuous increase in the number of people inclined toward using the SDF for PKO, even though many of those who hold this view qualify it with the stipulation that it be for non-military support or unarmed activities. The responses are even more affirmative in polls conducted by the conservative newspapers.

While some people would explain this shift in Japanese opinion as an indication that the Japanese public is becoming more aware of international concerns and considerations, I believe it would be more realistic to see this as a manifesta-

Table 1 Political Positions on the PKO Legislation

	Constitutional issue	Use of arms	Civilian control	Conditions
<b>Government position</b>	PKO participation is compatible with the Constitution's principles of peace and international harmony. Participation is fully constitutional so long as it is premised on the non-use of force, etc.	Approval for the use of pistols, rifles, automatic weapons and armored carriers as necessary for self-defense. Use is at the individual's discretion, but may be subject to orders in some cases.	Reports to the Diet required when deployment plans are drawn up, altered, and completed. Full attention to be paid to the discussion accompanying said reports. Reporting requirement ensures civilian control.	Commanding officer on the scene able to terminate operations at his discretion if the cease-fire breaks down. Prime minister may order withdrawal if it looks like the cease-fire will not be re-established soon.
<b>Social Democratic Party</b>	Current government position contradicts traditional government position that there are many constitutional barriers to participating in PKO.	Unclear distinction between the use of arms and the use of force. Using arms to defend non-Japanese PKO people would be collective defense and hence unconstitutional.	Is ridiculous to think of sending SDF overseas with just a report to the Diet and not even getting the Diet's approval. The government's position is a clear attempt to evade civilian control.	Procedures for withdrawal are unclear. Would it really be acceptable for only the SDF to withdraw in case of danger? Cannot approve dispatch of a PKF (peace-keeping force) to Cambodia.
<b>Komeito</b>	PKO participation is consistent with the desire to gain an honored place in international society as set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution.	Should be explicit on who decides on the use of arms under what circumstances. Should also clearly specify the arms to be carried.	Civilian control can be maintained even if Diet approval is not required so long as the Five Principles are enacted into law and the reporting requirement is rigorously respected.	Should be explicit procedures and lines of authority for withdrawal. Neighboring countries are anxious about Japanese PKO participation. Should take this opportunity to apologize clearly for wartime wrongs.
<b>Communist Party</b>	There is nothing in the Preamble to the Constitution that would justify sending the SDF overseas. This is a clear violation of the Diet resolutions forbidding sending the SDF overseas.	The United Nations secretary general has even approved the use of bazookas and mortars. It is clear that PKO will involve military activity.		Although the government promises to withdraw if the cease-fire collapses, the consent of the principals is lost, and neutrality is breached. These are also the conditions for U.N. withdrawal. The government promise is meaningless.
<b>Democratic Socialist Party</b>	PKO participation is consistent with the Constitution's advocacy of international harmony.	Approve the minimum use of arms for self-defense, etc.	Enacting the Five Principles into law and requiring reports to the Diet are not sufficient safeguards. Diet approval must be required. Cannot give the bureaucracy a blank check.	If the SDF are going to make an international contribution, the SDF Law should be amended to include this.

Source: *Tokyo Shimbun* newspaper, September 27, 1991

tion of the search for a new role for the SDF now that the Soviet threat has receded in the wake of the Cold War's end. Yet this is all the more reason that it is so important that the PKO—both the concept and its implications—be discussed in the Diet as Japan's highest organ of state power. And the people have a responsibility to require this of their representatives.

## The job ahead

Finally, I would like to go out onto a limb and suggest the kind of PKO that I think is needed—a suggestion that I make on the assumption that a national consensus can be molded in favor of participation and ignoring the clash of partisan interests in the Diet. Basically, I favor the Nordic model and think that Japanese PKO cooperation should be by a separate organization independent of the SDF.

When there is a special need for SDF personnel to take part, they should take part only as individual volunteers. The organization and training should both be multinational.

There are a number of reasons why I have come to this conclusion. First is that the SDF were created with the mission of deterring Soviet aggression and, despite the fiction that the SDF are not a military force, are a military force—a force that seems to be edging increasingly toward the same kind of mindset that pervaded the Imperial Army, Navy and Air Force of old. It is thus essential that the new PKO force be created as a separate organization, a multilateral organization, and an all-volunteer organization so that the force can be fully aware of its PKO mission and objectives.


Second is that, even though it would be advantageous from the command and

communication perspective to have SDF units take part as PKO units, the real imperative for PKO forces is not that they be able to act as well-ordered teams but that the individual members be able to exercise wise judgment and to take appropriate initiatives. SDF forces trained not to do anything unless they are ordered by a commanding officer are perhaps the very opposite of what the PKO needs.

Third, most of the areas where the PKO are active are places on the fringes of the Third World—places that are singularly unsuited to the SDF with their drive to have the most sophisticated and most modern weaponry available. This SDF shortcoming can be alleviated by making it a multilateral force.

Fourth, the tradition has been that the superpowers do not take part in PKO. Thus it would seem reasonable that a semi-superpower such as Japan would

Table 2 Results of Public Opinion Poll on PKO



Note: Figures above do not include "others and no answer" responses. Source: Asahi Shimbun newspaper, June 19, 1991

also be excluded from participation. This is especially so in the case of participation by Japanese military units. The idea of sending the SDF overseas for PKO work was a bad idea to start with. Not quelling the disturbances that they would be sent to quell, they could only arouse new anxieties and animosities among Japan's neighbors.

Fifth, if there is an insistent demand that the SDF take part as units—which there has not been so far and which I cannot see there being in the future—it would be unfair to the SDF to say that they may not use military force, that they would have to withdraw if fighting started, or otherwise to so hedge their actions that they could not be effective and would be better off not taking part at all. Why send them if they are not going to be allowed to do anything? If you are going to send the SDF, they should be sent with the full realization that they are going into dangerous territory and that some of them

may not come back alive. At the same time, it is essential that provision be made to care for the families of people who lose their lives for peace so that there are no bitter recriminations and regrets afterward. To do less would be the height of irresponsibility.

In effect, I am saying that the PKO debate taking place in the Diet is a game of political thrust and parry totally divorced from reality, and I fully expect the jousting to stop once the international situation stabilizes.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about a pet idea of mine. There is no reason why the PKO participants from Japan should have to be young people. There are many older people such as myself who would be willing to serve and who could contribute to the PKO mission. Such a "silver battalion" of retired SDF personnel would be very much in keeping with the times, and it has much to commend it. Older people have more experience

**What do you think about the possibility of sending SDF personnel overseas?** (Select the one of following answers that is closest to your thinking.)

SDF personnel should not be sent overseas.	21%
Should only be sent overseas for disaster relief and other non-military missions.	46%
Approve their serving under United Nations command and other U.N. military missions.	23%
Approve their taking part in multilateral military missions such as the Gulf War	5%
Others and no answer	5%

**Japan has sent minesweepers to clear the Persian Gulf. Do you think this was a good decision?**

Good decision	65%
Do not think so	24%
Others and no answer	11%

**Do you think that sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf generates anxiety in Asia that it may lead to Japanese troops being sent overseas?**

Generates anxiety	48%
Does not generate anxiety	40%
Others and no answer	12%

**The United Nations' PKO includes peace-keeping forces, teams to monitor cease-fires and election supervision teams. What do you think of Japan's taking part in these activities?** (Select the one of following answers that is closest to your thinking.)

Should be limited to election supervision and other non-military activities	42%
Should also be able to monitor cease-fires, including carrying arms	12%
Should be armed units taking part in peace-keeping operations	17%
Should not take part in any PKO activities	17%
Others and no answer	12%

**Are you in favor of having the SDF take some part in U.N. PKO activities?**

For	50%
Against	40%
Others and no answer	10%

and often have better judgment, and I think they could do just as much, if not more, to advance PKO ends.

Speaking from my own experience, I graduated from the Naval Academy and served as a professional soldier. After the war, I was a national security expert with the defense establishment. I have also studied at the University of Tokyo Law Faculty under the postwar Constitution and developed a legal mindset. Right now, I am teaching international politics at the university level and consider myself a "civil-military specialist." Although I am 65 years old, my faculties are unimpaired and I would be glad to serve with a "silver battalion" in the cause of peace. ■

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